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ABSTRACT
EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY:
ITS THEORY, RESEARCH, CLINICAL PRACTICE,
AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.
by
JERRY L. JENNINGS 
University of New Hampshire, May 1984
Experiential psychotherapy evolved historically 
from Carl Rogers' client-centered approach. Traditionally, 
client-centered researchers have been determined to find 
better ways' to experimentally study and understand 
complex subjective experience and personality change.
By the mid-1950's, Rogers increasingly appreciated the 
essential process nature of the therapeutic experience.
This marked a vital theoretical shift from an established 
"static content" view of personality to the "new process 
conception."
Meanwhile, coming from an educational background in 
existential philosophy and phenomenology, Eugene Gendlin 
contributed the unique process theory called "experiencing." 
Gendlin advanced the "new process conception" by clarifying 
the crucial distinction between direct experiencing as it 
is immediately given in awareness, and conceptualizations
of that experiencing. Gendlin accurately described the 
distinct bodily-felt awareness that characterizes 
consciousness, and which encompasses everything that we 
know about a given situation in a single, implicitly 
meaningful, bodily-felt sense. This "felt-meanirigfulness" 
implicitly contains all the values, attitudes, memories, 
and perceptions relevant for the individual in the given 
life situation.
Gendlin realized that the essence of effective client- 
centered therapy was an accurate listening response that 
helped the client to stay closely in tune with his or her 
on-going process of experiencing. Gendlin also participated 
in the client-centered Process Scale research, which 
consistently found that clients who displayed a high degree 
of experiential focusing on immediate feelings were those 
who eventually succeeded in therapy. Consequently, Gendlin 
elaborated his philosophy of experiencing and sought ways 
of directly facilitating this "focusing" process in 
therapy. He developed the therapy procedure called 
"focusing" as well as principles for "experientializing" 
the use of conceptual knowledge in various forms of 
psychotherapy.
In addition to demonstrating the theoretical necessity 
of process variables, Gendlin implemented them as measure- 
able variables in experimental research on therapy. A 
critical review of this research, which was largely 
abandoned by Gendlin in the mid-i960's , shows that it
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suffered from serious methodological problems. Hence 
there is little convincing experimental evidence that 
"experiencing plays a central role in positive psycho­
therapeutic outcome." However, there are alternative 
philosophical and phenomenological grounds for the 
justification of "experiencing," and some recommendations 
are also made for improving experimental research on 
experiential psychotherapy.
INTRODUCTION
The tody is wiser than all our concepts, for it 
totals them all and much mere. It totals all the 
circumstrances we sense. We qet this tctallinq, if we 
let a felt sense for m in inward space (Gendlin, 197Nb, 
p. 2 36).
This dissertation is organized as a progression of four 
chapters. The first ch a p t e r  introduces Eugene G e n d l i n ’s 
experiential pheromencloqy. The second c hapter explains how 
this basic philosophy of human experience is iistituted in 
the practice cf psychotherapy. The third c hapter outlines 
the historical development cf expe r i e n t i a l  psychotherapy 
from its origins in Carl R o g e r s ’ clie n t - c e n t e r e d  approach, 
and it examines the exp e r i m e n t a l  research that Gendlin 
conducted in support cf the imp o r t a n c e  of "experiencinq" in 
psychotherapy. This critical review of the experimental 
research leads to the fourth chapter, which explores the 
relation between experimental research and experiential 
psychotherapy. The c o n t e n t s  of these four chapters are 
briefly summarized below:
The first chapter consists of an introduction to the 
basic perspective and descriptive terms cf Gendlin's 
p h e n o m e n o l c q i c a 1 a p p r o a c h  (Section 1). G e n d l i n  holds that 
human living is an on-gcinq process of bcdily-felt 
’’experiencing" or ’’felt meaninq." He points out that there 
is a distinctive, ever-present, "bo dily felt" quality of any
-1-
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qiven moment cf conscious awareness [Section 2). Such "felt 
meaninq" is distinquished frcm other sorts of "feelinq," 
such as emotion, pain, cr localized visceral sensations
(Section 5). This experienced "felt meaninq" encompasses 
everythinq that we knew about a qiven situation in a sinqle 
bodily-felt sense. In ether words, " e x p e r i e n c i n q ," or "felt 
meaninq," implicitly contains all the relevant values, 
perceptions, memories, attitudes, and social/cultural 
raeaninqs in a qiven life situation, and this is all "known" 
as it is "felt." This notion of "implicit meaninq" replaces 
the dominatinq conception in psycholoqy that posits an 
"unconscious mind" as a storehouse of repressed thcuqhts and 
experiences (Section 3). Another contributicn of this 
phenomenoloqical approach is the descriptive term "direct 
reference" (Section 6). "Direct reference" refe rs to the
experienced fact that people can sometimes point to, and
focus on, meaninqful c o n c retely-sensed phencmenoloqical 
data, and discern siqnificant chanqes in these data, without 
explicit conceptualizations of what these felt data are 
[Section 4) .
Gendlin's phenomenolooical approach, which is qrounded 
in a wider philosophy of life, has siqnificant imp lications 
for theory and practice in psycholoqy and psychotherapy.
Chapter IT explores how this philosophy can be translated 
into a systematic method of conductinq psychotherapy. 
Specifically, it calls for a new "experiential" approach, 
which makes this felt experiencinq process the central focus
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of treatment. Gendlin has developed a qeneral procedure 
called "focusing" to facilitate this crucial experiencinq 
process [Section 7). He has also laid out how other schools 
of therapy can be ” e x p e r i e n t i a l i z e d .’’ This means that the
i
theoretical concepts, techniques and methods of various 
therapies car te used effectively as lcnq as these concepts
are anchored in the on-qoinq experiential felt-sensinq of
the individual client in the imme diate moment [Section 8). 
Furthermore, based on his own clinical experiences, Gendlin 
recoqnized that the "essence and crux" cf R o q e r s 1
client-centered the rapy is  a special heedful listeninq 
response-- fost.eninq responses that help the client stay 
closely in tune with his or her immediate felt experiencinq. 
Gendlin focused more precisely on this responding by 
encouraqinq the constant inward checkinq of accurate verbal 
responses with the experiencinq process of the client 
[Section 91 .
Chapter III is crqanized as a qeneral historical
exploration cf the client-centered oriqins of experiential 
psychotherapy and its supporting experimental research. 
Althouqh the basic ideas cf G e n d l i n ’s experiential 
phenomenoloqy represent traditional issues in phenomenoloqy 
and existential philosophy, the most immediate historical 
influence cn G e n d l i n ’s psychcloqica1 ideas was Carl R o q e r ’s 
client-centered therapy. As a doctoral student, Gendlin 
became interested in seme of the theoretical problems that 
Carl Roqers faced in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 ’s. Ro q e r s  and his
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client- centeied researchers wanted to better understand and 
scientifically study the essential fluid nature of the
therapeutic process ir. its full richness. This concern with 
change and flow in the t h e r apeutic experience was the
driving fcrce behind the " new process c o n c e p t i o n 11 in 
client-centered theory (Section 12). Specifically, Rogers 
was perplexed by the paradox cf hew a client's feelings can 
change and emerge even thouqh they are supposedly not "in" 
incongruent awareness (Section 12). Gendlin's answer to
this problem was to introduce terms that refer to
exp eriencinq as an aware feelinq containing i m plicit meaning 
(Sec ti on 17) .
Durinq the appro ximate period 1955-1962, Gerdlin worked 
closely with Rogers and the client-c entered movement, and he 
made many practical and theoretical contributions durinq 
this time. In particular, Gendlin (1962a) argued that 
traditional static, "content" variables of psychclcqy cannot 
adequately handle the on-going process nature of human 
experience in therapy. Instead Ge ndlin demonstrated the 
theoretical necessity of using process variables, and he 
showed how they could be implemented as measureable 
variables in experinertal research. n n f c r t u n a t e l y , the bulk 
of this research suffered from serious methcdoloqical 
problems (Section 13).
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Gendlin also c o n t ributed to the development of the
"Process S c a l e ” research in clie n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy (Section
14). The Process Scale methodolocy allowed researchers' to 
measure the level cf client ’’e x p e r i e n c i n q ” by observinq and 
ratinq tape-recorded excerpts of therapy sessions. The 
Process Scale ratinqs were based on a system cf specified 
behavioral cbservaticns of clie nt verbal respondinq. This 
experimental research made the nonuraental findinq that
successful cases in therapy could be accurately predicted in 
the earliest sessions based on their "level of e x p e r i e n c i n q ” 
(as measured by the Process Scale). Those clients who 
displayed a manner of exp eriencinq c haracterized by focusinq 
on immediate feeliras and felt meaninq were those who
succeeded in therapy. Based cn these consistent findinqs, 
Gendlin became interested in pursuinq the i m p l i cations of 
the Process Scale research. In th i s  reqard, Gendlin studied 
whether experiential fccusinq is a trait or learnable skill, 
and beqan developinq ways of teachinq "focusirq" (Section
15). Eventually, by the early 1960*s, Gendlin had diverqed 
from the client-centered movement to actively pursue the 
many philosophical, practical, and theoretical implications 
of this criqinal quidinq idea cf " e x p e r i e n c i n q ” (Section
16) .
The fourth chapter examines the relation between 
experimental research and experiential psychotherapy. It
establishes the vital im portance of theoretical clarity
about what "really” happens in psychotherapy by carefully
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distinquishina R o q e r s ’ construct of "experience" from
G e n d l i n ’s descriptive term "experiencinq" [Section 17).
Gendlin notes that most psycholoqial theories, like Roqerian 
theory, lack terms that refer directly to  experiencinq, and 
lack research v a riables that directly measure the
experiential process in therapy. In contrast, G endlin  
established theoretical c larity and the need for terms that 
refer directly to experiencinq, and he deve loped several 
viable means cf scientifically measurinq experiential
process events [Section 18). However, it is arqued that 
there is nc stronq direct experimental support for the 
hypothesized crucial role of experiencinq in "effective" 
therapy because of serious meth odoloqical problems with
G e n d l i n ’s experimental research.
Furthermore, there is a more fundamental problem with 
the basic co rrelational desiqn typically used in G e n d l i n ’s 
studies, which s e verely limits concl usions about the
important role of experiencinq in positive therapeutic
outcome [Section 18). The shortcominq of the correlational 
paradiqm in G e n d l i n ’s experimental research is addressed. 
Then, based on an understandinq of the strenqths and 
weaknesses cf G e n d l i n ’s experimental research (Section 19), 
a qeneral experimental research strateqy is suqqested, which 
may offer stronqer direct support for the role of 
experiencinq in p s y c h o therapy (Section 20). Finally, there 
is a discussion cf the issue of whether the experimental 
iustificaticn of expe riencinq is necessar y. It is concluded
Paqe 7
that there are a l t e r n a t i v e  philosophical and practical 
p h e n o m e n o l c q i c a 1 qrcunds for the verification of
experiencinq as a crucial process in psychotherapy (Section 
2 1) .
CHAPTER I -
GEN DL IB'S EXPERIENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY:
A FRE-THEORETIC AI DESCRIPTION OF HEM AN EXPERIENCING.
1• Gen e ral I n t r o d u c t i o n .
Euqene Gendlin has been describinq and resea rchinq the 
phenomenon cf human experiencinq for over twenty years. 
Altoqether his exte nsive work includes over fifty published 
articles and books (see Gendlin b i b l i o q r a p h y ) , and he has 
offered valuable i n siohts into the nature and study of human 
experiencinq frcu several distinct perspectives:
—  as a n he r.ome n o l o q i c a l l y - o r i e n t ed t h ilo s o p h e r : 
Gendlin, 1962a; 1664a: 1964c; 1965a, h, c; 1966b; 1967c; 
1973a; 1973b; 1977; 1978-1979; 1982; 1983.
—  a s a practitioner speaking on therapeutic 
Efocedures and aethcds: Gendlin, 1964b; 19 66b; 196 8b;
1969a; 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1978; 1979; 1981;
Gendlin ard Olsen, 1970.
' -8-
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— as an e m p i rical psychologist and researcher; 
Gendlin, 1961a; 1962b; Gendlin and Berlin, 1961; Gendlin 
and Shlien, 196 1; Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien, 1960; 
Gendlin, Eeebe, Cassens, Klein, and Oberlander, 1968; 
Roqers, Gendlin, Kiesler and Truax, 1967,
—  aj an advocate o f new research app r o a c h es to 
p s y c hot herapy: Gerdlin, 1 957; 1961a, b; 1969a; 1 973; 
Gendlin, Beebe, Cassens, Klein, and Oberlander, 1968.
—  a_§ .an a d vocate of nej theo r y in psyc h otherapy; 
Gendlin 1957; 1961a; 1962a; 1964a; 1966b; 1967a; 1969a;
1973; 1979.
—  as a co a men tat c-r on the p r o fes s i on ; Gendlin, 
1966b; 1968a; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1979; 1981; Gendlin
and Beebe, 1968a; Gendlin and Eychlax, 1970; Gendlin, 
Kelly, Faulinaitus and Spaner, 1966; Bookbinder, Gendlin 
and Pearscn, 1963; Gendlin, Diesenhaus, Oberlander and 
Pearson, 1967; Ger.dlin and Glaser, 1973.
— as a l e a d er in the area of sc h i zop h r e n i a . 
commenting on; the nature of the illness and its 
treatment (Gendlin, 1962c; 1966 ; 1972) ; the practice of
therapy with schizophrenics (Gendlin, 196 1b; 1963a;
1964b; 1966; 1972; Gen dlin and Geist, 1963); and
conductinq research in the area (Gendlin 1962b; 1963a; 
1966) .
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To some extent, G e n d l i n ’s prolific writinq makes it 
hard to find a point of departure in presentinq his
philosophy and psycholoqy. Yet his broadly based efforts  
center around a core of fundamental ideas. I believe the
foundation stcne of his approach is the notion of
’’experiential felt s e n s e . ” In some ways, this notion seems 
inconqruous with the usual ways psycholoqists view
experience, but this does not mean that it is a complex 
conception that is difficult to comprehend. On the 
contrary, Gendlin has successfully communicated this 
perspective to l a y p e r s o n s  untrained in philosophy or 
scientific psycholoqy in his popular book Foe usi n g (Gendlin, 
1931), with self-help instructional tapes (Gendlin, 1978), 
and with fccusinq traininq workshops, and "C h a c q e s ” qroups 
across the country (Gendlin, 1979; Gendlin and Hendricks, 
1972; Gendlin and Glaser, 1973). For Gendlin, experiential 
felt-sensinq is not an abstract idea but rather an
accurately descriptive term for the nature cf immediate
\
qiven experiencinq. Felt sensing is somethinq directly 
available tc any individual, and Gendlin (1965a, 1967a) 
holds that its " t r u t h ” can be established by clearly 
beholdinq and a d e quately describinq the phenomenon of 
experiencinq. This is the aim cf his experiential 
phenomenoloqy (Gendlin, 1962a, 1973a).
rhis openinq chapter will be devoted tc G e n d l i n ’s 
phenomenolcqical task of describinq what human experiencing 
is like and introducing his descriptive t e r m inology for it.
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For Gendlin, this endeavor is ” p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , " meaninq 
that it is crucial to heqin with a descriptive cj a r i f i c ation 
of the immediate nature of experiencinq before formulatinq 
theories about the stru cture of human personality and 
b e h a v i o r .
2. The C o n c ept of ” Felt S e n s i n g . ”
In the fcllowinq quote, Gendlin describes what a ” felt 
sense” is to his lay readers. His aim here is not to 
introduce "lust a n o t h e r  theory" about human behavior, which 
the reader could accept or reqect as a new way cf viewinq 
the world. Father, he wants tc esta blish a convincinq 
"pre-theo r e t i c a l ” d e s c ription cf human experiencinq that the 
reader must ackncwledqe as completely accurate tc his or her 
own e x p erience of the world. Therefore his approach is to 
describe the nature cf exp eriencinq [which is common to all 
people) in such a way that the reader can reccanize this 
same process i r. himself, and say "yes, that is how I 
experience the w o r l d . ”
A felt sense is not a mental experience but a 
physical one. Physical. a bodily awareness of a 
situation or person or event. An internal aura that 
en compasses everythinq you feel and know about the qiven 
subiect at a qiven time—  encompasses it and 
communicates it tc you all at once rather than detail by 
detail. Think of it as... a biq round feelinq.
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A felt sense d o e s n ’t ccue tc you in the form of 
thoughts or words or other separate units, but as a 
single (though cften puzzling and very complex) bodily 
feeling (Gendlin, 1981, pp. 32-33).
In this quote, Gendlin is calling attenticn tc the fact 
that th ere is a distinct and essential ’’bodily f e l t ” qua lity 
in any given moment of human awareness, When he stresses 
the ’’p h y s ic a 1” quality of a felt sense, Gendlin is 
emphasizing that a w areness is always charact erized by this 
ever-present singular ’’bodily f e l t ” quality. For Gendlin, 
the ’’me n t a l ” ideas, thouqhts, and perceptions we hav e are 
not our immediate experiencinq. Rather felt sensing is the 
qround for any wcrds cr thoughts we may have. Words and 
ideas are mediate fcrmulaticns ari sing from our immediate 
bodily-felt experiencing cf the world. This e xplains why it 
is true that we can already know what we are aoing to say 
before we have the words to express it. At any qiven 
moment, in any situation, conscious awareness is experienced 
as a single aura of bodily feeling, a full and round 
sensation. This experiencinq has a distinctive and unique 
"s h a p e ” at any given moment. But the shape or "neaninq" of 
a felt sense cannot be mentally deciphered or labeled by the 
person, because e x p e r i e n c i n q  is not a pattern or a 
collection cf discrete units cf information. A felt sense 
must be "met" or "allowed to show itself” via the 
through-the-body route which Gendlin calls "experi ential 
focusing” (described in Section 7).
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Gendlin holds that we can directly attend tc cur ’’felt 
sensing" ic any given moment. It is always "there for us," 
with or without our k nowing "what it is," and it is always 
open to formulation into explicit meaning. In ether words, 
experiencing is an on-going process of " im p 1 icit felt 
meaning" (discussed in Section 3) , wh'ich is the basis of our 
explicit wcrds and con c e p t s  [i.e. understanding) atout the 
world. This is noted in the following guote from Gendlin 
[1962 a, pp. 11-13):
TExperiencing) is something so simple, so easily 
available to every person, that at first its very
simplicity makes it hard to point tc. Another term for 
it is "felt meaning," or "feeling." However, "feeling" 
is a word usually used for specific c o n t e n t s —  for this 
or that feeling, emotion, cr tcne, for feeling good, or
had, or blue, or pretty fair. But regardless of the
many charges in what we feel — that is to say, really, 
how we feel—  there always is the concretely present 
flow of feeling. At any moment we can individually and 
privately direct our atte ntion inward, and when we do 
that, there it is. Of course, we have this or that 
specific idea, wish, emotion, perception, word, or
thought, but we always ha v e  concrete feeling, an inward
sensing whose nature is broader. It is a concrete mass 
in the sense that it is "there" for us. It is not at 
all vaaue in its being there. It may be vague only in
that we may not know what it is. He can put cnly a few
aspects cf it intc words. The mass itself is always 
something there, no matter what we say "it is." Our
definiticrs, our knowing "what it is," are symbols that 
specify aspects of it, "parts" of it, as we say. 
Whether we name it, divide it, cr net, there it is... 
This inward referent [always this or that concrete 
aspect ycu attend to) is what I term "experiencing."
Notice, it is always there for you. It may not 
always be clearly definable. In fact, when you pay 
attention ycu can notice that it is really never iust 
any definable guality or tcne or content. It can always 
be further differentiated and further aspects cf i t  can 
bo specified.
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This quotation provides an excellent description of 
what Gendlin terms "exneriencinq" or "experiential felt 
s ensinq," and it is used here for definitional purposes. at 
the same time, several important issues are implicated in 
this definition. These issues will, be "unpacked" and 
addressed in subsequent sections, beqinninq with the notion 
of "felt meaninq" or "implicit meaninq" in the next section.
3. The Concept cj "Tmpiicit M e a ni ng . "
Gendlin (1964a) has developed the idea of "implicit 
meaninq" as an a l t e rnative to the problematic concept of 
"unconscious awareness," which is presently sc widespread in 
psycholoqy (Gendlin, 1962a). This well-established 
traditional approach tc personality theory postulates that 
there are masses of "known" thoughts and contents that are 
beinq actively repressed or blocked from consciousness. 
There are two fundam ental mistakes with this theoretical 
approach, which Gen dlin (1964a) calls "the repression 
paradiqm" aEd "the content paradiqm." The rep ression 
.Eatadijgm makes the mistake of positing experiences as 
contents, which are "repressed" (Freud), "denied to 
awareness" [Sogers) , or "not me" (Sullivan). The con tent 
makes the mistake of formulatinq experience as
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fixed discrete "contents" in the personality, whether they 
are call ed "experiences," "factors," "S-R bonds," "needs," 
"drives," "traits," " s e l f - c o n c e p t s , 11 "infantile fixations," 
etc.
For example, Carl Roqers' personality theory 
illustrates the problems caused by these two traditional 
mistakes. Fcqers defines "experience" as all the crqanismic 
events occurrinq within the envelop of the person at any 
qiven moment. "Experience" therefore includes those events 
which the individual is unaware of, as well as those which 
have been accurately symbolized in conscious awareness. 
These contents of "ex perience" are reqarded as essentially 
the same in nature whether they are "in awareness" as 
explicit conceptualized contents [e.q., "this arousal is 
anqer at my bo s s " ) , or "denied to awareness" because they 
are inconaruent with the self-ccncept (e.q,, "as a peaceful 
person, it is unacceptable for me tc be a n q r y " ) . like other 
personalitv theories, Roqers' theoretical formulation leads 
to three main p hilosophical difficulties. Cne is the 
absurdity of positir.q an infinity of discrete psycholoqical 
events, some cf which are accurately conceptualized as 
explicitly known contents "in awareness," and ethers which 
are "denied to awareness" because they lack 
conceptualization. A second problem is hew to talk clearly 
about experiences, which are meaninqful, but which are not 
"known" throuqh accurate explicit conceptualization. A 
third problem is exp laininq hew "repressed" contents, which
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are "unconscious" or "unformed," can be ccncruent cr 
inconqruent with conscious awareness.
Gendlin reccqnized that Rcqers needed terms that refer 
to "experiencinq" as that which in awareness implicitly 
contains meaninqs and values (see discussion Section 17). 
This notion cf "i m p l i c i t  meaninq" is Gendlin's alternative 
to the repression and content paradiqms of psychclcqy. The 
nature and advantaqes of this new approach are outlined 
b e l o w :
As we have seen, a "felt sense does not come to you in 
the form cf thouqhts or words or ether separate units, but 
as a sinqle (thouqh often puzzlinq and very complex) bodily 
feelinq" (Gendlin, 1981, p. 33), Furthermore, any qiven 
felt sense contains a wealth cf implicit meaninq. To 
demonstrate how this concept of implicit meaninq works, 
Gendlin (1981) uses the follcwinq illustration. If you 
think about two important people in your life, you will 
notice a distinct "inner aura" that qi ves you a sense of 
"all about Jchr," and a distinctly different aura of "all 
about Helen." This sense of "all about the person" is not 
created frcii discrete thouqhts and impressions that are 
added toqetber ere by one. Indeed there are millions of 
bits of data that constitute John as you know him.
Gendlin points out that it is philosophically absurd to 
conceive of these thousands of thouqhts as lurkinq in a 
hypothetical unconscious mind, waitinq to be called up into
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consciousness one tv one. This would mean that J o h n ’s red 
hair would net enter your conception of John as vou know him 
until that actual thouqht entered conscious awareness. 
Instead, the sense cf "all about John" emerqes all at once 
as a sinqle bodily-sensed aura that includes e v e ry one of 
those thousands of past and present experiences ccncerninq 
John. In fact, G endlin (1981, p. 34) suqqests that this 
awesome amount of infor mation is stored in-the-bedy as a 
kind of "fcioloqical computer." This is the meaninq behind 
his terse sayinq that, "the unconscious is the body" 
(Gendlin, 1974b, 1 979) .
Gendlin (1964a) asserts that most of our "thinkinq" 
proceeds in the form of felt meaninq without verbal 
symbolization. In ether words, "expe riencinq" is felt (as 
implicit meaninq) rather than known (as explicit words and 
concepts). At times, felt meaninq may become explicit 
— when it occurs in interacticn with desiqnated symbols, 
such as words, and we "feel" what the s ymbols mean. But 
even then, felt m eaninq "always con t a i n s  a qreat deal more 
implicit meaninq than we have made explicit" (Gendlin, 
1964a, p. 112). For example, even if my concept cf John is 
explicitly symbolized as "a pleasant, easy-qcinq scholar 
with red hair," there is still a wealth of implicit felt 
meaninq "about John" that is  not captured in the "contents" 
of this verbal symbolization. In ether words, the felt 
sense of "all about John" is but one aspect of 
"experiencinq" that can be attended tc directly — i.e., as
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it is immediately bodily-felt.
at any qiven moment, there are innumerable aspects of 
"experiencinq" that can be made explicit thrcuqh verbal 
s y m b o l i z a t i c e . When an aspect cf implicit
felt-meaninqfulness has bee n " e x p l i c a t e d , " the individual 
can feel an experiential "shift." The exp e r i e n c e  of this 
shift was demonstrated earlier in the self-experiment, in 
which the reader imaqined two familiar persons in his or her 
life. Imaq ininq one friend had a distinct concretely-sensed 
"aura" of "all about that person," and then imaqininq the 
second friend had a distinctly different "aura" of feelinq. 
The actual bcdily-felt sens ation of a chanqe in felt sensinq 
when imaqininq the two different persons is an illustrative 
example of a "felt shift." However, the impo rtant point is 
that this felt chanqe is the bodily-felt indice cf a "shift" 
in implicit feIt-meaninqfulness.
This example is somewhat misleadinq because it is an 
instance cf experiencinq "narrowed" tc felt-meaninqfulness  
about one specific topic. More appropriately,
f elt-meanincfulness is ab out one's broader rel a t e d n e s s  with 
the world at any qiven moment, and it implicitly ercompasses 
all of one's perceptions, meaninqs, values, and history in a 
qiven situaticE, in a sinqle qlobal "feelinq." "Explication" 
occurs when the person focuses attention on a felt meaninq 
with the aim cf openinq up the implicit meaninq into an 
explicit conceptual understandinq. This sort of
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’'explica t ic n" is an event that commonly occurs in 
psychotherapy, when the client has a particular intense 
feelinq and desires to "know" what is "in" this feelinq, or 
what " i t ” means. By concentrating on the felt meaninq, 
"selected" symbols present themselves — such as a word, or 
phrase, or imaqe—  and these symbols have the pcwer to call 
forth the felt meaninq which selected them. When the words 
or symbols are considered, and "feel riqht" as "yes, that is 
what I was f e elinq," then we reqard these words as havinq 
explicated the implicit meaninq in the felt experiencing. 
As this process occurs, there is a bodily-felt "shift," 
which indicates that some aspect of the implicit meaninq of 
the felt sense has been differentiated and carried forward.
At the same time, the specific aspect of the felt sense 
which has been exp l i c a t e d  should not be viewed as some sort 
of "thinq" resting in s i d e  the person prior to its 
re-presentaticn in explicit words: for example, positinq
"John's red hair" as a "content" in the mind, which can then 
be represented in these exact words. Such a view would 
revert to the mistakes of the content and repression 
paradiqms, which held that there are contents cr entities 
stored in the " u n c o n s c i o u s , " which have a cne-to-ane 
correspondence with co nceptual co n t e n t s  in conscious 
awareness. 0 r the contrary, a felt sense is richly complex 
in its implicit meaning. Thus there are a multitude of 
meaningful aspects of a qiven felt sense which could be 
potentially differentiated: and there are no set words or
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conceptualizations that symbolically represent cr "stand 
for" de siqrated inner subjective events.
In other words, . e x p e riencinq is capable of many 
different for aula ticns, but it is never itself the e xplicit  
contents of any par ticular verbal synbclization. 
Experiencinq is a felt sensinq cf an aura of felt meaninq 
about <1 situation rather than a cumulative collection of 
discrete thcuqhts abcut the c o n s tituent elements of that 
situation..
Finally, a felt sense can often be explicated in ways 
that do net involve symbolization. Explication is the 
"explication cf" f e I t - m e a n i n q f u l n e s s  such that somethinq 
happens that carries forward, or opens up, or differentiates 
the meaninq that functions implicitly in the felt sense. 
Fre quently this e x p l ication occurs throuqh synbclization, 
but not always. T h erefore symbolization is only cne way to 
"explicate" the process of experiencinq. There are also 
occasions when symbolization — such as verbal
conceptualization—  fails tc expl icate the felt meaninq that 
functions implicitly in experiencinq (i.e.,
fe l t - m eaninafulness). In order to understand hew some acts 
of symbolizaticn do expl icate experiencinq, while other 
symbolizations do not, it is crucial to'further clarify what 
"experiencirq" is like and how it is "explicated." This 
issue is addressed in the followinq section.
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^ • E xre rie n cinq D ist irq u i shed from 
? cr mulati eng of Exp e r iencing.
In review, "experiencing" is an immediate, tcdily-felt 
process of felt-mearinqfulness, c o n t inually flowing and 
chanqina in response to the chanqinq circumstances of 
living. The felt experiencinq cf any qiven moment 
implicitly certains and encompasses the wealth cf all the 
perceptions, values, past experiences, and meanirqs involved 
in the qiven living situ ation for the individual at that 
moment. Experiencinq is feIt as implicit meaninq rather 
than known as explicit c o nceptualized words and thouqhts. 
However, at times, aspects of an implicitly meaninqful felt 
sense can he made ex p l i c i t  thrcuqh explication.
"Explication" occurs when symbols have "called forth" 
or "opened up" . the felt meaninq cf experiencinq such that 
this meaninq has been clarified in awareness. "Explication 
is always a further process of experiencinq. It carries 
forward what we already feel" (Gendlin, 1965a, p. 1321. 
This quote emphasizes the close dialectic relationship 
fcetween ex periencing and e x p l i c a t i o n ; the
felt-meaninqfulness cf experiencinq is carried forward by 
explication, which then eff ects and chanqes the felt-meaninq 
quality of experiencinq, which then calls for further 
explication, and so on. The two processes are sc intimately 
related in this manner that it is problematic to discuss
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them as beinq separate. This is analoqous to the way mind 
and body are distirq uished in modern Western thinkinq, 
althouqh they are not separable in reality. However, for 
the present purposes of further defininq the notion of 
"experiencinq," it is instructive to d i s t irquish between 
experiencinq ard formulations of experi encinq. This 
conceptual dualism is used in the followinq discussion 
precisely to clarify and define expe riencinq for ar audience 
that is unfairiliar with G e n d l i n ’s phenomenoloqica 1 approach. 
But this distinction has been prefaced by the cautionary 
reminder that there is a dialectic relationship between 
experiencinq and explication.
The pherc irenolcgical d a tum refers to that which is 
immediately and directly beheld in awareness. This can be 
distinguished from s vmboli'zat ion, which is the terms, 
patterns, cr units that are used to describe, represent, or 
point to the pheromena of this awareness. It is crucial to 
understand this distinction between the phencmenoloqical 
datum and the formulations that are placed upon this datum. 
However, it is difficult to grasp this distinction because 
of the usual ways in which psychclcqists view subjective 
inner events, Gendlin f1965a) poin ts out that direct felt 
experiencinq has two properties that are independent of the 
formulations that are placed on it: powers that he calls 
"independent access" and "response." These two properties 
provide an immediate demonstration cf the fact that 
experiential felt sensing alwa ys constitutes the ground of
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our words, ideas, and thouqhts.
Independent ac c e s s  means that we fre quently can sense 
and feel an inner datum without havinq any explicit  
formulation cr conce p t u a l i z a t i o n  of it. For example, one 
can " k n o w ” what cne is qoinq to say without recitinq any 
words or ideas of it. Or one can feel that scmethinq is 
’’out of place" lonq before cne can specifically identify 
what this awkward feelinq is. For example, a hurried 
commuter miqht be departinq his house and knows that 
somethinq is "not riq bt." Several minutes later, he realizes 
that his "nct-richt feelinq" involved the lunch he forqot to 
brinq. Similarly, thinkinq of a person that you know well 
is characterized by ar aura of "feelinq about that person," 
but the exact "contents" of that aura remain "unknown," 
implicit in that felt sensinq.
The second power of immediate experiencinq is called 
"X§JE2 Pse". This means that we can directly seise how what 
we are feelinq "responds" differently to different 
symfcolizatiors in words, actions or events. vie can 
"inwardly" perceive when there is any chanqe or shift in 
felt sensirq in response to a particular conceptualization. 
For example, the hurried commuter can tell that his 
"not-riqht feelinq" was not "leavinq the stcve on," or 
"failinq to feed the cat," and then know with certainty 
[with a bodily-felt "shift") that "it" was foxaettinq his 
lunch.
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Before proceeding with this discussion, it is important 
to first sav a few words about the interaction cf symbols 
and experiencinq. Obv i o u s l y  symbols do not ’'float around" 
in some haphazard fashion, waitinq to interact with 
experiencinq. S ymbols always occur in a meaninqful context, 
such as a conversation, cr a particular, social event, or in 
psychotherapy, or wal kinq on the beach. For instance, the 
hurried commuter considered several symbolic formulations 
that were appropriate in the context of "leavinq for work": 
it was possible that his feelinq was about forqettinq the 
hunqry cat or the bur n i n g  stove. But his felt meaninq was 
net about hew to spell "xylophone" since this was not a part 
of the meanirqful c o n t e x t  e n c o mpassed in his immediate felt 
sensinq of that moment.
In some cases, symbols arise from the felt sense itself
and. can function as its explication. A t ether times,
symbols may be a p p l i e d  by a nother person, such as a 
counselor, in reference to another's inner subjective state. 
There are innumerable ways that symbcls can interact with 
felt experiencinq. However, recardless of the "source" of 
the symbols, we can d irectly sense how our felt meaninq 
responds differently to different symbolizations.
In summary, the two properties of "in dependent access"
and "response" demonstrate that exp eriencing can be
distinguished from symbcli zation and formulations of 
experiencinq. We can have independent access to felt
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meaninq, such as "oh, there it i s , ” without a 
conceptua lization cf what " i t ” is. Moreover, we can 
inwardly sense to what deqree ’’that is it," or "that's not 
it" in " re spcnse" tc various potential symbolizations, such 
as "it" is leaving the stove burninq, cr forqettinq one's 
lunch.
With this in mind, we new understand that what 
psycholoqists usually conceive of as "experience" is 
actually symbcliza t i cn—  form u l a t i o n s  of experiencing. 
Psychologists make the mistake of equating
conceptualizations cf experiencinq with experiencinq. For 
example, "feelinq anxiety about personal failure" or 
"desiring tc chanqe careers" is not direct. experiencinq 
itself. It is only cne way that experiencinq miqht be 
explicated in this qiven moment, and it represents only one 
aspect of an entire complex of implicit meaninq encompassed 
by the felt sense. These particular words, ideas, and 
thouqhts may seem to be what is immediately experienced by 
the person, hut e x p e r iencinq is rever -just this or that 
formulation. Experiencinq always c o n t a i n s  much mere meaninq 
than what is ex plicitly formulated as designated words or 
ideas, such as "feelirq anxiety about failure."
Ge n d l i n  f 1962a) points out that this is a ccmmon error 
because psychology lacks terms that refer directly to 
immediate experiencing (see Section 17). Present terms in 
psvcholoav either {1) refer to externally observable
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behavior, cr (2) they are theoretical constructs without 
observable referents at all. In other wcrds, terms like 
"anxiety," "security," " s e l f - c c n c e p t , " and "inferiority 
complex" s eem like they are referrinq to direct 
experiencinq, whereas in fact they are actually 
c oncept u a l i z a tions (constructs) of e x p e r i e n c i n q .
Experiencinq and conceptualizaticns of it can occur 
toqether, cr separately. But the fact that experiencinq and 
conceptua lization are d i f fere n t is most noticeable when they 
do not occur t o qether—  e.q., those occasions then we have 
experiencira that we cannot conceptualize, or when we have 
co nceptualizations that "don't feel quite riqht." Gendlin 
points out that this is a very common event in psychotherapy 
(see Gendlin, 1962a, pp. 117-127 and 233-235). Clients 
often find it difficult tc find words for intensely felt 
experiencinq, and they can immediately tell whether a 
proposed c o n c eptualization "carries forward" the unclear 
feelinq or ret—  "yes doctor, that's exactly it," or "no, 
that's not quite what it is."
We can further define experiencinq by introducinq an 
example of hew e x p e r i e n c i n q  raiqht be explicated. As an 
instance of direct experiencinq, suppose that at this moment 
in time, T have a felt sense. Initially, this 
felt-meaninqfulness is a "whole" feelinq that implicitly 
encompasses everythinq "all about" this present situation in 
life for me. I knew that this feel inq is my d irect
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experiencinq because this felt sensinq has the two defininq 
powers of independent access and response. First of all, 
"independent access" is demonstrated by the fact that I have 
this felt sensinq of some phencmencloqical datum without any 
present conceptualization of what "it" is. Then the process 
of explication beqins when I direct my attention to this 
felt sensinq. As a result of this attendinq, I become aware 
that this felt sense has been narrowed to a felt sensinq of 
"somethinq" as yet "unknown" to me. I can sense that 
"somethinq is there," that "there it is." As yet, 3 have no 
explicit kncwledqe of what the felt sense "means," but I
have employed verbal symbols [such as "there it is"} to
point to, or refer to this particular datum. This is a type 
of formulation of e x p e r iencinq called d i r ect re f e rence (see 
Section 6), and the phencmencloqical datum which I can 
"refer to" is called a "direct referent" (Gendlin, 1964a). 
In turn, this direct reference has chanqed the "shape" of my
felt sense, fccusinq it so that I feel it more intensely.
Next, as a result of attendinq to this intensely-felt 
referent, conceptual symbols present th emselves from the 
felt sense. At first, I realize that my felt sense is 
"about somethinq that disturbs me." The property of 
"response" i s  demonstrated here by the fact that I can 
directly sense shifts in my expe riential felt sensinq as a 
function of (in "response" to) various symbolizinq ideas: 
initially, I sense no bodily felt shift to the idea, that 
"perhaps it is about Helen," while I do feel a distinct
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chanqe in this felt datum with the explicatinq idea that "it 
is about Jehu." Thus an aspect of the felt experiercinq has 
been first explicated throuqh direct refer e nce—  "I sense a 
somethinq": and then further explicated throuqh
conceptu.aliza ti cn—  "this is a sense cf somethinq ab out my 
friend John." The •various ideas and memories that I 
subsequently have "about John" may then represent further 
steps in the cn-qoinq process of explication of this qiven 
moment of experiencinq. In other words, e x p l ication is a 
process of ira]<inq variotis aspects of "implicit meaninq" 
explicit. At the same time, the explication furthers the 
process of experiencinq, "carryinq it forward," openinq up 
new aspects of feIt-meani n q f u l n e s s  for explication, and so 
on. It is na.t a process of findinq labels for what was 
"lyinq there" already. Eventually, I may find that John's 
broken promise is an aspect of "that somethinq" which I 
directly referred to in the beqinninq. I may then proceed 
to explicate further implicit asp ects of this particular 
instance of felt sensinq, whose felt shape has been 
continually chanqinq throuqh-out this process as it was 
referred to and explicated.
In the ahcve example, it is clear that my experiencinq 
is always "ahead of my concepts," and "quides" my 
conceptualizaticns. As I for m u l a t e  concepts or hypotheses 
about my experiencinq, I can "check them aqairst" ray felt 
sensinq. In ether words, if I co n s i d e r  these symbols and 
they "feel" the same as the felt meaninq I endeavored to
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explicate, then I reccqnize that the felt meaninq has been 
called forth and explicated.
But felt meaninq should net be conc eived cf as some
sort of static entity, which words and concepts can be 
"fitted to." This mi sconception ccmirits the mistakes of the 
content and repression paradiqms, which posit psycholoqical 
contents that are "denied tc awareness" until they are
accurately conceptualized as explicit contents in conscious
awareness. In this view, s y mbolizations are "fitted to"
static conte nts in the mind in a "re-presentational" 
fashion.
The explication of exp e r i e n c i n q  is a very different
process. Here selected symbols call forth seme aspect of 
the implicit meaninq in f e l t - m e a n i n q f u l n e s s , bet not by
correctly symbolizinq some content already "lyinq there" to 
be symbolized. Rather, in explication, symbolization is 
recoqnised as "correct" when the felt meaninq resultinq from 
the exolicit symbolization feels the same as the
felt-meaninafulness I attempted tc explicate. This is the 
bodily-felt experiential effect of differentiatinq some 
aspect of experiencinq and carryinq forward this aspect of 
its implicit meaninq. In turn, the e x p l icatinq process 
furthers experiencinq, openinq up new aspects, affectinq its 
felt quality, and carryinq forward "that which" is contained 
in the implicit meaninq of the felt sensinq.
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Thus, in explication, the " c o r r e c t n e s s ” of 
conceptualizations is de termined on the basis of felt 
changes or "sh ifts” in my felt sensinq. An "inco rrect" or 
inadequate conc eptualization produces little or no 
discernible shift ir. bcdily-felt sensinq, while more 
accurate conceptualizations produce distinctive positively 
felt chanqes in sensinq. For instance, when I thouqht of 
Helen, there was no felt effect. But when 1 thouqht of 
John, T "knew" — based immediately on my felt response—  
that "that was it." Subsequently, if I thouqht of "the money 
John owes- me," I may have sensed little shift. But when the 
idea of J o h n ’s broken promise arose from the felt sense, I 
knew with certainty "that was it."
C learly then, net all conc e p t u a l i z a t i o n  functions as 
explication. Conce p t u a l i z a t i o n  of experiencinq is
"explication" cnlv when it is an explication cf imme diate 
felt-meaninafulness that d i fferentiates and carries forward 
experiencinq. Conceptua l i z a t i o n  is net explication if it 
merely labels an experience without referrinq tc immediate 
felt meaninq. Hence, the same verbal symbols that 
explicated experiencinq in one situation may not function as 
explication ir a different situation, or even in the same 
situation a few moments later.
Furthermore, when a particular conceptualization  
carries forward some a spects of a direct referent, the 
person usually senses the felt meaning more vividly. There
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is a "shift," a pleasant feelinq of easinq and relief of 
tension when felt meaninq is explicated. This experience of 
tension-relief as a function of direct reference to, and 
explication cf, felt meaninq has important implications for 
psychotherapy. In his own clinical work, Gendlin (1964a) 
has pointed out that even when e x p e r iential focusinq 
involves personally painful topics, the process of directly 
focusinq on a felt ireaninq (i.e., the direct referent) 
produces positive feelinqs:
A very important and surprisinq fact about direct 
reference to felt m e aninqs is that if the natter under *
consideration is anxiety producinq cr hiqhly 
uncomfortable, this felt discomfort decreases as the 
individual d i rectly refers to the felt meaninq. Cne 
would have expected the opposite... Thus, f the client) 
may be in quite a lot cf inward pain as he decides to 
brinq the matter up at all. However, crce into the 
topic, the more directly he a ttends to the direct 
referent, the felt meaninq, the less his discomfort and 
anxiety. If he momentarily leses track of it, the 
anxiety flares up aqain, and the diffuse discomfort of 
the topic returns...
Tn contrast to the a nxiety or discomfort, the felt 
meaninq itself becomes sharper, more distinctly felt, as 
he refers to and corr ectly symbolizes what it is. In 
fact, his sense cf whether cr not he has "correctly" 
symbolized is partly -just this sense of increased 
intensity of the felt meaninq.
This decreased anxiety is a very surprisinq fact, 
much aqainst the qeneral a s s u mptions about 
anxiety-provokinq material. He qenerally assume that to 
focus directly on the expe riencinq makes us more 
anxious. fly observations indicate that in c r eased 
a nxiety comes fr_cm t o pic choice, and it is this which we 
qenerally expect. On the other hand, qiven the topic, 
the . jnore we fo cus d i rectly upon the felt m e a n i n q . and 
the mere jef it we sjrabolize c o r r e c t l y  the sore relief 
we feel. Even a little error in symbo lizinc ("no, what 
I just said i s n ’t quite it") aqain increases the anxiety 
(Gendlin, 1964a, pp. 116-117, latter italics added).
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Despite G e n d l i n ’s claims, it may still seeir contes table 
that recoqnizinq soite horrible " f a c t ” about on eself can feel 
physically qocd. However, it is crucial to understand that 
symboli.zat.icr is not just a process of findinq an explicit 
label for a horrible "fact” about oneself. Ir Gendlin's 
view, th e r e  is no static entity of experience, no horrible 
"fact,” that is "lyinq there" inside, and which, is then 
"symbolized correctly" and it feels qood, This is not 
explication, it is merely c c n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . As the 
quotation emphasizes, the positive feelinqs of 
tension-relief arise from the manner in which the individual 
directly refers tc the felt meaninq: "the felt meaninq
itself becomes sharper, more distinctly felt, as he refers 
to and corr ectly s y m b olizes what it is." Clearly then, 
symbols are ret applied tc a felt sense as if it was a 
static thinq. Gymbcls flow from the felt experiencinq 
itself when it is directly referred to, and these sym bols 
can then call forth aspects of the felt-meani n q f u l n e s s  and 
carry it forward. In other wcrds, correct symbolization 
emefqes frcm the on-qoinq process of experiencinq and the 
explication cf experiencinq.
For example, suppose you are feelinq "ureasy and 
irritable" after d i m e r  in a restaurant, and dc not know 
why. Beinq told that you are a "cheapskate," anc realizinq 
that it is probably true, is very unlikely to yield a qood 
feelinq of tension- r e l i e f . In this instance, the explicit 
recoqnition cf "what you are feelinq" is not ch aracterized
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by relief of tension. Gendlin would arque that there is no 
felt relief here because this is not an e x p lic a tion of 
experienci nq. Beinq called a neqative name like
'’cheapskate" — without reference to the cn-qcinc process of 
experiencinq-- is an example cf "mere conceptualization" 
that does net explicate. This is a crucial distinction. 
Becoqnizinq "had" c o n t e n t  per se does not "feel qccd." It is 
the manner in which the "bad" content is experienced that
determines whether there will be an experiential shift and a
bodily-felt relief of tension.
Althcuqh the direction may seem deplorable to I the 
individual], he feels' unquestionable relief as he 
differentiates. It is as if he is so qlad tc know, at 
last, what the feelinq is. Hcwever, it isn't really a 
qladness at knowing, since, if he had been told this 
piece cf knowledge without the concrete
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ’s havinq occurred, he would not have 
felt at all qlad (Gendlin, 1967b, p. 186).
In short, beinq "tcld" you are a cheapskate hurts if 
this content does net directly emerqe from the on-qoinq 
process of experiencinq and the explication of experiencinq. 
On the other hand, if you have allowed a felt sense to form, 
and this ccrc eptualization emerqed directly from that felt 
sense, and it "carries forward" the felt mearinq of that
direct referert, then you may feel the tension-relief of an 
"experiential shift." This felt shift in experiencinq marks 
the freeinq up of "stuck" life processes. They became 
"unstuck" throuqh experiential focusinq and explication of 
this implicitly meaningful experiencinq.
As a clcsinq note, the reader may Header whether there 
is any empirical evidence tc support Gendlin's assertion 
that experiential focusinq cn a painful topic can be 
experienced as positive tension-relief. For the most part, 
Gendlin's rationale for this claim is philosophical, 
qrounded in his broader systematic phenomenoloqy (Gendlin, 
1962a). But there are two sources of suppcrtinq empirical 
evidence. First cf all, Gendlin's claim that direct 
experiential focusinq on "bad" content can brinq 
tension-relief is based on his own clinic a l e x periences. 
Hence there are empirical clinical and "testimonial" qrounds 
for this claim. Secondly, there is a small bit of 
expe r i mental s upport for this obser vation about therapy. 
Two expe rimental studies have suqqested that there are 
demonstrable physiolcqical co rrelates of tension-relief 
durinq exp eriential focusinq on "bad" content (Gendlin and 
Berlin, 1961; Don, 1977-1978). For example, in a laboratory 
analoque study, Gen d l i n  and Berlin (1961) found clear 
tension-reduction patterns on a GSR measure, which 
corresponded tc instances of direct reference to 
experiencinq involvinq "disturbinq content" (discussed in 
Section 1 3) .
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Sf ” Fe eling11 Such as Emotion and. Pain.
The fundamental notion of experiential felt sense can 
be defined acre c l e a r l y  by carefully distinquishirq it from 
’’emotion." Ir a few words, althcuqh feelinq and emotion are 
both "felt," felt meaninq constitutes the around of any
particular emotional state. A felt meaninq is internally 
complex and the individual can feel this direct referent 
chanqinq as a function cf focusinq attention cn it. Eut 
emotions are "sheer" in the sense that eactions are 
"internally all cne quality," and they are "about" the
direct referent.
S uppose an individual feels the erection of anxiety. It 
is a strcnq uncomfortable sensation, but the actual
"emotional tcre" of the anxiety does not chance in an
essential way without either disa ppearing or chanqinq into 
another emoticnal state. To remain with the eircticn serves 
only to feed the emoticn. When the individual is 
preoccupied with the emotion of anxiety, he or she is often
confused abcut the felt meaninq about which he cr she has
the anxiety. In a sense, he or she must move "cn by" the 
emotional tcre in crder to refer directly tc what the
anxiety means, and to focus on what it is that makes him or 
her feel arxicus. In this way, the individual can directly 
refer to the felt meaninq in the on-qoinq process of
experiencinq, and he or she can sense distinct changes in
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felt meaninq e v en t h o ugh the emotional tcne of the anxiety 
has remained essentially unchanqed, fThe word "tone" is 
used here tc emphasize the sheer, sinqular quality of an 
emotion. It is directly analcqous to a musical tcne, which
is simple and sinqular in quality, and sounds the same each
time it is sounded. Though the musical tone may vary in 
intensity with repeated execution, the tcre remains 
essentially unchanqed in quality. In contrast, a musical 
piece is a compl e x blendinq of many musical "teres," whcse 
quality chanqes dramatically as a function of multi ple 
contribtit inq scunds.l
Furthermore, when the i n d ividual distinctly feels a 
chanqe in the qua l i t y  of the felt referent, it is a
"movement" or "shift" which feels riqht and welccire. Thus 
while the individual is in the "sheer" e m otional state of 
anxiety, the individual can focus on a variety of felt
meanings that are "inside" or "beneath" the arxiety. For 
example, the fccusirq person may say; "I feel this anxiety 
when I think of ray iob... There 'it' is aqain, that sense 
of helplessness, like I'm a baby... It feels like I've no 
one to hold me, like I felt when ray wife died..." These 
statements represent a succession of c o n c e p t u a l i 2ations that 
might elicit a felt chan qe or shift as a function of 
svmbolizinq and carryinq forward some aspect of "that which" 
the individual is anxious about. But the tonal quality of 
the person's anxiety itself never chanqes, except to 
increase or decrease in intensity.
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Some psychologists miqht try to debate G e n d l i n ’s 
position by claiminq that we cannot focus precisely on our 
inner sensations. Fcr instance, the behavicrist Howard 
Rachlin (198C, P« 54) says that "cur internal sensibilities 
are crude, whereas cur external sensibilities are precise." 
Rachlin suqqes+s that there is little distinction between 
internal states such as pleasure and "joy, and that we 
probably canrct make such a distinction based cn our inner 
sensibilities alcne. For example, "we often cannot tell 
which tooth is ca u s i n g  a toothache or whether a pain is in 
our stomach or tack." In contrast, Rachlin notes that we can 
make delicate discriminations amcnq external factors, such 
as detectinq the mis alignment of two lines by as little as a 
fraction of a millimeter. Therefore Rachlin cc r c l u d e s  that 
external situations determine how people label their 
internal states. This position is certainly consistent with 
Skinner's own view cf the (delusive) "apparent intimacy of 
the world within the skin" (Skinner, 1976).
However, for Gendlin, this entire argument is 
fundamentally misdirected and misconceived. An experiential 
felt sense is .never merely some specific twinge cr pain that 
is traceable to a specific physical location "inside" the 
body. we have seen, a felt sense is experi enced as an
aura of feelinq that encompasses everything ycu feel and 
know about a given subiect at a given time. It is 
experienced as a rcund,. bread feeling that ccites all at 
once. It may often be vague in that we may not know "what
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it is,” but it is definitely sensed in a concrete way. On 
the other hard, a pair: cr internal stimulus like a hunqer 
panq is distinctively "narrow" and specific, and in
principle can fce traced tc a physical location in the body. 
It certainly is not an ever-present quality of the
felt-meaninqfulness that constitutes human conscious 
awareness. While pains and twinqes can come and qo, any 
qiven moment cf awareness always has felt sensinq. The only 
similarity between all these phenomena is that they involve 
fjeolins of some kind. But there is no similarity in the
essential character of that feelinq.
For example, sup pose you feel a hunqer panq. You can 
feel it in your belly, and you can hear the qrowlinq noises 
a ccompanyinq that stimulus. While this twinqe is in your 
awareness, such a sensation does not constitute a l l of your 
awareness [unless it is seme rare excruciatinq pain). At 
the same time that you are feelinq the hunqer panq, you 
probably alsc have a distinct felt sense abcut this 
situation in which you are havinq the panq. Perhaps it is a 
biq round feelinq of "all about qcinq out to eat with a
friend." This felt sense is quite distinct frcii the simple 
hunqer oanq ir ycur stcraach. The felt sensinq is sort of 
"all over" the body, literally like an aura.
An experiential felt sense is never "lust" a twinqe or 
hurt that can be traced to some localized reqicn in the 
body, such as a qrowlinq stcmach or sharp pain ir the spine.
Paqe 3 9
Like emotions, these sorts of stimulus sensaticxs and pains 
are "s imp le" in the sense that they are of cne constant 
tone. A pain in the hack may fluctuate in intensity, but it 
is of one characteristic tone that will remain essentially 
unchanged fcy "conc entratinq attention on it." Similarly, 
focusinq on o n e ’s hunqer panq does net chanqe the way this 
panq is "felt." But think inq about o n e ’s felt sense of 
"eating with a friend" d o e s chanqe o n e ’s feelinq about the 
s i t u a t i o n .
Thus, in contrast to emotional states and internal 
bodily stimuli, a felt sense is c o mplex. This means that
aspects of the felt mass or aura can always be further 
differentiated into other felt meaninqs. However, a pain or 
twinqe is simple, "sheer" in its tonal quality. There are 
no fur ther aspects of it that can be specified. 
Concentrating on a hunqer panq will not draw out any 
ad ditional embodied meaninq from the felt panq. It will 
only increase your awareness of the panq itself. Similarly, 
if you iust stubbed your toe, the pain has a sheer quality 
until it subsides. Concentrating on the pair does not
chanqe the pain, it will only make it more precisely sensed 
[and more painful!) in your awareness.
Furthermore, this quality of "sheerness" would hold 
true for pains and visceral sensations that are more
accurately portrayed as states of qeneral physioloqical 
arousal, or as complex, broadly-dispersed emotional
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reactions. Thus, for example, the arousal pattern may be 
"complex" ir terms of invclvinq many sophisticated 
interactive bodily and neural systems, or "complex" in its 
relations tc ccqnitive, behavioral and situational factors. 
But the actual experienced tonal cjualit.Y of the arousal will 
be simple, all of one physical texture. Obviously then, the 
"complexity" cf emotion is of a different order than the 
rich, im plicitly meaninqful, "complexity" of a felt sense.
In conclusion, it is a misdirected strateqy tc conceive 
of a ^elt sense as a sensation that can be traced to a 
specific location "in the b o d y . ” For the same reason, it 
would be misdirected to search for some neuro-phys ioloqical
basis for a felt sense in the same way that investiqators
have pursued neural bases for emotion and pain. For 
instance, in the field cf emotion research, irvestiqators
have lonq teen conc erned with the respective contrib utions
of the interactinq ccqnitive, physioloqical, and bodily 
aspects of encticnal experience (Mandler, 197?) . In this 
regard, emotion resea rchers have been interested in 
indiv iduals sufferinq from spinal cord iniuries, which have 
left maior portions cf the viscera and nervous system
paralyzed. By measurinq the altered quality cf emotional 
experience fcllowinq the reduction cf the p h y s i o l o q i c a 1
component, one can make inferences about the ccntributinq
role of physicloqy tc emotion. Actually this notion
oriqinated with William James, who felt the "experimentum 
crucis" for his theory of emoticn would be an "anaesthetic
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p e r s o n ’1 with no visceral pe rception (James, 1890, 1694). 
Decades later, modern researchers have asked patients with 
spinal cord lesions about the intensity and quality of their 
emotional life fcllcwinq the iniury. They have fcund that 
the hiqher the level cf spinal cord damaqe, the qreater the 
reported less of emotion (Hchmann, 1966; Jasnos and 
Haktniller, 1815) . From this, resear chers were able to infer 
the importance of v i sceral feedback in the production of 
emotion.
as a clcsinq note, I would suqqest that this research 
approach cculd be used to provide an informal illustrative 
demonstration of the distinction between felt ex jreriencinq 
and ’’felt” emotion.' Usinq the same paralyzed subjects, two 
outcomes should be expected: (1) Subjects should report a
decline in intensity of e m o t i o n a l  ex perience followinq 
massive bodily paralysis. (2) The same subjects should 
report no chanqe at all in the essential experiential felt 
sensinq of conscious awareness.
6. The C o n c e p t of 11D i rect R e f e r e nc e . ”
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P erhaps one of Gendlin's nest important contributions 
to the theory and practice of ps ychotherapy is the notion of 
"direct reference." Purinq his early years in the 
client-centered orientation, Gendlin was intriqued by the 
fact that patients very frequently would respond in ways 
that showed they were di stinctly aware cf ireaninqful 
bodily-sensed feelinq, even thcuqh they lacked words to 
label this feelinq. Often a client would vociferously 
report that "that's it," or "that's net it," or "I can 
really feel it," d espite the fact that he or she did not yet 
know what "it" was. The term "di rect reference" was first 
introduced by Gendlin and Zimrinq f1955) to describe this 
vitally impcrtant phenomenon in therapy.
For Gendlin, direct reference is but one of seven basic 
modes in which symbols and felt meaninqs function toqetber 
in "the creation of meaninq" [for a complete discussion, see 
Chapter 3 cf Gendlin, 1962a) . Symbols are words, imaqes, 
persons, behaviors, situations, obiects, or anytbinq that 
can play the role cf a symbcl. Symbols function quite 
differently in direct reference than in the other modes. In 
direct reference, symbols do  not function to conceptualize 
or label aspects of experiencinq. Instead, verbal symbols 
such as "this," or "that," or "it," serve only tc "point to" 
and "hold cntc" a particular felt meaninq. Thus the felt 
meaninq o? any qiven moment cf experiencinc is already 
meaninqful irdependen tly cf the symbols used tc re fer to 
that, felt sense. Thus, on one hand, the qiven felt meaninq
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"n e e d s ” the ieferrinq symbol tc "mark it off as a referent.” 
Cn the other hand, the referinq symbol [such as the word 
’’this” or "that") d efends entirely on the felt meaninq to 
which it refers for its meaninq.
G e n d l i n ’s idea cf "direct reference" had important
implications for the practice cf psychotherapy because it
held that positive therapeutic qrcwth was characterized by 
shifts in felt experiencinq, rajther than c l e a r l y  articulated 
insiqhts or c o n c e ptualizations of subiective feelinq. If 
this was indeed true, the very nature and purpose of 
psychotherapy needed tc be rethcuqht. As noted by Gendlin, 
most therapies c o n c e n t r a t e  cn help.inq the client to find 
words for his or her feelinqs in order to qair insiqht 
— i.e., "accurate conc e p t u a l i z a t i o n s "  of experience. This 
basic approach is based on the content and repression 
paradiqms (see Section 3), which conceive cf inner
experience as entities cr c ontents that can be accurately 
labeled as this or that thinq, and then brcuqht into 
awareness.
In contrast, accordinq to Gendlin, the primary aim of 
therapy is tc refer tc and remain in direct c o n t a c t  with the 
client's immediate "experiencinq." In this manner, the rich 
implicit meaninq of the felt sense is allowed tc unfold and 
open up. Consequently, the act of c o nceptualizinq the 
client's problem is therapeutic only to the deqree that it 
"explicates" or "carries forward" aspects of
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f elt-inean inGf u Iness. as we have seen, experiencinq is
always '’much more than" this or that explicit conceptual 
content. Other therapies have the tendency to equate 
conceptualizations with "that which is beinq immediately and 
directly experienced." This can freeze experiencinq as
static content rather than facilitate its process of
ever-chanqinq implicit meaninqfulness, which is known as it 
is "fe I t . "
In the followinq quotes, Gendlin is arquinq aqainst the 
dominant view amonq cl inicians that (1) denies cr iqnores 
that there is such a therapeutic phenomenon as "direct 
reference," and/or (2) holds that all siqnificant moments of 
progress require conceptualization:
Chanqe in therapy does net concern only those few 
c onceptual mearinqs which the individual thinks or puts 
into words. T h e r a p e u t i c  chanqe occurs as a result of a 
process in which ij'^licit meanings are in awareness, and 
are intensely felt, d i rectly referred to, ard chanqed, 
w i t h out eve r b e ing put in t o words (Gendlin, 1961a, p. 
239, italics added).
Direct reference ... can occur alcne. For 
example, a client says, "this feelinq, that I have now, 
puzzles me." T h i s  is not a conceptualization. The 
client refers directly to somethinq con c r e t e l y  qiven in 
his field. The sym bols "t his feelinq that puzzles me" 
conceptualize nothinq for.him...
It is vitally important tc the cl i e n t  tha t both he 
and the therapist refer directly to the client's  
feelinq, whether this be c cnc e p t u a 1 ized c c n g r u e n tly or 
not. Pecall the example cf the client, who, after much 
use of certain ccrcepts, has arrived at the actual 
experiencing that these c crcepts "really" meant 
(Gendlin, 1962a, p. 263, italics added).
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A moment of concretely felt livinq in interaction 
contains tra n v . many p o t ential m e a n i n gs — and resolutions 
of problems—  and not all of these can, or need be, 
conceptually insiqhtfully symbolized (Gendlin, 1952b, p. 
40, italics added).
First cf all, Gerdlin is makinq a crucial distinction 
between (1) direct refe rence to experiencinc, and (2) 
conceptualization, in the process of effective therapy. 
More importantly, Gendlin is assertinq that psychotherapy 
should concentrate cn qroundinq its work in the immediately 
qiven, bcdily-felt process of experiencinq. He points out 
that both the client and the therapist can refer directly to 
the c l i e n t ’s felt experiencinq with and without 
conceptualization. At times, as in "di rect reference," it 
is possible to attend directly to a qiven felt sense as it 
is immediately and directly felt in awareness, without 
"puttinq this feelinq into words." For Genclin, it is 
vitally important to "really 1ive" experiencinq as it is 
occurrinq in therapy, rather than try to fird words to 
identify "what it is." Experiencinq is meaninqful livinq—  
encompassinq "all that" which is meaninqfully related to the 
individual interactinq with his world, and commuricatinq it 
in a sinqle directly— sensed "feelinq." Thus deeply feelinq 
this experiencinq — which is accomplished thrcuqh direct 
reference tc experiencinq—  is like livinq life mere fully, 
and serves tc brinq mere life meaninqs to bear in therapy. 
For Gendlin, this rich livinq process is the real basis for 
therapeutic chanqe.
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Frequently this process is facilitated throuqh 
explication—  that is, when aspects of this rich 
experiencirq process are formulated into explicit 
conceptualizations that carry forward the
f e l t - m e a n i n q f u l n e s s , However, words and symbols can 
sometimes he used in a manner that is not in reference to 
(i.e., in direct c o n t a c t  with) the implicitly meaninqful, 
rich qrcurd of experiencinq. This is "mere"
c onceptualization that is not explication. It Irinqs no 
qenuine therapeutic chanqe because "that which" has been 
conceptualized is not "that which" immediately and fully 
const itutes the i n d i v i d u a l ’s problem as it is presently 
felt. Thus, this sort of conceptualization chanqes nothinq 
in terms cf the stuck life processes that constitute the 
clinical problem.1 This important difference between 
conceptualizaticn that is explication, and conceptualization 
that is not, was d i scussed earlier in Secticn 3. However, 
Gendlin is net cla i m i n q  that therapeutic charqe always 
occurs without conceptualization, simply that it can occur, 
as in direct reference.
In summary then, a client can focus on a "direct 
referent" — an inner-sensed experiential datura—  and may 
puzzle over what an odd sort of "this" he is talkiEq about. 
Yet there is rothirq at all vaque about the definite way he 
f^els it and enqaqes in this process. The "it" is vaque 
only conceptually because the client can clearly attend to 
it, talk about it, point to it, feel its special qualities.
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and feel it chanqinq in response to words and events. We
will return tc this c entral issue in a later section on the 
therapeutic use of concepts in relation to experiencinq (see 
Section 8).
Finally, it is useful to note that Gendlin has tried to 
demonstrate exper i m en t al evidence for direct reference. 
This involved first showinq that direct reference could be 
measured operationally as a variable, and then ccrrelatinq 
the amount of direct reference with positive outcome in
therapy fsee Gendlin, 1961a, discussed in Section 13).
CHAPTER II -
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY.
The openinq chapter of this dis sertation examined 
Fuqene G e n d l i n ’s p h e ncmencloqical description of 
" e x p e r i e n c i n q .” The second chapter will explain how this 
description cf human experiencinq can be translated into a 
valid systematic a p proach to psychotherapy.
7. The Pro c e d u r e  of Feeusing.
” F o c u s i n g ” is G e n d l i n ’s term for the process by which 
individuals can qain a fuller sensinq and richer 
understandine of their e x p e r iencinq fin therapy as well as 
in daily livinq). Focusinq al s o  refers more specifically to 
a qeneral procedure for a t t ending to a fel t sense and 
waiting for meaningful messaqes to emerqe fxcn the fe.lt 
sense. The qcal of this section sill be to describe this 
focusing procedure.
To begin with, G e n d l i n ’s basic aim in psychotherapy is 
not to "cure*1 the individual, nor to ’’fix the problem,” nor 
to "reconstruct the personality." Rather, successful therapy 
is c h a r a c t e r i 2 ed by teaching c lients to be c o m e  efficient
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" f o c u s e r s . " lurinq the course of therapy, clients learn to 
" f o c u s ” and can e v e n t u a l l y  enqaqe in this a c t i v i t y  without
the necessity of a professional psychotherapist. In this 
way, clients can depart from the therapeutic relationship 
with the capacity tc handle present and future difficulties 
on their own by usinq exp e r i e n t i a l  focusinq. Althouqh 
Gendlin was initially unce rtain (Gendlin, et al. , 1968), he 
is now convinced that effective focusincj can be successfully 
taught (Gendlin, 1998, 1999; McMullen, 1992; Platt, 1971; 
Van den Bos, 1993) .
In fact, the focusinq procedure has been used
s uccessfully with children (Rainsford, 1977) ; s c h i 2ophrenics 
(Gendlin, 1972; Siirala, 1964; H i n terkopf and Erunswick, 
1975; Hinterkopf, 1977); borderline personality types (Gray, 
1976); retardates (with seme modification of the procedure, 
Prouty, 1976); and children with learninq disabilities
(Murray, 1976). Furthermore, e x p e riential focusinq ha s  been
applied to other areas of livinq "beyond" psychotherapy,
such as -job interviewinq in business (Xberq, 1976); dance 
and body movement (Alperson, 1974); s p i r i tuality (Campbell 
and McMahon, 1979); self-healinq (Olsen, 1978); creative 
wr iting (Berime, 1977) ; problem-solvinq (Kantor and Zimrinq, 
1976; Zimrirq ard Balccmbe, 1974); dreams (Hendricks and 
Cartwright, 1978); and meditation (Weiss, 1978).
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Althouqh Gendlin has developed a distinctive procedure 
that people can use tc "focus," focusinq itself is not 
"necessarily" restricted to any set procedural steps or 
conditions. Tn fact, Gendlin denies that a n y  procedure can 
be prec isely laid out as "the" definitive method cf focusinq 
for se v e r a l  reasons. Fi r s t  of all, focusinq is qrounded in 
the on-qoinq, open process of experiencinq, which is never 
"-just" th i s  cr that static event, or act, or outcome. 
Focusinq functions in the cn-qcinq flow of felt 
experiencinq, which is implicitly meanincful and 
ever-chanqinq. To arti f i c i a l l y  separate experiencinq into 
specific intentional acts with fixed procedural rules would 
constrain this vital, flowinq process. Secondly, the 
experiencinq of ev e r y  individual is entirely unique to that 
individual in any qiven moment. Hence there are an infinite 
variety of ways that people can point to, differentiate, 
refer to, focus cn, and explicate their experiencinq. Thus 
individuals may use words, or poetry, or imaqery, cr musical 
inspiration, cr dancinq, or any variety of means to "do" 
experiential focusinq. Thirdly, focusinq is net somethinq 
limited to resolvinq problems in a psychotherapy settinq. 
Havinq a problem may sometimes be the catalyst fcr focusinq, 
but not always. Foc u s i n q  is basically iust a way of usinq 
experiencinq as a q u i d e  for livinq. "A moment of concretely 
felt livinq in interaction contains many, many potential 
meaninqs — and resolutions of problems" (Gendlin, 1962b, p. 
40) .
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For these reasons, Gendlin emphasizes that there is no 
specific cr preferred method of focusinq. However, with 
these cauticrary cons i d e r a t i o n s  in mind, it is possible to 
describe a qeneral procedure that has been developed to 
facilitate experiential focusinq. T will be presectinq the
focusinq procedure outlined in the first 197E edition of
G e n d l i n ’s beck, F o c usinq, which c o n c e ptually divides 
focusinq into six movements. It should be remembered that
there are no inherent units or defined steps into which the
focusinq process can be divided. Thus, althouqh the process 
itself can be described as involvinq distinquishahle aspects 
or movements, there is no particular set number cf movements 
or steps in the process. Gendlin has described several 
different variations cf the focusinq procedure, all of which 
share the same basic pattern. For instance, in his earlier 
work, Gendlin described focusinq as involvinq four steps 
[Gendlin, 1964a), or as requirinq three preliminary 
conditions (Gerdlin, 1969a). Moreover, variations on the 
qeneral instructions for focusinq can also be found in The 
Focusing Manual [Gendlin, 1969a; 1979; 1981; Gendlin, et
al., 1968) and the Fap Manual [Gendlin and Hendricks, 1972). 
The followinq description is only one version of the 
focusinq procedure, which. I hav e selected for the purpose of 
illustratinq the focusinq process in qeneral.
The First Movement of focusinq is called clearing a 
space. Here the person endeavors to relax quietly and make 
himself or herself comfortable. This is a time to ’’set the
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staqe" for focusinq, so to speak. To beqin, the person 
allows all of his or her present problems to rise up—  
problems such as h assles with the in-laws; mechanical 
problems with the car; annoyances at work; sq uabblinq with 
one's spouse; cr whatever. The person tries tc mentally 
list everythinq that is preventinq him or her from feelinq 
contented riqht new. Then he cr she "stacks" all these 
problems to cne side, qrantinq himself or herself some time 
away from these troubles. Obviously, this is net an act of 
forqettinq or denyinq one's problems. It is simply one way 
to temporarily "clear a space" amidst these problems so that 
the person can then focus on bis cr her immediate 
experiencinq. Althcuqh this experiencinq may cr may not 
include some or all of these problems, it is never merely 
this or that specific problem.
The Seccrd Movement is called jeelincj for the problem, 
flith all his cr her problems temporarily stacked to the 
side, the person can now "ask" himself or herself which 
problem "feels worst," or which is "most pressinq" riqht 
now. It is crucial to avoid any intellectual chcosinq of 
which problem should be mcst important to work cn. In fact, 
the person is directed to shut off all the "internal static" 
of self-talkinq, s e l f - l e c t u r i r q , cliches, analyzinq, 
theorizinq, ar.d do's and d o n t 1 s . Rather than intel lectually 
huntinq for the prcblem, the person qropes for the f e lt 
sense of the prcblem " throuqh-the— body." The person must 
allow the felt sense tc come in its own way. The focuser's
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aim is to qet down to a sinqle feelinq that enc c m p a s s e s  the 
.whole Droblem. It will be a larqe, vaque, formless aura, a 
sense of Mall that." And though it lacks words and details, 
it is concretely sensed as a whcle, sinqle, felt sense. It 
is analogous to listerinq to a symphony and feelinq the 
effect of the entire orchestra as a sinqle immediate whole 
of musical sound. It is unnecessary to know the details of 
the multitude of notes contributed by each separate 
instrument. The full and total effect of the symphony comes 
to you as a whcle without discrete units cr details. In the 
same way, the second movement of focusinq is like trying to 
avoid becoirirq distracted by the horns or the violins, and 
instead allowinq the symphony to be experienced as a whcle 
sinqular effect.
The Third Movement of focusinq is called finding t he 
crux. Havinq contacted the felt sense of ’’all about 
the person now asks for the c rux of the felt sense. In 
’’asking'1 this question, the person deliberately refrains 
from trying tc answer it with intellectual prcfclem-solvinq. 
It requires waitinq fcx the crux to come from the felt sense 
itself. m he person finds he or she can ’’c o m m u n i c a t e ” with 
his or her cwn felt sense without any words, ideas, or 
labels. It is cc ncretely felt throuqh-the-body as ’’there it 
is" even thcuqh the person dees net yet know ’’what it is." 
At this point in the process of focusinq, people often feel 
the first "shift"—  a sensation cf internal movement that 
says "that is it," cr "this is right."
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In review, at this point in the focusinq procedure, the 
shape of the pe r s o n ’ s immediate experiencinq has been ’’m e t , ” 
or " f o u n d , ” or "felt," or "allowed to show i t s e l f ” fviz.
the Second M o v e m e n t ) . In the Third Movement, the person now
has a sinqle felt sense that encompasses the whole 
all-about-ness cf somethinq, and has now ” qone deeper” into 
this larqe, vaque, felt sense to contact the crujf of the 
felt sense. It is important to notice that the individual 
has communicated directly with his or her experiencinq 
without, as yet, recou rse to any particular words cr labels.
The Fourth Movement is called labeling the felj: sense.
Here the person allows words or imaqes to flow cut of the 
felt sense, thereby lettinq the felt sense i d entify or label 
itself. As it has been true from the beqirninq of the
focusinq procedure, it is crucial to avoid fcrcinq words
onto the feelinq by applyinq intellectual hypotheses about 
what it is. Instead the person allcws words tc come and 
f^eels whether the felt sense and the label match. 
Oftentimes, the person finds that the words may flew out of 
the felt sense s i m u t a neously with "feelinq the crux" (the 
Th i r d  Movement). The labels that ccme cut of the felt sense 
could be words, imaqes, thouqhts, music, or any type of 
"s y m b o l ” that serves to label the crux of the felt sense for 
the individual.
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The Fifth Movem ent is called c bee k ing fcacj^  with the 
feeling or " r e s o n a t i n q ." St this staqe, the person takes the 
’’label" that has come from the felt sense, and new "matches" 
it against the feelinq. To do this matchinq, the person 
must continue to s tronqly experience the felt sense. If the 
c o n firming sensation does not come — that is, a 
hodily-sensed awareness of "yes, that's it," or "that's not 
quite it"—  then the person must allcw more accurate words 
to come from the feelinq. However, the iudqement cf whether 
the words, imaqes cr labels are "accurate" trust be made
" throuqh-the-body," If the label is accurate, the person 
will immediately sense a ccnfirminq sensation such as an 
easinq in tension, or a shift in bodily-felt well-teinq. If 
the label is inaccurate, the labelinq will have little or no 
bodily-felt effect, or may even incur discomfort. If the 
labelinq words are somewhat accurate, the perscr will sense 
this bodily, and car then allow ether words tc flew from the 
felt sense, which may more c o r rectly match the felt sense. 
Gendlin [19 81) states that s o m e t i m e s  the q uidinq feelinq 
disappears, leavinq the person with only the words. When 
this happens, it is necessary for the person to let the 
feelinq ccme as it new is (perhaps sliqhtly charqed) before 
he or she can check the label aqainst the feelinq.
The Sixth Movement is called an o t h e r  r ou nd c f  focusing. 
At this pcint, the person has qrasped the felt sensinq and 
found labels which "carry forward" the meaninq of the felt 
sensinq. However, now that the person has "lived with it"
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for a while, it is tine tc qo cn and qet the felt sense of 
"that which" is under whatever body-messaqe has "just been 
received. In short, it is time tc qo back throuqh the cycle 
of focusinq movements once aqain.
In review, we can distinquish between the deliberate 
and the ncn-deliberate aspects cf the focusinq process 
(Gendlin, 1969a; Gendlin and Olsen, 1970). Tryinq to 
maintain the special "set" of focusinq c o n s t i t u t e s  the 
deliberate part of the procedure. This is  the act of 
deliberately forcina oneself to stay quiet and relaxed and 
then carefully attendinq "inwards" to find the felt sense. 
However, within this s p ecific deliberate set, one is 
allowinq "wha tever comes" to arise from the felt sense. 
This requires a dis t i n c t l y  ncn- d e l iberate act cf patiently 
waitinq for words and imaqes to come from the felt sense. 
Meanwhile, cne d e l i b erately refrains from fcrcinq these 
words to come, waitinq for them tc flow natu rally from the 
concrete felt sense of the problem.
For Gendlin, the focusinq prccedure described above is 
certainly net all that experiential psychotherapy is about. 
The focus inq prccedure is intended as a practical tool or 
quide that can be employed usefully in therapy. But 
"focusinq is part of a wider philosophy," which centers 
around the vital importance of "experiencinq" as the basis 
for human livinq (Gendlin, 1981, p. 165). Gendlin 
specifically developed this particular focusinq procedure as
Paqe 57
a means of facilitating the fundamental process of 
" e x p e r i e n c i n q ," which he identifies as esse ntial to 
effective psychotherapy. This is the basis for his 
assertion that focusing can be t a u g h t and used in the 
context of a ry the r a py (Gendlin, 1969a, p. 4; 197 4 b ) . More 
importantly, he arques that the theories of any "school" of 
therapy can be usefully employed as long as these conce pts 
are anchored in the experiential felt sensinq of the 
individual client, and serve to explicate his or her 
immediate exp eriencinq (see Section 9). This is what he 
calls "experiertializinq a method." For example, Gendlin has 
shown how psychoanalytic free association, Junqian active 
imagery. Ratio nal Emctive Therapy, Gestalt rcle-playinq, 
client- centered responding, ope r a n t  situation-re structurinq, 
and systematic desensitizaticn can all involve experiential 
focusinq (Gendlin, 1969a: 1970; 1974b). The fol.lowinq
section will examine this central issue in mere detail, 
discussinq the prcper relationship between theoretical 
concepts and "expe riencinq" in the practice of 
psychotherapy.
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3* Xhe Pole of Kn ow ledg e in Practice.
In several cf his writings, Gendlin has dealt with the 
issue of using clinical theories and c o ncepts in the 
therapeutic process. He has specifically addressed this 
central issue in a recent article entitled, "The Role of 
Knowledge in Practice" [Gendlin, 1974). This article 
presents a fine practical description cf how theoretical 
co ncepts can be used helpfully and harmfully in the practice 
of psychotherapy. It is addressed to an audience that is 
already sympathetic to client-centered and experiential 
psychotherapy, and communicates G e n d l i n ’s pcsiticn on the 
use of conceptual knowledge in a very illuminating fashion. 
However, before outlining Gendlin's basic position with 
regard to the rcle cf knowledge in practice, it would be 
enl ighteninq to first define what Gendlin means by 
"kn owledge," and how it is related to the experiencing 
process.
As Gendlin states, "psych o t h e r a p y is a special area in 
which the art iculaticn of experjejce c o n s tant l y occurs. The 
individual in psychctherapy struaqles with many experiences  
that he has never symbolized before and for which he knows 
no symbols" (Gendlin, 1962a, p. 77, italics added). There 
is no question that accurate verbal and conceptual 
formulations can facilitate the client's efforts tc explore 
and "articulate" the personal meaning that is beira felt in
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any qiven moment. Felt experiencinq quides the choice of 
words and concepts that are used to help the client 
understand the a s - yet-not-articulated meaninq, which he or 
she is presently feelinq. When words, theories, concepts, 
or interpretations are used in direct reference to the 
experiencinq process, they can carry it forward by makinq 
the meanincful feelinq more intense: by clarifyinq its
meaninq; and/or by makinq it more tanqible and capable of 
beinq dealt with. For it is the distinct bcdily-felt 
quality of experiencinq that constitutes cur sense of 
definite krowinq. It is this experiential reference that 
allows us to "know" with cert ainty that a particular 
formulation has functioned to mere or less adequately 
express this or that aspect of a felt meaninq. Thus a felt 
meaninq serves both tc indicate scmethinq potentially known, 
and to indicate accurate and inaccurate conceptualisations 
of it.
Accordinq tc Gendlin, practitioners ca n  employ all 
kinds of disparate clinical theories in therapy provided 
they chan qe the way that the theory was intended to 
flin^ii_oa• "Ke do not qive up on theory; rather, we restore 
theory to its proper relationship to actuality" [Gendlin, 
1973-1979, p. 66). In short, theories function to 
formulate moments of experiencinq to which they are applied; 
they allow an aspect of experiencinq to be seen which is 
then seen on i ts own. Hence there can be many ways of 
conceotualisi r.q a qiven moment cf exper ie n c i r q , and many
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theoretical concepts can ’’brinq o u t ” aspects of experiencinq 
that are a l ready there to be clarified. However, at no time 
does any particular theory itself constitute the actual 
structure cf human experiencinq. With this perspective in 
mind, one could say that it is valuable to be educated in a 
wide variety cf cli n i c a l  theories because ”the mere ways of 
articulatinq human experience one knows the b e t t e r ” 
(Gendlin, 1976-1979, p. 66).
Thus conceptual knowledqe rep resents an extremely 
useful means of explicatinq experiencinq if it is used in 
the proper manner — i.e., in direct reference to 
experiencinq. "Formulations, and concepts and loqic have 
their use precisely in the power to be p r e c i s e , to make 
loqical differences, and by differences tc point at 
something e x p e rient i a 1 that is beinq m is s ed” (Gerdlin, 19 82, 
p. 326, italics a d d e d ) . If a qiven interpretation is 
closely attuned to the on-qoinq felt experiencinq of the 
client, it can often function tc clarify the c l i e n t ’s felt 
meaninq,
Conversely, when ccnceptual knowledqe is
inappropriately used to label the cli e n t ’s present 
experience as a fixed static ” thinq” — and then equates this 
ccnceptual formulation with the felt meaninq which the 
client is exploring—  it inhibits the experiencirq process. 
This is the serious danger of diaqnosis and interpretation 
in therapeutic practice. Diagnosis ’’freezes” the rich and
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multiple meaninqfulness of experiencinq intc a static
"thinq." Similarly, interpretation can seem completely 
"true" in its loqical relation to the client.'s 
verbalizations, and still "miss" the crucial felt meaninq of 
what the client is presently livinq at this moment in 
therapy. This is one manifestation of the earlier 
distinction between conc e p t u a l i z a t i o n  that f u n ctions as the 
explication cf experiencinq, and c c n c eptualizaticn that does 
not [see Section 4).
With this introductory discussion of knowledqe in mind, 
we can new examine G e n d l i n ' s  five pitf a lls of usinq
knowledqe in the practice of psychotherapy:
1. Turning the c l ient into a concept-- There is a 
harmful tendency in cl i n i c a l  practice to try to "fiqure out" 
what is "wrenq" with the client. This prcblem is 
particularly acute when it involves makinq diacncses. The 
use of a diaqnostic label reduces the practitioner's 
sensi tivity to the unique human qualities and expe riencinq 
of the individual client. The danqer is that the therapist 
may deal with the client as a diaqnostic concept, treatinq 
him or her as a " m a n i c -depressive," or "compulsive 
neurotic," rather than enco u n t e r i n q  the client as a unique 
individual.
2. The .biasing .effect—  Another problem with
diaqnostic labelinq, cr " f iqurinq out" the client's problem, 
is that it predisposes the practitioner foften in a subtle
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and unreccanized iiarrer) tc interpret the r e sponses of the 
client in set ways. For example, if a client labeled 
"manic-depressive11 exci tedly tells his therapist about his 
recent thrill at the theater, the prac t i t i o n e r  miqht be 
predisposed tc view this action as evidence of "manic 
behavior" rather than as a personally rewardinq experience. 
The predispcsinq "hiasinq effect" als c tends tc reduce the 
t h e r a p i s t s ’s attention to the c l i e n t ’s immediate  
experiencinq. The ther apist tends to focus mere cn what he 
already supposedly "trews" about the client, instead of 
attendinq clcsely tc the c l i e n t ’s expe r i e n c i n q  in the 
here—a nd-now.
3• ^a Ving " l ogical" a s s u m p t i o n s based on c c n c e pts—  
Yet another danger of applyinq ccncepts is that when the 
concept fits, there- is a subsequent tendency to assume 
additional "facts" about the client that are loqically 
consistent with this concept. For example, if a 
psychoanalyst has labeled his c l i e n t ’s behavior as 
"oral-retentive," he will "loqically" expect to fird certain 
other facts about the early ps ycho-sexual development of the 
client.
4. Differential use of d i a q c cstic conc e p t s —  Gendlin 
believes that, for the most part, p s y c h o lcqists presently do 
not have differential treatments for differing diaqnostic 
classes. Therefore there is a nother clinical danqer of 
inferring different ways of treating people based on
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diagnostic kicwledqe.
5. Static concejijts interfere wjLth process flew—  Usinq 
concepts has the u n p r o d u c t i v e  effect of riqidly fixing what 
the problem is, or fixing how the p e r s o n ’s personality is 
structured. The aiit cf therapy is to facilitate change, and 
therefore the therapist should avoid concepts that serve 
only to fix a bad structure, or solidify a consistently 
troublesome active cr attitude. In G e n d l i n ’s own words,
when a person is trying to sense exactly what is wrong, 
he is sensinq with his organism... From conceptual 
knowinq cf what is wrong, nothing follows... In the 
experiencing of what is wrong, positive forces are 
involved..., whereas in the con c e p t s  of what is wrong, 
no c h a n a e - a v e n u e s  are open [Gendlin, 1974, p. 277).
At  this juncture, we h a v e  outlined five ways in which 
di agnostic labeling and static concepts can be used to the 
detriment of therapy. Not only can such knowledqe instill 
harmful biases and constrain the t h e r a p i s t ’s respe nsiveness 
to the client, it can also hinder the free flew of the
client's own experiencing. There is always a danqer that 
the client will "intrciech" the process-fixatinq concepts of 
the practiticner because of the therapist's authoritative 
influence and "e x p e r t ” direction. Clients typically tend to 
overvalue the observations and interpretations of the
therapist, often in contra diction of their cwn iudqment. 
For example, a client labeled "manic-depressive" may tend to 
interpret instances of his or her own behavior in accordance 
with this diagnosis. In other words, the client may
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substitute ac alternative "bad structure" in deference to 
the therapist's interpre t a t i o n  and analysis cf "what the 
problem is." Gendlin's position is that therapy shculd focus 
on the client's pro c e ss of e x p e r i e n c i n q , and thus 
concentrate cr flow and chanqe, instead of formulating 
static conceptions cf what is happeninq. This crucial point 
is pursued further in terms of how knowledqe can be usefully 
employed in clinical practice.
In contrast to the five pitfalls, Gendlin presents 
seven h e l p f u 1 uses of k n o wledqe (see Gendlin, 1974a, pp. 
278-289). These seven "key rules" center on one fundamental 
principle: 11The key to a saje and h e l pful use cf any a nd
every kind oj k n o wledqe lies JLn the refer en ce to. and 
criterion role o f t h e  directly felt sense and its steps" 
[Gendlin, 1974, p. 2 R C ) . These are the seven ways that 
knowledqe can be used po sitively by the practicing 
t h e r a p i s t :
! lwavs jnc h p r  concepts in felt experiencing—  at 
all times, the therapist should endeavor to make knowledqe 
felt. This means that therapy should focus on 
felt-meaninqfulness as "that which" is immediately "known" 
in awareness (as it is b o d i l y - f e l t ) , and which encompasses 
all the personal meanings, values, perceptions, and past 
experiences of the individual client in that qiven moment of 
living. This rich well-sprinq cf felt-meaninqfulness should
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be the sour ce of explicatinq concepts as well as the 
criterion cf their explicative pcwer. For instance, if a
hypothesis such as "fear of failure" is suqqested to the
client, ther the therapist mtst help the client to qet in 
touch with his felt experiencinq in order to check the
concept aqairst .the felt sense itself. T h i s  allows both 
therapist and client to assess whether the c oncept "fear of 
failure" has ex plicated experiencinq [e.q., "yes, that 
really f eelj riqht") , or whether it has been "irerely" a 
conceptualization fe.q., "maybe so, but that lust doesn't 
feel qu ite ri q h t " ) . No concepts or hypotheses about the
nature- of the experienced problem should be offered without 
an immediate return to the felt experiencinq from which the 
ideas have ccire.
2. A lways p u r su e the e x p er i e ntial e f tget s of 
knowledqe—  If the application of a particular concept has 
led to a bodily-felt chanqe or shift in the experiencinq of 
the client, then the therapeutic work must pursue this 
chanqe in felt sensinq. The danqer of successful concepts 
is that both client and therapist can become overly 
impressed with the concept, and forqet about its immediate 
felt siqnificance. Instead they elaborate on the concept 
and pursue its loqical implications. However, the value of 
the concept has been lost when direct contact with the 
experiential effect is lost.
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For example, i aaqine that the c o u n s e l o r ’s hypothesis of 
"maybe it is a fear of failure," is met with an exuberant 
affirmation by the client. The correctness of this concept 
is "-judqed" by the c l i e n t ’s satisfyinq feelinq of 
tension-reduction, which characterizes the "carryinq 
forward" of his or her expe riencinq in the qiven moment.
Eut this dees not mean that "fear of failure" was like a
static thinq (i.e., an "unconscious thouqht"), which had 
been lyinq there until it was accurately labeled in words. 
Rather, it is that, in this qiven moment, for this
individual client, this particular symbolization explicated 
some aspect cf the client's experiencinq, and carried
forward its implicit meaninafulness. But a different
phrasinq cf words, or perhaps even a different concept, may 
have als o functioned to explicate the person's exp eriencinq 
in this qiver rrcment. Similarly, the same conceptualization 
of "fear of failure" miqht no lenqer function as explication 
of experiencinq sev eral moments later. For this reason, 
therapy should always be qrounded in the experiencinq 
process rather than based cn the concepts applied to 
experiencinq. In turn, changes in e x p e riencira should 
always be followed, rather than the logical implications of 
the concept itself. In this instance, it is important to 
stay with the bodily-sensed chanqe in experiencinq that 
resulted freir usinq the concept of "fear cf failure" rather 
than pursue further loqical implications cf the concept 
itself. For exanple, a therapist could easily qc astray by
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loqically assuminq that because the client has a "fear of 
fai l u r e , ” the client trust therefore commit sel f-sabotaqinq 
acts.
3. P r e v iously successfu l cc ncepts should always be 
9 verthrown bjjj la t e_r e x p e r i e n tial e f f e cts—  The therapist 
should not be concerned with hew correct or consistently 
accurate his concepts have been. Thus, no matter how 
precise a concept miqht have been — even if it had yielded 
tremendous qains in experiential felt chanqe—  later 
contradictions cf this con cept should be welcomed. In fact, 
the felt sense, which the concept helped one to find, may 
often act to chanqe the basis of that assistinq concept.
h. a felt sense i s  mul t i.pie—  As we have seen, one of 
the d efining c h aracteristics of a "felt s e n s e ” is its 
complex whole quality. There are man^ potential aspects of 
any qiven felt sense that can be differentiated and 
specified, hut the whole felt sense itself is always 
"broad,” or "r o u n d . ” It is felt as a " m a s s , ” or felt as a 
whole sensing cf the mcment. As Gen dlin says, there are 
"many, many potential m e a n i n g s ” contained in any qiven felt 
sense, and therefore there is never a sinqle "correct" 
expli cation cf a felt sense. Many specific concepts can be 
said from a mcment’ s whole feelinq of somethinc—  meaninq 
that many possible concepts can be valid and useful in 
explicating the felt sense in that qiven moment. Therefore 
it is inadequate and inexpedient for a therapist to rely
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exclusively upon a specific fixed conception cf the problem 
as defininq what is occurrinq in the therapeutic experience. 
This harmful use of knowledqe in clinical practice tends to 
narrow the process of experiencinq to a static event,
" freezing" it as this cr that p s y c h o l o q i c a 1 experience. Eut 
e xperiencinq always contains much more mea ninq than is held 
in the words cr c oncepts used to describe it.
5 . Sensing intc e x p e riencing yields further jrcvement—  
By enterirq into and feelinq the whcle of a felt sense, one
enters into a "moving living process," from which further
"steps" of movement can be articulated. Direct felt sensinq 
in constantly mcvinq and chanqinq, and the concepts which
refer to it must also chanqe with it. Concepts, by nature,
are static, while experiencinq is a c o n s t a n t l y  chanqinq
bodily-felt process of felt meaninq,
5. E.eccgnise e x per i enci n g as a rich texture and f l o w , 
and not as the par t i c ular c o n c e p tual pattern a p p lied to it—  
Theories such as "the Oedipus complex," or "masculine
protest," or "identity crisis," should never be taken
literally as real st ructures that constitute the
experiencinq cf the individual client. Human life is a rich 
texture and flow. Any theory or conceptua l i z a t i o n  refers to 
only part cf the "qlc bally felt texture of living," At 
times, co n c e p t s  and t h e o retical patterns may serne usefully 
to "carry forward" aspects of this experiencinq, but human 
life is never lust one such pattern. In other wcrds, the
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rich flowirq texture of experiencinq is responsive to
various patterning concepts, but experiencinq itself is
never "-just.” these static structures or fixed patterns. As
experiencinq chanqes, one pattern may serve well in one 
moment and be co mpletely i n a p p r opriate a moment later. Thus 
one must "allow the same experience already havirq one set 
of concepts fittinq to it, to still be there for other 
concepts as well" (Gendlin, 1974, p. 288).
7. T r a ns late t he c r ies into likely f e_l t di pensions of 
£2tperiencij;.9—  When the therapist does enqaqe in reasoninq 
and h y p o t h e sis-qeneraticn based upon a particular theory, he 
or she should "keep quiet" about his or her thinking, and
avoid interruptinq the client's experiencinq process with
subsequent e x p l a nations or recommendations. Instead, the
therapist should think of how the client is likely to be
feeling, based on the assumption that the theoretical 
premise holds valid i r. this moment. The therapist should 
then check tc see if the client is indeed experiencinq that 
feelinq which is " p r e dicted" by the theory. This is vastly 
different from intellec t u a l l y  explaininq a theory at 
someone. Fcr example, the therapist may sense that the
client's experiencinq involves an "inferiority complex." The 
practitioner should refrain from defining what an
inferiority complex is and explaininq what its loqical 
ramificaticns are for the client. Father, the therapist 
would use Adlerian theory in this instance to infer what the 
client is likely to be fe e ling and responds to t^at. Thus,
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the practitioner might ask, ndo you feel weak arc impotent 
when that happens?"
In summary, Gen dlin arques that conceptual kno'wledqe 
must always be used it reference to direct experiencinq. 
Above all, it is cr u c i a l  to allow concepts to "c c m e from" a 
felt sense, in con t r a s t  to applyinq c o ncepts to a felt 
sense. Practitioners must always use concepts with 
experiencinq, and never use iust conce pts alone, reqardless 
of how effective the concepts seem to be. Moreover, it is 
the bodily-felt efject of usinq concepts, which constitutes 
the crit erion for iudqinq the value of any qiven 
c onceptualivation of experiencinq. Distinct "steps" or 
"shifts" in felt expe r i e n c i n q  characterize therapeutically 
effective concepts, while the application of ineffective 
concepts yields no felt chanqe. Moreover, when a felt shift 
does occur, it is that bodily-sensed chanqe which must be 
pursued, not the intellectual implications of the concept 
which influenced that chanqe. Finally, since concepts are 
static, they tend to "fix" or "freeze" the flcwinq texture 
of experiencinq into set "contents." Hence over-reliance on 
concepts presents a continual threat to the ever-chanqinq, 
movinq life process of experiencinq that is sc vital to 
therapeutic growth.
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In clcsirq, we can now understand why many 
insiqht-oriented therapists fail to qround verbalizations in 
the felt experie rcinq process from which these 
conceptualizations ccme. The? are iqnorant cf the felt 
siqnificance of experiencinq, and believe they can overcome 
the emotional problem by pursuinq the loqical implications 
of insiqhts, cr by intellectually "figurinq cut11 the
underlyinq causes cf the problem (for instance, Adler, 1956; 
Fenichel, 1945; Alexander and French, 1946; Franh and Asher, 
1951; Freud, 1905; Mullahy, 1952). On the ether hand, 
catharsis-oriented therapists fail to disti nguish between 
felt sensinq and emotion (Scheff, 1979; Nichcls, 1974;
Nichols and 2ax, 1977). Therefore they dc not understand 
that emotions are net the same as direct experiencinq, nor 
that "emotions themselves" are "about" some more immediate
felt meaninq. Hence cathartists endeavor tc simply vent the
bothersome encticns without attendinq a ppropriately to the 
meaninqful experiential qround of these emotions.
9. Exp e r i e n t i al P s y c ho t h e r apy Cist inguished From 
Client-C e n tered T h e r a p y .
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Historically, experiential psychotherapy developed from 
Carl Poqers' c l ient-centered therapy. This development will 
fce discussed in detail in Ch a p t e r  3. However, for the 
present purposes of describinq experiential psychotherapy, 
we can use the contrast between the two approaches as a way 
of further clarifyinq the defininq qualities of the 
experiential method (see Gendlin, 1974b). Stated in brief, 
G e n d l i n ’s clinical experience with client-centered therapy 
led him to the recoqnition of what he calls "the vital 
essence" of F o q e r s ’ therapeutic approach (Gendlir., 1974b, p. 
211). As Geidlin qained a better understandinq cf iust what 
it was that made c l ient-centered therapy sc effective, he 
modified his approach to facilitate this essential quality.
In the fcllcwinq quote, Gendlin acknowledges some of 
the most important contributions of the client-centered  
movement and its lastinq impact on the field of 
psychotherapy.
Client-centered therapy... first broke the 
dominance net only of psychoanalysis, but also of the 
pseudomedical idea that a therapist practices 
techniques, and that it is these that qet someone well. 
Rogers (1961) e m p h a s i z e d  the the r a p i st as a g e n u i ne 
r s o n , rather than techniques... Other contributions 
of c l i ent-centered therapy too, have been absorbed. To 
mention a few: re s e arch with unashamed tajse re cording of 
ongoing therapy is no lonqer exclusive to 
client-centered therapy... Similarly, most therapists 
today accept emphasis on the p r e s e n t, and reqect the 
total focus on the past that characterized 
psychoanalysis. The emphasis on feeling, anc reiection 
of pure irtellectualizinq, which client-centered therapy 
beqan, is widely shared today. Similarly, the 
client-centered idea that the t h e r a p ist ’s feelings 
toward _the client are not necessarily a_n unreal 
”c ountertransference" is now widespread. Heal relating 
is widely accepted. The face-to-face way of doing
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therapy, rather than the infantilizinq couch, is used 
today by all but orthodox psychoanalysis (Gendlin, 
1974b, p. 213, italics added).
However, despite these many valuable contributions, 
Gendlin (1974b) asserts that the "essence and crux" of 
client-centered therapy has not been, learned by the field. 
In fact he admits his own failure to emphasize this quality 
mere often in his writinqs (Gendlin, 1974b, p. 2 14). 
Basically, this "essence" is a very special kind of 
listeninq (i.e., what Rcqers calls "active listerinq"). It 
is not merely reflectinq what the client has said. It is 
respondinq that stays directly in touch with the c l i e n t s  
experiencinq. It is a careful listeninq response that helps 
the client tc stay in touch with and enter intc his or her 
feelinqs (i.e., felt meaninqs) .
Gendlin (1974b) states that two new additicrs to this 
special "Fcqerian listeninq" characterize current 
client-centered therapy. Hi r s t  cf all, client-centered 
therapists have learned the importance of e x a ct s pec ificity 
in respondinq to the client. Inaccurate responses or vaque 
approximations cf what the client is feelinq are net helpful 
and tend to interfere with the client's efforts to "hold on 
to" what he cr she is feelinq deeply. "Today we den't stand 
for that, we want tc say it exactly as the person feels it, 
and we don't mind tryinq three times... We recccnize that 
the c l i e n t ’s reaction is a comeback to our inaccuracy" 
(Gendlin, 1974b, p. 2 15).
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The seccr.d " a 3 e lement” to client-centered therapy is a 
new insistence that the client check inside tc see if the 
c o u n s e l o r ’s response has accurately captured exactly what 
the client is feelinq riqht now. This inner checkinq is 
necessary in order tc become exact and stay in contact with 
what is immediately "there" in the client's experiencinq. 
This overcomes the tendency of bcth therapist and client to 
"settle for" merely approximate concepts and thereby fcrqet 
about what is beinq e x p e r i e n t i a l l y  felt in the here-and-now.
Gendlin holds that these two new specifications of 
inner checkirq and exactitude have made client-centered 
therapy more "exjge rj.e r tial." In fact, this new emphasis on 
the e x p e r iencinq process is the basis for what Hart calls 
"the e x p e riential phase" in the evolution of client-centered 
therapy [Hart, 1970). The r a p i s t s  are now more aware of the 
unique essence of c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy, which has been 
its cul t i v a t i o n  of listeninq responses that provide a 
constant baseline fcr stayinq in touch with the c l ient's 
experiencinq. It is this special client-centered response 
that points directly at the cli e n t ' s  felt meaninq, which 
Gendlin now calls "the experiential response" [Gendlin, 
1968b, 1974b) .
There are a number of a d d itional ways that Gerdlin has 
"reformulated" clie n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy into an
"experiential" apprcach. One cf these has been tc convert 
the ’ three vital therapist attitudes of client-centered
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therapy into experiential terms: Gendlin feels that the real 
meaninq of empathy, congruence, and unconditicral positive 
reqard is the t h e r a p i s t ’s use cf his or her own onqoinq
experiential process (Gendlin, 1970). Thus emjua th ic 
understanding entails c ommunicatinq one's sensitivity to the 
c l i e n t ’s felt meaninq, referrinq directly to it, and helpinq 
the client himself cr herself tc fccus on it and further
unfold its meaninqs. C o n g r u ence refers to consistent 
respondinq that auth e n t i c a l l y  flews from out of the 
therapist's cwn cnqcinq felt experiencinq. Finally, 
unconditional posi t i v e regard means valuinq the client as a 
person, ever' though the therapist may dislike the c l i e n t ’s 
behavior or the situation the client is struqqlinq with. 
This means always respondinq positively to the feelinqs of 
the client reqardless of h i s  cr her actual behavior or
illness.
Another way that Gendlin has "experientialized" 
client-centered therapy has been to chanqe many of its 
" d o n ’t” rules into " d o 1’ rules (Gendlin, 1964b, 197C, 1974b). 
Gendlin nctes that many of the gui d e l i n e s  for 
client-centered therapy are stated as neqative "don't" 
rules—  such as d o n ’ t interpret, d c n ’t ask questions, don't 
answer questions, don't interrupt, don't express your 
feelinqs, and so cn. According to G e n d l i n ’s experiential 
approach, any of these rules can be "violated," provided 
that the client is "reallj listened to before, after, and 
continually." Thus the "essence" of the client-centered
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response is carefully retained as the baseline for therapy. 
This e s s e n c e  is a h eedful listeninq response that is closely 
attuned to the immediate felt experiencinq cf the client.
It helps the client sharpen the intensity of his or her
experiencinq, and thereby carry forward its felt meaninq. 
However, the listeninq response is now used more precisely 
to focus on the client's subiective felt process by 
fosterinq ccrstant inward checkinq cf verbal responses with 
inner feelinqs. In this way, client-centered respcndinq has 
"steps" that ccntinually "unfold" cr "carry fcrvard" the 
client's experiencinq.
These ’.'steps" refer to a qeneral pattern of siqnificant 
moments in the therapeutic process that further the
experiencinq cf the client. This pattern can be 
conceptually distinquished as "steps," but there are no
inherent units into which the process can be divided. In 
the first "step," the client has teen accurately heard and 
responded tc. In the second "step," the therapist and 
client check this verbal response aqainst the client's felt 
sense. Then the next "step" occurs when seme meaninqful 
aspect of the c l i e n t ’s felt sense is carried fcrward. For 
instance, the client miqht find his or her experiencinq has 
been enhanced atd intensified in awareness, or perhaps some 
aspect of its implicit meaninq has been clarified and 
"correctly" labeled. Guided by this unaerstandinq, 
client-centeied respondinq actually becomes "experiential 
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meaning-- and focused instead on "mere" intellectual 
concepts that are far removed from immediate feelinq life. 
The "fundamental axiom" of client-centered therapy is that- 
the client has the potential tc know what is best and riqht 
for himself cr herself, and can trust his cr her own 
subiective experience as a reliable quide for livinq. 
Attendinq tc a t h e r a p i s t ’s interpretation moves the "center" 
of focus from the client's inward feelinqs tc an outward 
intellectual sphere that lacks immediate tanqifcle feelinq.
In contrast, Gerdlin asserts that interpretation can be 
used therapeutically as lonq as it is done "experientially" 
— that is, by usinq it in direct reference tc immediate 
feelinq. Thus# for example, a male client may sense a heavy 
round feelirq inside him as he speaks about his early family 
life. The experiential therapist reccqnizes that this 
feelinq constitutes the way the client's childhood 
e xperiences are beinq presently lived. Thus the therapist 
can apply Freud's Cedipal theory in this situation by 
inferring what sort of feelinqs the client should be 
experiencinq in this moment based cn that theory. The 
therapist does not enoaqe in an intellectual e x p l anation of 
the Oedipal interpretation. Instead, having inferred what 
the feelinq response should be, the therapist can inquire 
about that. For instance, if the therapist reccqnizes a 
theme of conpetiticn with the father in the client's 
descriptions cf his family, he cr she miqht respond, "You 
must be feeling iealcus and anary towards your father riqht
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n o w . .."
Another traditional ’’d o n ' t ” rule for the 
client-centered therapist has been "don't i n t e r r u p t . ” 
Therapists were advised to refrain from merticrdnq their 
confusion alcut something the client said rather than 
interrupt the client. This rule was intended to keep 
attention focused on clarifyinq what the client was feelinq, 
which was deemed far more important than pursuinq the 
therapist's cuestions about it. On the contrary, Gendlin 
asserts that it is healthy for the therapist tc express his 
or her puzzlement cn such occasions because it actually 
helps the client clarify these feelinqs for himself or 
herself. Furthermore, the client benefits from the 
experience of havinq the therapist closely fcllcwinq and 
prizing his cr her every step. Indeed, this is an 
expression cf unconditional positive regard precisely 
because the therapist accepts what the client says as worth 
respondinq tc.
As a final example of a "dcn't” rule, client-centered 
therapy has traditionally instructed the therapist aqainst 
expressing his or her opinions and feelinqs. The aim here 
was to avoid burdening the client with the therapist's 
feelinqs and to maintain " c e ntering” on the client. 
However, tjbe d i e  n t 1 s exf>er jencincj process cannot be 
"carried for w a r d ” bj re s p o nses that do not ccme from a 
genuine e ther person. Historically, Foqers himself
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increasinaly valued the importance of such 11 cccc rue n e e ” on 
the part of the therapist. The client needs "an open and 
self-expressive therapist, a visible, and real person who can 
be lived with" (Gendlin, 1974b, p. 224). If the therapist 
is not honest with his or her reactions, then he cr she is 
not qenuinely "there” for the client to i n t e r a c t  with. With 
an actively self-expressive therapist, the client does not 
have to imaqine what is qoinq cn inside the ether person. 
Moreover, the self-expressive therapist provides an on-qoinq 
"model" of a person who listens inside tc his or her
feelinqs, and uses these feelinqs as a reliable and
trustworthy quide fcr respondinq. Of course, in drawinq 
upon his cr her own experiencinq, the therapist must be 
careful not tc intrude on the interactional "space" that the 
client needs tc allcw his or her cwn experiential felt sense
to form. As lonq as this caution is exercised, Gendlin
feels it is healthy fcr the therapist to speak honestly of 
his or her feelinqs because it allows the therapist to be 
more qenuine in the therapeutic relationship.
Per h a p s  the best way to communicate the difference 
between experiential and c l ient-centered therapy is to 
present an actual case example. In the follcwirq therapy 
excerpt, the experiential co u n s e l c r  will violate the " d o n ’t" 
rules of client-centered therapy in order to "stay with" the 
immediately sensed feelinqs of the client:
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CITENT: I' ve been doinq rcthinq but takinc care of 
Karen since s h e ’s back frcm the hospital. I haven't 
been with me at all. And when I do qet time new, I iust 
want tc rur cut and do another chore.
LISTENER: You h a v e n ’t teen able to be with yourself 
for sc lenq, and even when ycu can now, you don't.
CLIENT: She needs this and she needs that and no 
matter what I dc for her it isn't enouqh. All her 
family 'are like that. It makes me anqry. Her father 
was like that, tcc, when he was sick, which went on for 
years. They're always neqative and qrumpy and down on 
each other.
LISTENER: It makes you anqry the way she is, the 
way they are.
CLIENT: Yes. I'm anqry. Damn riqht. It's a poor
climate. Livirq in a poor climate. Always qray. 
Always down on somethinq. The ether day, when I—
LISTENER [interrupts): Wait. Ee a minute with your 
anqry feelinq. Just feel it for a minute. See what 
more is in it. Don't think anythinq...
fexcerpt taken frcm Gendlin, 1981, pp. 123-12N).
In the abcve excerpt, one can see the experiential 
therapist is relyinq heavily upon client-centered listeninq 
and "reflecticn cf feelinqs." Like a Eoqerian, he first 
listens carefully for the "feelinq edqe," lcckirq for the
essential feelinqs beinq expressed in the m e s s a q e . He then
reflects this felt meaninq back to the speaker. However,
towards the end of the seqment, the listener senses an 
opportune trcnent tc focus more directly on the client's 
immediate felt meaninq. Notice hew the listener actually
ipterrugts the speaker and offers a clearly "direc t iv e"
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suqqestion tc held cntc the feelinq and see "what irore is in 
i t . ”
In summary, Gendlin disticquishes his brand of 
"experiential psychotherapy" frcm client-centerec therapy in 
terms of the manner in which he uses client-centered 
respondinq. He actively focuses on the feelinq process of 
the patient at all times, even thouqh this nay involve 
vio'latinq the non-directive "don't" rules of traditional 
client-centered therapy. F r e quently this necessitates 
therapist self-expression, and, in contrast to 
client-centered therapy, Gendlin strcnqly urces honest 
direct interaction that draws upon the therapist's own 
experiencinq process. For Gendlin, client-centered 
respondinq is ineffective and wasteful to the deqree that 
the "reflection of feelinqs" fails to focus on the client's 
immediate felt meaninqs or lacks "exact specificity" in 
articulatinq these feelinqs. Finally, Gendlin's
experiential psychotherapy is distinquished from 
client-centered t herapy by the reqular use of the "focusinq" 
procedure (described in Section 7). This focusinq procedure 
involves quided Instructions and deliberate "directive" 
efforts o r  the part cf the therapist, which is acainst the 
client-centered philosophy of non-intervention.
CHAPTER III - 
THE EMERGENCE OF EXPERIENTIAL P S Y C H OTHERAPY—
ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT, 
AND SUPPORTING RESEARCH.
10. In troducticp—  The Five P e r iods of E v o l u t i o n .
Gendlin states th a t  ’’c l ient-centered therapy has helped 
give birth to experiential psyc h o t h e r a p y ” (Gendlin, 1970, p, 
544), In this third chapter, vie will explore the 
significance of this remark in terms of two primary issues. 
First of all, we need .to clarify G e n d l i n ’s place within the 
broader historical context of Carl R o g e r s ’ client-centered 
theory and experimental research. Secondly, we need to 
establish the practical, theoretical, and philosophical 




The first step toward a.chievinq these goals is to 
examine the historical development of the client-centered 
movement. Several helpful histories are available for this 
purpose: notably, K i r s c h e n b a u m 's [1979) bioqraphy On
Becoming, Carl Rogers; H a r t ’s [1 970) brief history of "The 
Development of C l i e n t - Centered Therapy"; Shlien and 
Zirarinq's [1966/1970) brief history of "Research Directives 
and Methods in Clie n t - C e n t e r e d  Therapy"; and Gendlin and 
Tomlinson's (1967) qeneral description of the development of 
"The Process C o n ception and its Measurement." The 
information and frameworks provided in these four sources 
can be synthesized into a useful picture of the history of 
the client-centered movement.
Basically, the client-centered approach has evolved 
through five distinguishable periods or staqes, which are 
suqqested in outline below;
Period I - Nondirective Therajgy (1940-1 948): Emphasis
on facilitating positive change through nondirective 
TECHNIQUES; focus on client.
Period II - Early Cli e nt-Centered T herapy (1948-1951); 
Emphasis on facilitating positive change through ATTITUDES; 
focus on therapist.
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Period III - Mature C lient-Centered Therafii 
(1951-19 51): Emphasis on facilitating positive chanqe
through the RELATIONSHIP; focus on both therapist and 
client.
Period IV - The P r ocess C oncejp ti on (1957— 1962): 
Emphasis on facilitating Rogers' con c e p t i o n  of the 
therapeutic PROCESS; focus on the cl i e n t  in therapy.
Period V - Exp e r i e n t i al Psyc hotherapy (1962-present): 
Emphasis on facilitating G e n d l i n ’s notion of the therapeutic 
EXPERIENCING PROCESS; focus on enhancinq and training client 
experiential focusing skills in therapy.
The first three historical stages will be briefly 
described, and will merely outline the general historical 
context of client-centered therapy (see Section 11). 
Gendlin eraerqes durinq the fourth staqe of development. His 
ideas and research in this time period were inti irately tied 
to the broader movement of client-centered theory and 
research (see Sections 12-15). The fifth stage marks 
Gendlin's departure from mainstream c l i e n t - centered therapy 
and pursuit of his own philosophical and scientific 
interests (see Sections 16 and 17). Thus, a detailed 
examination cf the fourth and fifth periods will elucidate 
the influence of the client-centered approach cn Gendlin's 
work, his role in implementing c l ient-centered therapy 
research, and the reasons for his eventual departure from
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the client-centered orientation.
11. The Early Evolution of C l i e n t - C e n ter ed T h e r a p y :
Periods I* £1* III 1 1 9 4 0 ^ 9 5 7 1 -
K i r s c henbaum ( 1979) probably offers the icost useful 
starting point for r e v i e w i n q  the evclution of 
client-centered therapy. He arques that all of Cairl Roqers* 
work has been based on a sinqle 11 fu n damental a x i o m ” 
(Kirschenbaum, 1979, pp. 75-76). Carl Roqers qradually 
came to believe in this cen t r a l  assumption, which is now 
called ” the actualizinq t e n d e n c y , ” durinq his ea r l y  years at 
the Child Guidance Clinic in Rochester (1923-1939):
Host children (people), if qiven a reasonably 
nor m a l  environment which meets their own emotional, 
intellectual, and social needs, have within themselves 
sufficient drive toward health to respond and make a 
comfortable adjustment to life T (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 
75, quoting Roqers (1 939) 1.
This quidinq ass u m p t i o n  of an individual drive within 
every bioloqical orqanism toward qrowth, health, and 
adiustment determined that Roqerian 'therapy would become a 
systematic effort to create an environment which facilitated 
this inherent capacity. Basically, to create an environment 
that supports qrowth is to allow the person to be healthy.
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Therefore the history of the client-centered approach can be 
seen as the story of qradually d i s c o v e r i n q , refininq, and 
researching the precise f actors that facilitate the inherent 
orqanismic drive toward health, and then implementing these 
particular ther a p e u t i c  behaviors and a t t i tudinal conditions. 
In the following history, we will find that the focus of 
client-centered therapy qradually evolved from an initial 
concentration on nondirective techniques; to the key 
attitudes of the therapist; to the therapeutic relationship 
i t s e l f ; to the subiective process of experience and chanqe 
in therapy.
Period X ~ Nondirective Therapy _[_19 40-1.9481.
The first stage of development can be called the period 
of nondirective therapy. Durinq this period, there was a 
stronq e m phasis cn non d i r e c t i v e  techniques and a sharp focus 
on the client. The t h e r a p i s t ’s participation was carefully 
restricted to avoiding intervention, and helpinq tc release 
the assumed qrowth potential in each client. Thus, aside 
from creatinq an atmosphere of permissiveness, and 
refraininq from directive intervention of any kind, the 
therapist was limited to the application of twc primary 
techniques: "reflection of feelinqs" and "simple
acceptance." At this time, re flection of feelinqs basically 
consisted of ["mere") therapist re-statemerts of the 
semantic meaninq of cli e n t  expressions. The purpose of this 
technique was to help the client clarify his or her
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perceptions and feelings. Sirajgle acceptance was the 
t.echnigue of giving brief aff i r m a t i o n s  in response to client 
expressions. For example, the therapist might say, "I s e e , ” 
or "mm-htnm," to indicate his or her careful a ttentiveness to 
the c l i e n t ’s communications. For the most part, however, 
the non-directive therapist was distinctively passive in 
therapy.
Even during this formative period, there was a 
prominent concern with scientific analysis and validation 
that would characterize the client-centered movement 
throughout its history. As noted by Shlien and Zimring 
(1970), research in this period made several important 
contributions: the first systematic use of electrical
recordings of actual therapy cases; the definition of 
therapy-descriptive concepts; the development of obiective 
measurements cf these concepts; and the application of these 
measures to interview material. At this time, mcst of the 
research relied up o n  con t e n t  analyses of client and 
counselor responses using c lassification systems for 
identifying and counting types of in-therapy behavior.
Period II - Early C l i e n t - C e n t e r e d  Therapy (.1 9 4 8-1 951) .
The second stage of evolution can be called the period 
of early client-centered therapy. In the late 1940's, 
influenced by his own c l inical experiences, Carl Sogers 
began to fccus more attention on the t h e r a p i s t 's feelings
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and the key importance of the attitudinal conditions
provided by the therapist. With the eventual incorporation 
of the concept of conqruence in the years 1949— 1951, Roqers
proposed that the really crucial therapeutic factors were
the attitudes of acceptance {later renamed unconditional 
positive r e q a r d ) , empathic understanding, and conqruence. 
It was this shift in emphasis from the t e c h niques of 
nondirection to the special qrowth-proraotinq attitudes of 
the therapist, which d istinquishes the period of early 
client-centered therapy.
Durinq this time, Roqers was also developinq a theory 
of personality and personality chanqe, which was "basically 
p h enomeno l og i c al in character, and relies heavily upon the 
concept of the self as an explanatory construct" {Roqers, 
1951, p. 532, italics added). In his theory, Roqers
stressed the importance of conqruence between an 
i n d i v i d u a l ’s self-concept and his personal e x p e riences and 
perceptions. Roqers and D y m o n d ’s classic book.
P sychoth erapy and Personality Chanqe {1954), is a basic
summary of the research conducted durinq this period. Much 
of this research c o n c e n t r a t e d  on R o q e r s ’ notion of
conqruence, using c a t e q o r y  systems applied to recorded
verbatim interviews. There was also an important new 
emphasis on relatinq this information to the actual outcome 
of therapy.
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Of special note was the picneerinq work on the Q-sort 
method [Butler and Haiqh, 1954), which offered an effective 
method of quantitatively measurinq individual self-concept, 
chanqes in self-concept, and decrees of conqruence between 
self-concept and experiences. The Q-sort typically consists 
of 75 to 100 self-descriptive statements printed on cards. 
The client then "sorts" these cards into piles ranqinq from 
’’very characteristic cf me" to "not at all characteristic of 
me." Based on the c l i e n t ’s distribution of the cards, the 
researcher can obtain a concrete picture of the client's 
self-concept. Moreover, by administerinq several Q-sorts, 
the researcher can obtain measurable profiles of the 
client's view of h imself or herself (the self-concept), the 
client's view of how he or she would like to be [the ideal 
self), and even the client's perception of what "the averaqe 
person" is like. By coraparinq the discrepancy between the 
placement of the s e l f - d e s c r i p t i v e  statements in these 
Q-sorts, the researcher can measure the deqree of 
"conqruence" between the cli e n t ' s  self-concept and how he or 
she would like to be. Furthermore, by administerinq the 
Q-sorts at various times durinq the course of treatment, the 
researcher can use the Q-sort as a measure of c h a nge in the 
client's self-concept and ideal self-concept. The general 
research hypothesis predicted increasing conqruence between 
the client's self-ccncept and ideal self, and increasing 
conqruence between self-concept and experiences, durinq the 
course of treatment. Thus, the Q-sort provided a useful
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measure of personality change as a result of therapy. For 
this reason, the remarkable methodology of the Q-sort would 
continue to play a large role In research throughout the 
history of client-centered therapy.
E^ITiod III r Ma ture C li e n t-C e n t e r e d Therapy [195 1 - 1 957) .
The third stage in the e v olution of the client-centered  
approach can be ca l l e d  the period of mature client-centered 
therapy. This period is chiefly c haracterized by a - new 
emphasis on the therapeutic r e l ationship. In short, the 
therapeutic attitudes of congruence, unconditional positive 
regard, and e m pathic u n d e r s tanding must be lived and 
experienced by both client and therapist in order for 
positive change to occur. Moreover, there is a clear 
realization in this period that effective ’’reflection of 
feelings” concentrates on the f e e lings and emotions in 
client verbalizations, rather than the mere semantic 
content.
The essence of this period is captured in R o g e r s ’ 
classic paper, ’’The Necessary and Sufficient C o n ditions of 
T herapeutic Personality C h a n g e ” [Rogers, 1957). Here Rogers 
clearly recoqnized the necessity of the the r a p i s t ' s  active 
role in setting the con d i t i o n s  of therapy. He also realized 
it is necessary that the client is presently suffering and 
perceives the establishment of these conditions for growth. 
Thus Rogers proposed six essential conditions for
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therapeutic chanqe. First of all, [1) there must be some
type of relationship between therapist and client, and 
secondly, (2) the client must be in a state of psycholoqicai 
discomfort. Then it is n e c essary that the therapist provide 
the three crucial atti t u d i n a l  conditions. The therapist
must be (3) c o n q r u e n t  and qenuine in the relationship, (4) 
feel u n c o n d itional positive reqard for the client, and (5) 
experience an e m p a t h i c  u n d e r s t a n d i n q  of the client's 
internal frame of reference. Lastly, f6) the client must 
recoqnize that these conditions have been achieved. The 
research in this period focused on relatinq these six 
conditions to successful outcome in therapy. There was also
continuinq refinement of the Q-sort method as a way of
measurinq conqruence and personality chanqe as formulated in 
Roqers' self-concept theory.
12. The P r o cess Con c e p t i on in C l ie n t -c e n t e r ed Wor k .
Period TV 11957-19621.
By the mid-1950's, c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy had firmly 
established itself as a maqor approach in connselinq and 
clinical psycholoqy. It had attained a larqe fcllowinq of 
practitioners and possessed a solid e v er-expandinq research 
base. An indication of the raaqnitude of the client-centered
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movement is provided by C a r t w riqht's "Annotated 
3iblioqraphy" of 1957, which reported 110 theoretical and 
research studies in the client-centered orientation. In
fact, Kirschenbaura (1979, p. 206) has shown that the actual 
number of studies for the period 1943-1957 is close to 200!
In short, c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy was enjoyinq a
"boominq" period of optimistic proqress in theory, practice, 
and research. Then, durinq the late 1950's, two major 
developments would have a dramatic impact cn the qrowinq 
client-centered movement. First of all, it was well-known 
that client-centered therapy had been predominantly limited 
to the community and student c l ientele of university
outpatient settinqs. T h erefore there was a desire to
"prove" the broader e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of c l ient-centered therapy 
by extendinq it to other populations, specifically to
"normals" and schizophrenics. As we will see, workinq with 
these types of patients required some drastic chanqes in the 
conduct of client-centered therapy: above all, the therapist 
needed to take a much more active role in therapy.
Secondly, in 1955 Gendlin had introduced an excitinq 
new concepticn of the process of therapeutic chanqe, which 
was called "experiencinq" (Gendlin and Zimrinq, 1955). Carl 
Roqers was qreatly impressed by Gendlin's theory of
experiencinq. In 1957, he spent many lonq hours listeninq
to tape-recordinqs cf therapy sessions in order to qet a
fresh view of the essential nature of the therapy
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experience. In this unique proqram of naturalistic 
observation, F.oqers endeavored to set aside all his 
preconceptions about therapy in order to newly qrasp the 
central orocesses of the therapeutic experience. In fact, 
Gendlin and Tcailinscn (1 967, p. 120) claim that Roqers 
undertook this proiect on the b a s i s of G e n dlin *s (1955,
1957) theory of e x p e ri e n c i n q . Based on his new
observations, Roqers derived seven different co-varyinq 
"strands" of client behavior that ware indicative of
positive "movement" in therapy (listed in Section 14) . This 
"new process conception" was described in Roqers* address to 
the American Psycholoqical Association in 1957, and later 
published in a landmark paper in 1958.
The siqnificance of this paper lies not only in the
specific process conception it outlined, but also in the
overall emphasis of the a rqument on a p e r vasive process 
of pe r s o n a l ity change erabracinq all siqnificant aspects 
of the client's chanqinq inner life, and its effect on
his p e rsonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and life situation... In his
"Process" paper, Roqers laid the qroundwork for the 
broadest and potentially most productive
phen o m e n o l o q i c a 1 conception, that o f  experiencinq (Hart, 
1970, p. 10) .
Roqers qradually developed the seven in-therapy 
behavior patterns outlined in the "Process Paper" into a 
full-fledqed process theory. In addition, he closely 
related these behaviors to his theory of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for therapeutic chanqe (Roqers, 1957; 
see d i s cussion in Section 11). In brief, assuminq that the 
therapist attitudinal conditions of empathic understandinq.
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conqruence, and u n c o n ditional positive reqard have been 
secured in the relationship, the research emphasis now
turned to explaininq and measuring the variables of flow and 
®ovement with in the client in the ongoing thera e y p r o c e s s . 
It was the eirerqence of this new e m phasis on " process" that 
marked the shift to the fourth staqe in the evolution of 
client-centered therapy. H i s t o r i c a l l y , G e ndlin*s early 
theory of experiencinq played an i m portant role in the
development of this process conception (Gendlin and Zimrinq, 
1955). In fact, Hart (1970, p. 10) claims that the process 
concept of experiencinq originated with Gendlin and Zimrinq 
(1955) . For these reasons, it is cr u c i a l  t o  examine the
theoretical importance of the "new process conception," and
explore its historical development in the client-centered 
move m e n t .
Actually, the significance of the process conception 
was first addressed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. As 
Gendlin (1962a) has shown, it requires a fundamental 
re-thinkinq in psycholcqy in order to accurately conceive of 
human experiencinq as a livinq, movinq process, In 
particular, it necessitates a complete shift in the way 
psychologists typically use concepts and operationalize 
variables. A jgrocess conception, which views human life as 
a stream of ever-changinq experiencing, is drastically 
different from viewing personality and behavior as a 
structured accumulation of "contents" from past experiences.
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As noted in Section 3 on "implicit meaninq," content 
conceptions view human experience as built-up of static 
elements or inqredients, In effect, each siqnificant life 
event constitutes another inqredient in the total 
accumulation that constitutes the i n d i v i d u a l ’s experience at 
this point in time. Viewed in this way, personality chanqe 
must become a matter of addinq new contents, or deletinq old 
contents, or reorqanizinq present contents in seme new way. 
Thus "contents" can be variously conceived of as "traits," 
"S-R bonds," "experiences," "archetypes," "instincts," "the 
self-concept," or any variety of such notions. However, in 
each instance, for whichever theoretical approach, 
experience is basically formulated as discrete units. 
Moreover, the problems of this content approach are often 
compounded by the "repression paradiqm," which posits some 
sort of "unconscious mind" as the vast reservoir of these 
accumulated units of experience. "Humans should not be 
conceived as containers with thinq-like e n t i t i e s  within" 
fGendlin, 1 966b, p. 84).
In contrast, the process conception of experiencinq is 
peg-conceptual. Experiencinq is never merely this or that 
"experience," or the push of an "instinctive drive." It is 
an on-qoinq immediate flow that we can recoqnise throuqh our 
constant "felt sense" of "all that" which is beinq 
experienced in this moment. Seme aspects of experiencinq 
majy be conceptualized as this or that "experience," but 
experiencinq itself is always much more than "-just" that
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conception.
For example, in 1951 Roqers had used a c o n tent
t
conception in his theoretical definition of "the self." The 
self was conceived of as an endurinq structure, which could 
assimilate ("add on") cr reiect discrete units of experience 
with reqards to that structure:
The structure of the self is ... an orqanized, 
fluiS, but c o n s i s t e n t  conceptual pattern of perceptions 
of char a c t e r i s t i c s  and relationships of the "I" or the 
"me," toqether with values attached to these concepts 
(Roqers, 1951, p. 498, italics added).
Psycholoqical adjustment exists when the concept of 
the self is such that all the sensory and visceral 
e x p e riences of the orqanism are, or may be, assimilated 
on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with 
the concept of self (Roqers, 1951, p. 513).
In the above quote, the word "fluid" provides an early 
clue of the d i r ection in which Roqers' ideas were movinq. 
Indeed, by 1959, Roqers had abandoned the notion of an 
endurinq structural self an d  had embraced a new process 
conception of the self:
The self is primarily a reflexive a w a r e n e s s  of the 
process of experiencinq... It is not a structure to be 
defended, but a rich and chanqinq awa r e n e s s  cf internal 
experiencinq (Roqers, 1959a).
Hav i n q  new established the siqnificance of the process 
conception for p s y c h o l o q i c a l  theory, we can turn to the 
historical development of the process conception. Gendlin 
s t a t e s ,
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The reformulation of c l i ent-centered concepts in 
terms of the e x p e r i e n c i n q  process occurred over the 
years 19 55-1958. It was deeply g r o u n d ed in HogersJ, 
e arlier work. and in turn influenced his later work 
(Gendlin, et al. , 1968, p. 223, italics added).
Specifically, Gendlin and Tomlinson (1967) cite three 
main sources of the process conception in R o q e r s 1 theory. 
First of all, Roqers (1957) had q u e stioned the necessity of 
diaqnosis, suqqestinq that d i a q n o s i s  may decrease counselor 
e ffectiveness by c o m m i t t i n q  him to a prematurely fixed 
impression of the client. Diagnostic concepts thus hindered 
the client-centered aim of understanding the unique 
life-world of the client in an open, n o n q u d qmental fashion. 
The client-centered t h e r a p i s t * s  purpose is to concentrate on 
the c l i e n t ’s concretel y - s e n s e d  fe e l i ngs in the here— a n d - n o w . 
and to provide responses that help articulate the personal 
meanings in these f e e l i n q s  as they are experienced.
Secondly, Roqers held that any organism will inherently 
"move t o w a r d ” life-enh a n c i n q  ma n n e r s  of a d i ustment when 
provided with a healthy cli m a t e  that encouraqes openness to 
orqanismic experiencinq (i.e., a climate c h a r a c terized by 
the attitudinal c o n d i t i o n s  of u nconditional positive reqard, 
empathic understandinq, and conqruence—  see Roqers, 1957, 
1977). The third source of the process conception was 
R o q e r s 1 e m phasis on ” trustinq o n e ’s own e x p e r i e n c i n q , ” which 
was a call to use o n e ’s orqanismic valuinq process (i.e., 
o n e ’s ’’onqoinq psych o p h y s i o l o q i c a  1 f l o w ” ) as a quide for 
behavior. In effect, this meant act i v e l y  using immediate
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onqoinq experiencinq to develop new ways of expressinq and 
orqanizinq experience. T h i s  was c o n trasted aqainst tryinq 
to "fit” experience to an existinq static structure of 
concepts and values. For example, rather than translatinq 
her feelinqs of reiection by a suitor into further 
confirmatory evidence of her " l o s e r ” status. Sue miqht use 
her immediate experiencinq of reiection to reveal i nsiqhts 
into the actual qualities of her comm u n i c a t i o n  style.
In his careful analyses of therapeutic movement, Roqers 
(1959a) was perplexed by the a p parent imp o s s i b i l i t y  of 
directly checkinq " c o n q r u e n c e ” between a client's 
c onceptualizations and the c ontents of his experiences.
Gendlin and Zimrinq (1955) took the next step. 
They beqan with the observation that durinq 
psychotherapy feelinqs and personal meaninqs — until 
then supposedly "in" e x p e r i e n c e  but not "in" i n c o nqruent  
a w a r e n e s s —  not only emerqe but chanqe as the client 
attends to them, expresses them, and is responded to 
[Gendlin and Tomlinson, 1967, p. 113).
In this way, Gendlin and Zimrinq (1955) first proposed 
a theoretical formulation of personality as an on-qoinq 
process of experiencing. This view contrasted with existinq 
content conceptions of human personality as a structure or 
static collection of "experiences". They introduced the 
term "direct referent" to describe the immediate, 
bodily-sensed feelinqs of client experiencinq. In the 1955 
paper, they concluded ■ that i m m e d i a c y  of e x p e r i e n c i n q  is 
inherent in the therapy situation, and depicted therapy as
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involvinq both client, and counselor efforts to employ words 
pointing to the c l i e n t ’s immediate experiencinq. In this 
work, Gendlin and 2imrinq [1955) also suqqested methods for 
measurinq this new process conception. Some of these ideas 
were later implemented in a therapy e f f e c tiveness study of 
"immediacy of experiencinq" by Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien 
[1956, 1 960) .
In the years followinq 1955, Gendlin [1957, 1958)
continued to further develop this theoretical formulation of 
the experiencinq process. Moreover, it is clear that 
Gendlin's early formulations of the notion of "experiencinq" 
siqnificantly influenced Roqers' thinkinq in this period. 
Roqers himself [1980, p. 141) states that "the concept of 
'experiencinq' as formulated by Gendlin (1962),.. has 
enriched my thinkinq in various ways." Others concur that 
Gendlin's experiencinq notion had a significant impact on 
Roqers' thinkinq in the late 1950's [Hart, 1S70, p. 10; 
Shlien and Zimrinq, 1970, p. 45; K i r s c h e n b a u m , 1979, p.
279; Roqers, et al. , 1967, p. x v i i i ) . However, it is
important to remember that G e n dlin's work in this period was 
larqely devoted to the collaborative efforts to further 
theory and research in client-centered therapy. It was not 
until 1962, that Gendlin announced his theoretical break 
with Roqers and the client-centered orientation (Gendlin, 
1962a), and beqan the major pursuit of his own philosophical 
and scientific interests (see Sections 16 and 17).
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In conclusion, the new process c o n ception heralded a 
new direction for theory and research in the client-centered 
orientation. In particular, it was now vitally important to 
d emonstrate that the process conception could be 
scientifically measured and observed. Obviously, to 
implement and incorporate this new con c e p t i o n  of the 
experiencinq process reguired the use of appropriate proc e ss 
variables rather than traditional content variables. 
Furthermore, it demanded effective and reliable means of 
operationally measurinq these new process variables. In the 
followinq sections, we will closely examine efforts by 
Gendlin and his c o l leaques to achieve these qoals. Section 
13 describes some early e x p e r imental studies of process 
variables, while S e c t i o n s  14 and 15 describe the bulk of the 
c l i ent-centered research, which was centered on the 
methodoloqy of the "Process Scale."
13. Early Experimental S t u d ies of Process 
Variables^. H 9 55-19511 •
In this section we turn to an examination of some of 
the initial efforts to formulate quantifiable variables from 
the new process conception of experiencinq. For 
orqanizational purposes, I have separated these early
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experimental studies from the subsequent series of related 
studies based specifically cn "the Process Scale" (see 
Section 14). The d i s c ussion of each respective research 
approach will be desiqnated by a headinq listinq the type of 
process measure used.
1. C o unselor P. a tings of P rocess—  Gendlin, Jenney, and
Shlien (1956, 1960).
An early study by Gendlin, Jenney and Shlien (1956, 
1960) represented a pioneerinq effort to implement a
quantitative measure of process in therapy. In this study,
they were specifically interested in the association between 
c o u n s e l o r s ’ ratinqs of the outcome of therapy, and
counselors* observations of the quality of experiential
process in therapy. Sixteen c o u n s e l o r s  aqreed to evaluate
the "immediacy of expe r i e n c i n q "  of their clients durinq the 
7th and final i n t erviews of time-limited psychotherapy 
(duration not r e p o r t e d ) . The counselors also rated the 
outcome of therapy on another scale ranqinq from neqative to 
positive effects. Thus the sole measure of therapy 
"effectiveness" in this study was a sinqle counselor ratinq 
of outcome. The authors state that the counselors made 
these ratinqs "without any knowledqe... of the diaqnostic
test results cn other evaluative measures" (Gendlin, Jenney
and Shlien, 1960, p. 212). However, the authors neqlected 
to identify what these "other measures" were, and failed to 
report the irean scores of these measures. Hence, the
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research desiqn consisted of correlatinq a few scale ratinqs 
of process with a sinqle ratinq of outcome. Nc control 
qroup was used for comparison with the 39 clients who aqreed 
to participate in the study.
Each of the six process items in this study was rated 
on a 9-point scale. Three of the items pertained to "using 
the therapeutic r e l a tionship for immediate siqnificant 
experiencinq," while the other three items pertained to 
"merely talkinq a b o u t  the relationship as a topic of 
d i s c u s s i o n . " As predicted, Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien 
[1960) found positive therapy outcome was siqnificantly 
correlated with usinq the therapeutic relationship for 
immediate experiencinq [as measured by the follcwinq three 
s c a l e s ) :
1. To what extent does the client find that his 
relationship with you is an important instance of the 
difficulties he h a s  qenerally? Tscale ranqes from "not 
at all" to "very siqnificantly" 1.
2. How i m p o r t a n t  to the client is the relationship 
as a source of new experience?
3. To what extent does the client e x j r r e s s  his 
feelinqs, and to what extent does he rather talk about 
them? This scale differentiates direct expression from 
report about one's feelinqs, reqardless of whether the 
feelinq is past or present. Tscale ranqes from "talks 
about; feelinqs past or present" to "expresses feelinqs 
of the moment"!.
This third scale item, in particular, i l l u strates how 
counselors could rate the cli e n t ' s  "immediacy of
experiencinq" as a process. One extreme of this scale is
Paqe 104
expression of feelinqs in the h e r e - a n d - n o w , and the' other
extreme is mere "reporting" about one's feelinqs,, past or
present. Direct expression would be evidenced in client 
statements like, "I feel very depressed riqht now," or "I'm 
furious at you." In contrast, statements like "often I feel 
depressed," or " g e nerally I don't qet anqry," show no 
indication of immediate feelinq in expression or intonation. 
The important point is that the ijmediacy of the clientfs 
experienc ing can be measured w ithout regard to the 
conceptual c o n tent of that experiencinq. Thus the client 
could score hiqhly on expression of feelinqs whether those 
feelinqs involve anqer, love, resentment, quilt or anxiety, 
and whether the fee l i n q s  are rooted deep in the past or are 
of recent oriqin.
On t h e  other hand, Gendlin, Jenney and Shlien (1960) 
found that counselor ratinqs on three scale items that 
pertained to "merely talkinq about the relationship as a 
topic o f  discussion" were uncorrelated with therapeutic 
outcome. It should be noted that two of these items (items
4 and 6 below) were adopted from an earlier study by Seeman
(1954), which also found no cor r e l a t i o n  between these items 
and therapy outcome.
4. Does therapy, for this client, focus chiefly on 
his problem, or does it focus c h i e f l y  on his 
rel a t i o n s h i p  with you? This scale separates 
relationship fr o m  problems, reqardless of the qualities 
of either, f s c a l e  ranqes from "focus on his problems" 
to "focus on relationship with you" 1.
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5. To what extent does the c l i e n t  talk about your 
q eneral c h a r a c t eristics such as aqe, sex, looks, 
beliefs, background, school of therapy, e t c . 2 Tscale 
ranqes from " o f t e n ” to "rarely" 1,
6. To what extent do  the problems focus in the 
past [childhood or earlier years)?
Based on this study, Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien [1960) 
concluded that the successful cl i e n t  is cha r a c t e r i z e d  by [1) 
immediacy in expression of feelinqs [as opposed to merely 
"talking about" f e e l i n q s ) , and [2) active use of the 
relationship for i m mediate experiencinq of feelinqs. 
However, this conclusion must be tempered by a more careful 
examination of the results of the experiment. To beqin 
with, there is a problem with the operational definition of 
"successful outcome" of therapy. There was only a sinqle 
measure of positive outcome reported — c o unselor ratinqs of 
outcome—  and the e x ternal validity of this measure is 
questionable. Specifically, it is unknown whether scores on 
this sole outcome measure are c o n s istent with other 
psychometric measures, which are more qenerally accepted as 
reliable and valid instruments of assessing therapeutic 
chanqes in personality and behavior. In fact, in a later 
discussion of this particular research, Gendlin acknowledges 
that a battery of outcome measures had b e e n  used in this 
study:
The scales measurinq expression of immediate 
experiencing c o r r e l a t e d  highly with se veral success 
measures, while the sea le of past or present content did 
not [Gendlin, 1962a, p. 248, italics added).
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This statement raises further questions about this 
research study. Th e r e  is no i dentification of these "other 
measures," nor any indication of the deqree to which these 
measures did or did not "aqree" with c o u nselor ratinqs of 
therapeutic outcome. For this reason, we can question the 
validity of the c o u nselor ratinqs of outcome as the only 
measure that was s i q n i f i c a n t l y  correlated with the scale 
ratinqs of experiencinq, In other words, it is dubious to 
reject the information from a whole battery of outcome 
measures in favor of a sinqle measure, which had yielded 
statistically siqnificant support for the hypothesis. It 
could be that the "other measures" constitute a more 
accurate indication of whether the measure of experiencinq 
level is related to positive outcome.
Moreover, since this is a c o r r e lational desiqn, it must 
be remembered that a siqnificant correlation does not 
indicate a causaj rel a t i o n  between variables. There may be 
no causal relation between "experiential focusinq" and 
"positive therapeutic outcome" despite the correlation 
between the ratinq scale measures of experiencinq and 
counselor ratinqs of outcome. A stronq correlation can 
result from the correlation of the two variables with a 
third unknown variable, such as intelliqence. Furthermore, 
since the study lacks any type of comparison or control 
qroup, it is unknown if outcome and process ratinqs would be 
any different for an equivalent " non-therapy" qroup. This 
is an interestinq question because the process ratinqs for
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the 7th interview were not siqnificantly correlated with
c o u n s e l o r s ’ ratinqs cf outcome. [In fact, this findinq 
conflicts with s u b s e q u e n t  Process Scale research, which 
consistently found that hiqh process ratinqs from the
earliest sessions of therapy can predict subsequent success 
or fa i l u r e —  see Sections 14 and 15),
Finally there is a problem with possible biases of the 
counselors, who rated both the process and outcome
variables. The raters may have been qiven a s e t about what 
was desirable as process quality, and this may have effected 
their ratinqs cf outcome. In contrast, obiective measures,
such as TAT and MMPI scores, are not based on the
counselor's iudqment, which is inherently biased by his or 
her earlier therapeutic exp e r i e n c e s  with the client. For
this reason, the two measures of process level and outcome 
lack "methodoloqical independence" in this ccrrelational 
desiqn. Moreover, the measures also lack "theoretical 
independence" because hiqh levels of experiencinq are 
already presumed to characterize the essential nature of 
positive therapeutic qrowth.
In view cf the many problems with this resarch study, 
there are severe limits on the qeneralizability of these 
results to con c l u s i o n s  about effective therapy. At best, 
Gendlin and his c o l l e a q u e s  had demonstrated a useful way of 
measurinq a process variable. Specifically, this study 
shows that it is possible to measure c o u n s e l o r s ’
Paqe 108
o bservations of clients' intensity of experiencinq, whether 
or not there is conceptualization into content.
2. Client Q - S o r t  Measures of Experien c i n g —  (Gendlin, 
1961a; see also Gendlin, 1962a, pp. 249-250) and (Gendlin 
and Shlien, 1961) .
In another early study, Gendlin (1961a) proposed a 
client Q-sort technique as a method of operationalizing the 
new process conception. In this study, Gendlin was 
specifically interested in measurinq instances of direct 
reference to immediate experiencinq with only minimal or 
inadequate conceptualization. Below are several sample 
items taken from the 32 item Q-sort, which was administered 
to clients durinq and after therapy. The complete list of 
items is printed in Gendlin (1962a, pp. 249-250) and the
results are briefly discussed in Gendlin (1961a). Clients 
were asked to Q - s o r t  statements about their personal
experiences in psychotherapy. Each statement describes 
occasions when the client tries to understand unclear
feelinqs or has strong feelinqs that are not yet understood.
3. I felt the therapist's presence intensely, 
although I didn't know what tc do about it.
5. It turned out to be excitinq not to know -just 
what we were doing.
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6. T had a certain shaky feelinq because it was up
to me how we proceed.
7. Somethinq I thouqht we couldn't do turned out 
to be quite possible for us.
21. I felt certain excitinq p ossibilities for me,
thouqh I don't know lust what they are.
25. I felt a certain thinq (which I wish I could
chanqe) mere intensely than I ev e r  have before, but it 
hasn't chanqed yet.
In reviewinq the results of this Q-sort study, Gendlin 
(1951a) made the follcwinq conclusion:
P r e l iminary findinqs show that success ratinqs by 
counselors correlate siqnificantly with client's scores 
on th i s  Q-sort. The findinq is a preliminary indication 
that clients succeed in therapy if they often experience 
immediately present feelinqs which they d o  not as yet 
understand (Gendlin, 1961a, p. 244, italics added).
Closer examination of the study severely restricts the 
experimental validity of these conclusions. Not only was 
this "preliminary" study never published, but Gendlin does 
not provide any descriptions of the method or results of 
this experiment. For example, he reports that the Q-sort 
measure was also c o r related with other measures of outcome: 
T/VT, Rorschach, Self and Id e a l  Q-sorts, Counselor and Client 
Ratinqs of Outcome and Chanqe, and Trait-Feelinq Q-sort (see 
Gendlin, 1962a, p. 250). However, there is no mention of 
the empiric results of these measures. It is unknown 
whether the Q-sort correlated only with the counselors' 
success ratinqs, and not with the other measures. 
Furthermore, it is unknown whether the "siqnificance" of the 
correlation endured beyond the "preliminary" analyses of the
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data. In short, this study simply cannot stand up as a 
sound experiment.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the study was 
meaninqless and not worth reportinq. At the very least, the 
study showed that this particular Q-sort method was another 
promisinq indication that the experiencinq process could be 
effectively measured with qua n t i f i a b l e  variables. 
Specifically, it provided a way to measure "direct 
reference" to feelinqs that are not yet conceptualized or 
understood by the e x p e r i e n c i n q  client. Thus it suqqested a 
possible way to measure instances when the client directs 
attention "inwardly" to a particular felt datum, such as "I 
feel it," or "there it is aqain," or "somethinq d o e s n ’t feel 
riqht," even thouqh the client does not yet knew what "it" 
i s .
In conclusion, this preliminary Q-sort study was 
valuable in two qeneral ways; first of all, it suqqested the 
Q-sort as another possible way to operatio n a l i z e  the new. 
process conception in c l ient-centered research. Secondly, 
it offered some preliminary e x p e rimental support for 
G e n d l i n ’s assertion that there is a vital phenomenon of 
"direct reference" cccurrinq in the therapeutic experience 
fsee Section 6). Nevertheless, as we have seen, the 
credibility of these "preliminary results" is hiqhly 
questionable. Therefore, based on the weakness of this 
particular evidence, Gendlin cannot make the conclusion that
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hiqher levels cf immediate experiencinq lead tc success in 
therapy.
In a second related study, G endlin and Shlien [1961) 
developed another c l i e n t  Q-sort measure of experiencinq. In 
this study, clients would Q-s o r t  attitudinal statements on a 
5-point scale ranqinq from "very like m y s e l f ” to ’’very 
unlike m y s e l f . ” Based on T a f t ’s [1953) theory of immediacy, 
this "Time-Attitude Q - s o r t ” consisted of self-descriptive 
statements which were positively, negatively, and un-related 
to i m mediacy of experiencinq. Previously, Shlien (1957) had 
reasoned that time-limited therapy should maximize immediacy 
o f  e x p e r iencinq because there is ’’less time to waste” due to 
the time restrictions. In the present study, Gendlin and 
Shlien (1961) compared two qroups of clients in time-limited 
therapy, predicting that the attitudinal preference for 
’’livinq in the h e r e - a n d - n o w ” would be siqnif icantly 
correlated with positive outcome of therapy. There were two 
qroups of clients in this study; One qroup of 23 clients did 
the Time-Attitude Q-s o r t  followinq c o m p letion of 
tiine-limi ted therapy consisting of twenty-two interview 
sessions. A second group of 22 cl i e n t s  did the Q-sort 
before and after t i m e - l i m i t e d  therapy c o n sistinq of forty 
interviews. A sam p l i n g  of the Q-sort items positively 
related to immediacy of exp e r i e n c i n q  is listed below:
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8. Nothinq in life is abs o l u t e l y  f i n a l —  endinqs 
also lead to beginninqs.
9. Every day is a fresh opportunity for me
11. I live in the present.
26. I work hard for as long as a iob takes, then
relax and forget it.
30. A challenqe is stim u l a t i n g  for me.
This is a samplinq of the Q-sort items that were
negatively related to immediacy of experiencinq.
12. I live in the past.
16. I'm often too worried about what may happen to
be really absorbed in what is happening right now.
17. I often do nothinq at all because there are so 
many different thinqs I ouqht to do,
24. I often do thinqs when the doinq has no
satisfaction, gust to be able to look back cn them.
35. I am often pushed into thinqs I d i d n ’t want to
d o .
37. To be satisfied with a relationship, I have to 
feel that the other person is not withholding anything.
Th e r e  were s everal interesting findings in this study. 
On one hand, Gendlin and Shlien £196 1) found that
pre-therapy scores on the Tim e - A t t i t u d e  Q-sort were n ot 
correlated with the Tim e - A t t i t u d e  scores at the end of 
therapy, and that pre-therapy T ime-Attitude scores were also 
not correlated with the therapy outcome measures. On the 
other hand, the post-therapy' Time-Attitude scores and
Time-Attitude Chanqe scores were significantly correlated
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with some of the outcome measures.
There were several outcome measures used in this study. 
•For each client in the 20 session qrcup, four measures of 
outcome were taken at the end of therapy: C o u nselor Rating
of Outcome, Client Rating of Outcome, TAT score, and 
Self-Ideal Correlation using the Butler-Haigh C~sort (see
discussion of Q-sort methodoloqy in Section 11). For each 
client in the 40 session qroup, measurements were taken 
during the seventh interview and at the completion of
therapy, thus providing three additional outcome measures:
Counselor Ratine of Change, Cli e n t  Rating of Change, and 
Change in Self-Ideal Correlation. Finally, with the 
exception of the TAT score, a l l  given measures were combined 
into a Composite sc o r e  for each client in both groups.
The results shewed three significant correlations
between the T i m e - A t t i t u d e  score and Client Eating of
Outcome, Self-Ideal Correlation, and Composite score. For
the 40 session group, significant corr e l a t i o n s  were also 
found between Time-Attitude Change score and the Counselor 
Rating of Change, Counselor Rating of Outcome, Change in 
Self-Ideal Correlation, and the Composite score. It is
noteworthy that none cf the individual outcome measures were 
significantly correlated with both the Time-Attitude and
Tirae-Attitude Change scores. Furthermore it is interesting 
that the TAT was the only ,,o b i e c t i v e ,, measure independent of 
direct counselor and client -judgments of outcome, and it was
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not significantly correlated with either Time-Attitude 
measure. This suggests the possible biasing influence of a 
"set," in which clients and cou n s e l o r s  were aware of the 
social desirability of certain ratings and responses. For 
example, a client who rated himself or herself high in 
positive change, might be inclined to make sizable changes 
in his or her Q-sort ratings to be consistent with that 
self-rating cf positive change.
One drawback of this study is the failure of the 
authors to report the inter-correlations between the outcome 
measures themselves. For this reason, it is unknown whether 
there is a consistent picture of agr e e m e n t  among the various 
measures about what c o n s titutes a "successful outcome” case. 
If there is inconsistency among the outcome measures, it is 
possible that the measures are tapping intc different 
phenomena altogether. Or, more fundamentally, there is a 
question of the validity of the idea of "su c c e s s f u l ” outcome 
and its measurement here. Again, it is noteworthy that the 
single standard ”o b i e c t i v e ” measure used in this study (TAT 
score) apoeared to be inconsistent with the client- and 
counselor-based measures.
In summary, Gendlin and Shlien (196 1) concluded £hat 
"high degree of i m m e d i a c y ” (operationally defined as a high 
score on specified items cf the Time-Attitude Q-sort) was 
significantly correlated with the successful outcome of 
therapy. Although this Time-Attitude Q- s o r t  measure
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indicated that '’successful" clients tend to hold certain 
attitudes about spontaneity and immediacy in felt 
experiencing, there was no direct process measure of what 
was really happeninq in therapy for these individuals. 
Therefore there is no way to know whether and how these 
attitudes become manifested in actual in-therapy responding. 
It is entirely possible that individual Time-Attitude scores 
could be correlated with therapeutic outcome even thouqh the 
individual was not truly acting in a spontaneous 
experiential manner.
There is another theoretical problem here. According 
to the general theoretical hypothesis, intensive involvement 
in the felt experiencing process is the qround for 
therapeutic change. Therefore a person who tends to be more 
in touch with his or her felt experiencing process should 
score high on the T i m e - A ttitude Q-sort as a measure of this 
process. If this is true, then either (1) there should be a 
stronq correlation between the outcome measures and the 
Q-sort measure of process both early in therapy (i.e., the 
seventh interview) and late in therapy, or (2) the level of 
experiential process should i ncrease durinq the course of 
treatment (i.e., changes in the Q-sort measure) as a result 
of training in experiential focusing. It would appear that 
the results in this study correspond with the latter event 
because the pre-therapy Q-sort was not siqnificantly 
correlated with the outcome measures, while the post-therapy 
Q-sort measure was. At the same time, this finding
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conflicts with later c l i e n t - centered Process Scale research, 
which consistently found that hiqh ratings of process level 
in the first sessions of therapy accurately predicted 
subsequent success or failure in therapy [see Sections 14 
and 15). In this study, there was no significant 
correlation between the early seventh interview scores on 
the Time-Attitude Q - s o r t  and subsequent outcome.
In conclusion, the shortcomings of this Q-scrt research 
study also limit any c o n c lusions that miqht be made about 
the role of experiencing in therapeutic outcome. Although 
the Time-Attitude Q - s o r t  represented another possible method 
of measuring "the new process conception," it was perhaps 
the weakest process measure because it failed to provide any 
direct measure of actual in- t h e r a p y  behavior. In contrast 
to the other Q- s c r t  approach [Gendlin, 1961a), which 
described actual experiences of "direct reference" in 
therapy, this Q-sort m easured only "mere" attitudes about 
immediacy of experiencing.
3. P h y s i o l ogical Me a s u res of Ex periencinq—  [Gendlin and 
Berlin, 1961; also discussed in Gendlin, et a_l, 1967, pp. 
230-231) .
Paqe 117
Also durinq this time period, Gendlin conducted 
research on ^ h Y 5 iolexica 1 c o r relates of the experiencinq 
process (Gendlin and Berlin, 1961). Similar
p s y c h o physioloqical studies had already been reported by 
Berlin (1960) and Matarazzo, et al. (1958), which found 
that different interview c o n d i t i o n s  have differinq autonomic 
correlates (Gendlin, 1 9 6 2 b ) . This supported ” t e s t i m o n i a l ” 
clinical evidence, which h a d  indicated that direct reference 
to experiencinq yields a distinct easinq of tension, even 
when the client is dealinq with a personally painful topic 
(see S e c t i o n  4). Therefore, since direct reference to 
experiencinq was a ssumed to be the basis cf positive 
therapeutic chanqe, Gendlin reasoned that crqanismic 
tension-reduction shculd characterize direct reference to 
experiencinq. He predicted that there should be measurable 
physioloqical tension-reduction durinq periods of continuous 
reference to experiencinq.
To test this hypothesis, Gendlin and Berlin (1961) 
measured qalvanic skin responses (GSR) of 17 colleqe 
students durinq a tape-recorded instructional sequence of 
seven "modes" of experiencinq. From amonq the many types of 
GSR m e asures that miqht be indicative of
"tension-reduct ion," Gendlin and Berlin chcse to use 
linearity (defined as the absence of d e f l e c t i o n s ) , and 
increment (defined as the increase in resistance between the 
beqinninq and end of each experimental period). The 
selection of these GSR measures was made on the basis of
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previous "pilot observations" even tbouqh Gendlin and Berlin 
acknowledged that there is "no riqorous theoretical basis" 
for makinq such a selection [Gendlin and Berlin, 1961, p. 
74). The seven experimental periods are listed fcelow. Each 
period lasted two and a half minutes followinq the
instructions, and they were presented in the followinq 
sequence: c2, b2, b3, a2, b1, a1» cl,
a1 - c o n t i n u o u s  reference to experiencinq with
disturbinq personal content (silence).
a2 - c o n t i n u o u s  reference to e x p e r iencinq with
undisturbinq personal c ontent (silence),
b1 - discontinuous reference to disturbinq personal 
content (silence).
b2 - d i s c o n t i n u o u s  reference to undisturbinq 
personal content (silence).
b3 - con t i n u o u s  attention «to an ex t e r n a l  obiect 
—  table (silence) .
c1 - speakinq out loud about undisturbinq personal 
content.
c2 - speakinq out loud about disturbinq personal 
content.
An analysis of variance was conducted on the two 
separate GSR measures, and three maior c o m p arisons were 
made. The first c o m parison found that there were no 
siqnificant differences between the type "1" (disturbinq 
content) and type 112" (undisturbinq) periods, Gendlin and 
Berlin concluded that this supported the hypothesis that 
there are no differences in tension-level due to the 
"content" of experiential focusing—  i.e., whether the topic
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is personally disturbinq or not. However, this conclusion 
is simply not -justified, G endlin and Berlin f 19 61) made the 
elementary methodoloqical mistake of assuminq that findinq 
no statistically siq n i f i c a n t  difference demonstrated support 
for the hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
treatment conditions. In short, you cannot state a 
hypothesis that predicts no siq n i f i c a n t  differences! That 
is the same as predictinq the null hypothesis.
The second maior ANOVA comparison locked for 
differences between type "a" silences, type ” b" silences, 
and "c" periods of talkinq. Here they made the obvious 
conclusion that there are measurable physioloqical 
differences between talkinq and silent states. There is 
certainly nothinq surprisinq about this findinq.
The third a n a l y s i s  made comparisons of the seven 
individual experimental periods. Usinq Duncan Eanqe Tests, 
Gendlin and Berlin (1961, p. 76) found that n 23 of the 3 2 ” 
possible differences were "siqnificant in the predicted 
d i r e c t i o n . ” The results tended to support the hypothesis 
that self-interrupted or externally focused silences (type 
"b” periods) differ from silences involvinq continuous 
reference (type " a ” p e r i o d s ) . Mean scores on the increment 
GSR for the a1 and a2 periods respectively were 
siqnificantly qreater than those f o r  b1, b2, and b3. It is 
interestinq to note that there were no siqnificant 
differences found on the linearity GSR measure except for
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the a1 vs b1 comparison. This inconsistency between the two 
GSR measures is not discussed by the authors.
Based on this third analysis, G endlin and Berlin 
concluded that there is greater tension-reduction durinq 
continuous reference to experiencinq than durinq 
discontinuous reference. However, this conclusion is open 
to alternative explanations. First of all, this result may 
be more readily attributed to the disruptiveness of the 
experimental instructional procedure. It would seem natural 
that actively interrupting one's own mental processes would 
induce hiqher physioloqical tension than continous focusinq 
on a topic. Obviously it is more difficult to "think about 
various things, not gust one" (the b2 instructions) than it 
is to "continue thinkinq about one feelinq as much as 
possible" (the a1 instructions). This procedural 
manipulation may be the actual source of the measured 
tension-reduction.
Above all, the sinqle greatest limitation of this study 
pertains to the qeneralizability of the findings, There is 
a huge discrepancy between the a r t i ficial laboratory 
situation used in this study and an actual psychotherapy 
session. One could argue that the instructions used in this 
laboratory settinq do not even remotely resenble qenuine 
instances of direct reference to felt experiencinq in 
therapy. The glarinq difference is readily apparent by 
looking at the actual instructions given to the subjects.
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The instructions below are intended to represent continuous 
reference to experiencinq with undisturbinq c o n t e n t  (period 
a2) , and continuous reference with disturbinq content 
(period a 1) .
a2—  Now, silently to yourself,- try to remember as 
many of your sch o o l m a t e s  in the early qrades of school 
as you can. Try to remember them, and, if you can, 
their names.
a1—  Please think about some one specific aspect of 
the problem. A s you think about it, try to feel it as 
specifically as you can. If you find yourself thinkinq 
about many different thinqs, please aqain choose one 
feelinq from amonq these and continue thinkinq about one 
feelinq as much as possible.
To some deqree, Gendlin and Berlin (1961) acknowledqe 
the crucial problem of tryinq to qeneralize laboratory 
findinqs to actual therapy situations. But th e y  do so in 
terms of suqqestinq that they miqht use "other i n s t r u c t i o n s ” 
based on the same theory. Finally, they reccqnize that 
there are alternative theoretical interpretations for the 
process they are callinq "continuous ref e r e n c e . ” They 
suqqest, for example, that critics miqht explain these 
results as "taskinq in reqressive thouqhts," or as "a liqht, 
self-induced hypnotic t r a n c e . ” But they do not question the 
methodoloqica 1 s o undness of the basic e m pirical findinqs of 
the study.
In summary, this p sychophysiclcqical study suffers from 
a number of methodoloqical problems, which severely restrict 
conclusions that miqht be made about the process of
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experiencinq in therapy. Like the other early studies we 
have reviewed, this study is limited by serious 
methodological flaws. Similarly, the best " c o n c l u s i o n ” that 
can be made from this particular study is that physioloqical 
measures may offer another possible way of ope rationalizing 
a process variable.
14• Experim e ntal R e s earch Os ing the 
Process Scale^ [19 5 8-1967).
Thus far, we have noted three qeneral methods which 
Gendlin and his client-centered colleaques had used to 
operationally define and measure the new process conception 
of experiencinq. (1) In the first method, Gendlin, Jenney 
and Shlien ( 1960) used the " e x t e r n a l ” "judgement of 
counselors, who e v a l u a t e d  the level of client experiencinq 
in therapy with counselor rating scales. (2) In the second 
method, Gendlin (1961a) and Gendlin and Shlien (1961) used 
the " i n t e r n a l ” -judgement of the cl i e n t s  themselves, who 
responded to s e l f - r a t ed client Q-sgrts measuring immediacy 
of experiencinq. (3) In the third method, Gendlin and 
Berlin (1961) suqqested a physiological measure of 
experiencinq in therapy, using the GSR.
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However, the most important and extensive research 
efforts tc implement the new process conception involved a 
fourth meth'odoloqical approach: 14) the Process Scale.
Clearly it is the Process Scale research that Gerdlin most 
often cites as experimental support for his pos i t i o n  on the 
central importance of e x p e riential focusinq in therapy (for 
example, see Gendlin, 1981, pp. 3— 9). By implementinq a
broad ra n q e  of interrelated process variables, the "Roqers 
Process S c a l e ” represented the most coqent means of "qettinq 
a t ” the observable e x p e r iential con d i t i o n s  that characterize 
” e ffee t iv e t h era py. ”
Historically, the basic Process Scale approach was
launched in 1957 by Ca r l  Roqers' naturalistic observation of 
tape-recordinqs of therapy interviews (discussed in Section 
12). As a result cf his efforts, Roqers identified seven 
experiential variables in the therapy process: (1) feelinqs
and personal raeaninqs, (2) manner of experiencinq, (3) 
deqree of inccnqruence, (4) c o m m u n i c a t i o n  of self, (5) the 
manner in which experience is construed, (6) the 
relationship to problems, and (7) the manner of relatinq to 
others. Usinq this framework, the researcher could assess 
the actual level or deqree of client experiencinq with 
reqard to each of these seven variables. Moreover, these 
ratinqs could be reliably based on specifiable client 
interview behaviors.
Paqe 124
This idea of m e asurinq t a p e - r ecorded interviews with a 
classification system of d i f ferent types and qualities of 
in-therapy behavior was not e ntirely new. For instance, 
Zimrinq had developed an early c l assification system for 
client verbalizations, which included classes for direct 
reference to experiencinq that lacked conceptua l i z a t i o n  (see 
Gendlin and Zimrinq, 1955; and Gendlin, 1961a).
In this instance, Roqers d e s i q n a t e d  seven process 
variables. For ea c h  of these seven variables, there are 
seven distinct aspects or "staqes" of interview behavior, 
which characterize differinq levels of direct felt 
experiencinq. Thus, for example, th e r e  are seven levels of 
experiencinq with reqards to the first variable listed 
above; feelinqs and pe r s o n a l  meaninqs. At the lowest level 
(staqe 1) , "the ind i v i d u a l  is larqely unaware of his feelinq 
life." At the hiqhest level (staqe 7),
new feelinqs are e x p e rienced with richness and 
immediacy, and experiencinq is used as a clear and 
definite referent from which further meaninqs may be 
drawn... The ind i v i d u a l  is able both to live in his own 
feelinqs and personal meaninqs and to express them as an 
owned and accepted part of himself" (Roqers and Rablen, 
1958) .
In qeneral, the research method fo r  the Process Scale 
involved first recordinq entire therapy sessions, and then 
randomly selectinq 4— minute taped seqments from early and 
late periods in therapy. These tape recordinqs would then 
be re-recorded onto small sep a r a t e  coded reels. In this
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way, raters were blind to the identity of the counselor, 
iqnorant of the therapeutic outcome of the subiect, and did 
not know whether the interview seqments were early or late 
in therapy. In the course of developinq the Process Scale
and this research approach, it  was found that underqraduates 
who were untrained in psychotherapy or clinical theory could 
use these ratinq scales very reliably. In fact, the
underqraduate raters showed more aqreement than trained 
clinicians, who often tended to d i s reqard the scales and use 
their own subiective impressions [Gendlin, 1966a, p. 7).
The first established version of ”the Process S c a l e ” 
was reported in Roqers and Rablen [1958). In the followinq 
years, the irethodoloqy of the P r o c e s s  Scale was continually 
modified, revised and improved as the scale was applied to
therapy research [Roqers, 19 5 9 b ) » In particular, there were 
efforts to further define and d ifferentiate the precise 
observations cn which the Process Scale ratinqs were based 
Tnotably. Hart [1960); Gendlin, Hart and T o mlinson [1959); 
and Tomlinson and Hart, [later published in 1962), workinq 
at the University of Wisconsin; and Holloway (1960), and 
Zimrinq (1958-1959), at the University of Chicaqo], An 
informal pilot study by Heisel souqht to determine whether 
the scale had validity and could be used reliably. Heisel*s 
study was siqnificant because he e x t racted interview 
segments from different i n t erviews rather than usinq entire 
interviews. This method represented a qreat economical
savinqs in the scientific an a l y s i s  of therapy
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tape-recordinqs, and it was applied in all subsequent 
studies usinq the Process Scale.
Basically the c l i ent-centered researchers concentrated 
on two primary revisions of the Process Scale. First of 
all, they endeavored to qround each staqe of the seven 
process scales in more precise specifiable descriptions of 
in-therapy client behavior. Secondly, they scuqht to 
measure the process variables of each of the seven strands 
independently of the other strands. For instance, van der 
Veen [1960) found that both reliability and validity 
improved when raters employed each strand separately.
Walker, Rablen, and Roqers [1960) put the improved 
Process Scale tc its first riqorous test, and found that it 
had validity and the strands could be rated reliably. In 
the next study, T o m l i n s o n  (1959) noted the interestinq fact 
that there were no clear differences between individual 
client process scores reqardless of therapy outcome or 
whether they were taken from early or late interviews. 
Subsequently, Hart (1961) found that there was a qreat
difference between the interrater reliability found in
Tomlinson's (1959) study and other earlier studies. Hart
souqht to clarify those ratinq materials and con d i t i o n s  that 
made for optimally reliable ratinqs. Another validation 
study was undertaken by Tcmlinscn and Hart (1962), which was 
based on the findinqs of the above studies. By subtractinq 
early process scale scores from late scores, Tomlinson and
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Hart were able to compare cases according to actual process 
change regardless of case length. In another important 
validation study, Tomlinson [1562) found that fcur of the 
seven scales of the P r o c e s s  Scale were sc highly 
inter-correlated that only a single scale was necessary. 
This new single scale became known as the Experiencing Scale 
(EXP Scale) .
On the whole, the early studies using the Process Scale 
relied on ratings of the experiencing level of ne u ro t ic 
patients (Gendlin, Klein and Tomlinson, 1962; Tomlinson, 
1959, 1962; Tomlinson and Hart, 1962; Halker, Rablen and
Rogers, 1960; van der Veen and Stoler, 1965). These studies 
converged cn the central discovery that c l i e n t s  who were 
rated high on the Process Scale tended to be more successful 
in therapy. Moreover, this was true whether process ratings 
were taken from early or late in therapy. Thus the process 
ratings overwhelmingly agreed that the more successful 
client began as well as finished therapy at a signif i ca n t ly 
higher level of process as c o m p a r e d to the less successful 
client. Success and failure in these studies was typically 
defined in terms of changes indicated by independent pre- 
and post-therapy psychometric measures, such as the HHPI and 
TAT. Actually these findings were foreseen by Kirtner and 
C artwright (1958a, 1958b). They were able to make accurate 
predictions cf length of therapy and of success and failure 
based on observations of the c l i e n t ’s manner of relating to 
his problems in the first two interviews!
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Also durinq this time period, Carl R o q e r s  and his
client-centered c o l l e a q u e s  moved on to study the effects of
individual psychotherapy with hospitalized schizophrenic 
patients. Fcr this purpose, they orqanized a massive and 
elaborate five year research proiect called the Wisconsin 
Schizophrenia Study. Durinq the years 1 9 5 8 - 1 S63, Gendlin 
was research coordinator for the P s y c h otherapy Research 
Group of the Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute at the
University of Wisconsin, and he had a leadinq rcle in the
development and impl e m e n t a t i o n  of this proiect. In Roqers' 
own words,
Gendlin initiated the proqram, with all of the 
detailed arranqements which that implies, and has 
contributed a basic theoretical formulation upon which a 
number of our process measures have been built (Roqers, 
et al., 1967, p. xvi i i ) .
The "Schiz S t u d y ” had two primary qoals. First of all, 
they wanted to con v i n c i n q l y  demonstrate that client-centered 
therapy could be as effective with schizophrenics and 
normals as it had been with neurotics in out-patient 
settinqs. Thus they wanted to expand the c l inical domain of 
client-centered the r a p y  to new areas of practice (van der 
Veen, 1970). Secondly, they wanted to confirm the basic 
theoretical formulations of Carl Roqers, which are probably 
best summarized in his classic 1959 paper, "The Necessary 
and Sufficient C o n d i t i o n s  of Therapeutic Personality C h a n q e ” 
(see S ection 11). The basic hypothesis of the Wisconsin
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Schizophrenia Study predicted that positive client chanqe 
would occur to the deqree that conqruence, unconditional 
positive reqard, and empathic understandinq were achieved in 
the relationship and perceived by the client. The crucial 
measure of process movement in therapy in this research was 
the newly revised and improved P r o c e s s  Scale (described 
below) .
A few words can be said about the basic desiqn of the 
Wisconsin Schizophrenia Study. There were three qroups of 
16 subiects: '’c h r o n i c 1' schizophrenics, "acute"
schizophrenics, and normals. The subiects were carefully 
matched to insure that they were e q u ivalent in sex, aqe, and 
socio-educational level. Each of the 8 participatinq 
client-centered therapists (includinq Roqers and Gendlin) 
was randomly assiqned triads from the three qroups.
There were three maior "clusters" of variables in the 
experiment. The first clu s t e r  of variables consisted of 
measurements of the deqree to which the client-centered 
attitudinal con d i t i o n s  of conqruence, e m pathic
understandinq, and unconditional positive reqard were 
attained in the therapeutic relationship. These conditions 
were measured with ratinq scales, which obiective iudqes 
applied to therapy interview seqments. This c luster also 
included the Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (qiven 
to both therapist and subiect) to measure the deqree to 
which the pair perceived the establishment cf these
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conditions. The second cluster consisted of the measures of 
therapeutic "effectiveness." These outcome measures included 
the MN?I, the Rorschach, abbreviated versions of the 
Thematic -Apperception Test and the Hechsler Adult 
Intelliqence Test, the Stroop Interference Test, the Truax 
Anxiety Scale, the Butler-Haiqh Q-sort, the Wittenborn 
Psychiatric Ratinq Scale, and the The r a p i s t  Ratinq Scale. 
All of the measures in these two clusters were taken at 
specified intervals durinq the t r e a t m e n t ‘period (i.e., 3 or 
6 month intervals) .
Finally, the third maior cluster of variables consisted 
of the p r ocess m e a s u rements of the therapeutic experience. 
Basically, there were four process scales: a scale for the 
ratinq of (1) experiencinq, (2) personal constructs, (3) 
manner of problem expression, and (4) manner of relatinq. I 
will describe each of these scales very briefly. The 
complete description cf these measures is provided in the 
appendix of Roqers, et al (1967, pp. 589-611). It should 
be noted that Gendlin was involved in the construction of 
the first and last of these scales.
(1) The exper i encinq sca-le has seven staqes. At the 
lowest staqe, the client narrates events without any 
reference to how he is personally involved in the story. He 
reveals nothinq about his feelinqs, attitudes, or reactions. 
At the middle staqe 4, the client describes his feelinqs and 
self-concept by usinq his "story" to communicate his self. 
The client is aware of his f e elinqs and able to express 
them, althouqh he is not usinq them as a basis for 
understandinq himself. At the hiqhest staqe 7, the client 
does not even 'need a narrative. He presents an immediate 
picture of what his attitudes and feelinqs mean to him, and 
"moves easily from one inward reference to another." His
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feelinqs primacy :  ^ -termi^inq verbalizations.
{2) The scale for ra t i ng cf pe rsonal cons tracts 
measures the ways in which the person "construes" {i.e., 
perceives, evaluates, and interprets) varyinq situations and 
experiences. At the lo w e s t  stace 1, the client reveals 
nothing about his a t t i t u d e s  and beliefs about the world and 
himself. Everything he says is banal, trite, irrelevant, 
3 nd void of personal meaninq. At the next staqe 2, personal 
constructs are e x t remely riqid and seen as .facts by the 
client. The client shows no awareness that external 
situations are subject to varyinq interpretations. At the 
middle staqe 4, personal constructs are still riqid, but 
there ar e  occasions when the client recoqnizes that his 
perceptions of the situation may not be correct. However, 
he does not explore alternative ways of construinq 
experience. At the hiqhest staqe 7, c o n s t r u c t s  are no 
lonqer seen as solid q u i d e s  for behavior, and are instead 
used as flexible ways of con s t r u i n q  any qiven moment of 
experiencinq. All interpretations and perceptions are 
checked and rechecked aqainst the ever-chanqicq flow of 
experiencinq, and are subject to constant modification in 
light of present events.
{3) The scale for rating the manner of e x p r e s sion is a 
bit different than the other scales because it utilizes a 
hierarchical format. Movement up this scale designates the 
deepening involvement of personal feelinqs in the client's 
expression of his problems. At staqe 1, the client says 
nothinq about his d i f f i c u l t i e s  or problems. At staqe 2, the 
client talks about his problem in a qeneral, detached way. 
At staqe 3, the person i n cludes himself in a specific way 
when d e s c ribing the problem situation. At staqe 4, the 
client talks about his own feelinqs and reactions to the 
problem. At staqe 5, the client acknowledges his own role 
in makinq the problem. At staqe 6, the person describes how 
he comprehends the me a n i n q  of his feelinqs and reactions to 
the problem. At the hiqhest staqe 7, the c l i e n t  describes 
an actual resolution of the problem in terms of changes in 
his feelinqs and attitudes.
{4) Finally, the scale for rating the manner of 
Eclating deals s p e c i fically with how the client experiences 
the therapeutic relationship. At the lowest staqe 1, the 
client flatly refuses any close per s o n a l  relationship at 
all. At the middle staqe 3, interchange in the relationship 
has an "intermittant" quality. At times, there is a clear 
indication of a valued personal relationship in which 
statements by the therapist are important to the client. At 
other moments, the client and therapist seem to seriously 
misunderstand each other and the client is hesitant about 
expressinq deep feelinqs. At staqe 4, "both individuals 
explicitly show that they assume t h e  rela t i o n s h i p  to be one 
of sharinq, intimacy-, personal and self-focused or other's 
self-focused communication" {Rogers, et a l . , 1967, p. 609).
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While at the hiqhest staqe 6, the person to person 
" t o q e t h e m e s s "  is a qiven natural state, in which nothinq 
more about the r e l a t ionship needs to be "worked throuqh" 
[except maybe termination).
In conclusion, the Process Scale represented a hiqhly 
economical measure of the on-qoinq experiential process of 
therapy. It had the advantaqe of qatherinq information from 
a broad ranqe of interrelated process events in therapy, and 
summarizinq this data into a few quantitative values. The 
client-centered rese a r c h e r s  endeavored to establish clear 
observational quidelines for makinq reliable Process Scale 
ratinqs. Certainly one of the tremendous advantaqes of the 
Process Scale was that it could qive a reliable qeneral 
measure of client experiencinq, with the convenience of 
usinq only brief excerpts from tape-recorded interviews.
On the ether hand, there are two problems with the 
Process Scale measure. The first problem is that it 
provides only a gross measure- of the therajgy process. The 
measures used in the Process Scale studies are so cjlobal 
that they "overlook" a lot of valuable information about 
specific in-therapy behavior. It is a n aloqous to tryinq to 
evaluate the quality of a basketball team's entire winninq 
season with a sinqle qlobal measure of "team spirit." 
Perhaps it was the way the team came from behind to win 45% 
of their qames; or how they wen every qame in overtime; or 
how they consistently won the most important qames in their 
own division; or a host of other factors and combinations of
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factors. Conversely, there is only minimal i n d i cation of 
wh.it ac t u al process events co n s t i t u t ed the raters^ 
assessment of the level of client experiencinq. Without 
precise quidelines for determininq these ratinqs, there is 
no way to discern what sorts of therapy observations 
contributed to the iudqes* process ratinqs. However, for 
the most part, this disadvantaqe . is outweiqhed by the
qreater advantaqe of research economy afforded by the
Process Scale methodoloqy.
The second, and more serious problem with the Process
Scale m e t h o d c l o q y , is the way that hiqh scores on the 
process scales were theoretically eguated with successful 
outcome of therapy. This second disadvantaqe is the more 
fundamental problem of tautolog_y. Gendlin {1962a, p. 267) 
unequivocally declares that " experiencinq is a process that 
brinqs about therapeutic chanqe." If experiencinq is held to 
be the key process responsible for therapeutic chanqe, then, 
by definition, experiencinq level is a direct measure of the 
effectiveness of on-qoinq therapy. In fact, the Wisconsin 
Schizophrenia Study and several later studies continued to 
uphold this same basic findinq from the early Process Scale 
studies:- clients whc showed a certain manner of interview 
behavior {one characterized by hiqh levels of felt 
experiencinq) were those who showed successful therapy 
outcomes {Gendlin, 1966; Matarazzo, 1965; Truax, 1963; 
Roqers, et a l . , 1967) .
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However, this tautological problem with positinq the 
"equivalence" of "experiencing level" and "effective 
psychotherapy" leads to a basic confusion. It is analoqous 
to a hypothetical psychoanalytic researcher, who feels that 
"insiqht" is the key to e f f e c tiveness of therapy, and 
desiqns a quantitative measure of "amount of insiqht" gained 
in therapy. He then finds that patients who showed success, 
as measured by changes on personality test measures, also 
showed hiqh scores on the "insiqht" measure. Since the 
psychoanalytic researcher assumes that "insiqht" defines 
effeetiveness, he thereby concludes from these correlational 
results that insiqht was the "cause" of positive therapeutic 
outcome. Section 19 will cri t i q u e  this basic problem of 
interpretive ambiquity, which arises from the c orrelational 
paradiqm that is typically used in G e n d l i n ’s experiencinq 
research and the P r o c e s s  Scale research. In brief, the most 
serious error in usinq the c o r r e lational method "arises from 
i n v e s t i q a t o r s ' tendencies to assign it powers cf proof that 
it does not possess and thus to draw unwarranted conclusions 
or inferences from the data it provides" [Shontz, 1965, p. 
158).
Finally, there was one other extremely important 
outcome of the Wisconsin Schizophrenia Study that was 
entirely unexpected. Roqers, Gendlin, and the other 
therapists found that workinq with recalcitrant 
schizophrenics [and normals) necessitated some drastic 
changes in client-centered practice, and these mcdifications
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impacted on the therapy as a whole. Specifically, the 
client-centered therapists in the Schiz Study had to learn 
to handle such new obstacles as {1) extended periods of 
uncommunicative silence, (2) "total rejection of the whole 
prospect of a relationship," (3) failure to d e v e l o p  "a sense 
for the s e l f-explcration process of therapy," (4) the lack 
of any self-mot i v a t e d  process, and (5) the e xtraordinary  
isolated or disconnected quality of schizophrenia [Gendlin, 
1954b, 1 9^2) .
workinq with s c h i z o phrenics tauqht us a much wider 
vocabulary of behavior, a much wider ranqe of what one 
miqht do, what one miqht be pushed into doinq by oriels 
own f e e l inqs and own needs, in order to reach a person 
not beinq reached...
In order to make some thins h a p p e n , a therapist can 
use not only what the client is  expressinq and qoinq 
throuqh, but al s o  what he himself, as a therapist, as a 
person in this moment, is qoinq throuqh. While the 
client may qive me very little to qo on, I have all the 
events qoinq on in me to use in order to make somethinq 
happen [Gendlin, 1964b, p. 172, first italics added).
In short, the c l i e n t - centered therapists learned to 
rely much more heavily on their own feelinqs as a basis for 
treatment, often askinq themselves, "what is response as 
a person to this other person?" This technical development 
was also consistent with the qeneral historical trend toward 
qreater emphasis on therapist conqruence. Another promisinq 
observation was that the minimal statements and nonverbal 
behavior of the sch i z o p h r e n i c  frequently arose "from a very 
eventful, concretely felt process—  and that the 
interactions with the therapist are affectinq or enablinq
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this p r o c e s s ” (Gendlin, 1962c, p. 211: see al s o  Gendlin,
1963a, 1972),
Above all, it became c l e a r  that the central 
e xperiencinq process e n c o mpassed both c o n t i n u a l  focus on the 
c l i e n t ’s felt experiencinq as well as expression of the 
therapist's own e x p e r i e n c i n q  in the relationship. Hart 
(1970) sees this new emphasis on the experiencinq process as 
markinq the openinq of a new period in client-centered 
therapy, which he ca l l s  ’’experiential psychotherapy" and 
dates 1957-1970.
In closinq, the completion of the Wisconsin 
Schizophrenia Study marked the end of an era in , the 
client-centered movement. Followinq many active years of 
fruitful research and theoretical development, the Wisconsin 
Schizophrenia Study was in some ways a disappointment and a 
finale. Althouqh the results enhanced knowledqe about 
therapy with schizophrenics and suqqested many new methods 
and areas of research, the results were qenerally 
inconsistent and undramatic. Furthermore, serious personal 
conflicts amcnq the primary a uthors of the prefect caused 
lenqthy publication delays that reduced its impact on the 
field (see Kirschenbaum, 1979, pp. 280-239).
In the wake of this mixed success, Carl Roqers moved 
into new areas, such as student-centered edu c a t i o n  (Roqers, 
1969) and encounter qro u p s  (Roqers, 1970). At the same 
time, Gendlin's interests turned to pursuinq the practical.
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theoretical, and p hilcsophical implications of his oriqinal 
experiencinq conception. His years as a therapist and 
researcher in the c l ient-centered orientation helped him to 
clarify his pre-theoretical descriptive notion of 
"experiencinq" and distinquish it from Roqers' c o nstruct of 
"experience" [see Section 17). The publication cf Gendlin's 
Ex p e r iencinq and the C r e a t i on of Me a ning in 1962 marked his 
philosophical break with the clie n t - c e n t e r e d  novement and 
diverqence into the realm of experiential phenomenoloqy and 
psychotherapy [see Sections 16 and 17).
15. Impl i c ations of the Process Scale Research.
The consistent results of the Process Scale research 
had tremendous i m p l i cations for clinical practiae. Above 
all, the Process Scale promised a reliable method of 
determining when therapy was being effectively conducted. 
Level of e x p e r i e n c i n q , as m e asured by the P rocess Scales, 
seemed to- be an accurate index of the e ffectiveness of 
on-qoinq therapy. However, the disturbinq implication was 
that suc c e ss was predict able rijght at the start of therapy! 
Stated simply, when experiencinq level was low, therapy was 
not occurring.
Page 138
'J’he fi^dina each time was that experiencing ratings 
of a few d-Muinute segments predict success cr failure 
with a hiqii deqree of statistical significance, We can 
now measure, while it is still going on, whether an 
effective m o d e ’ of therapy be h a v i o r  is cccurrinq. 
[Namely that the client uses his immediate on-going 
experiential process as a basis for his thoughts and 
actions,) We need no longer wait some years for the 
outcome measures to tell us!
The implications for clinical practice and for 
future research strategy are quite momentous. Both 
practice and research procedures can now be instituted 
and tested by rating the s u b sequent interviews soon 
after whatever one does. In the past, each 
psychotherapy research study was condemned to require 
many years, until outcome measures were available, and 
each patient had to be left to continue whatever he was 
doing [often unproductive and ineffective), since there 
was no obiective way to evaluate if his present therapy 
process was of an effective sort. rGendlin, et al., 
1968, p. 224, parentheses added].
These surprising results drew attention to two 
important distinguishable aspects of the experiencing 
variable: [1) deqree of e n g a g e m e n t  in experiential focusing
in therapy, and [2) increases in experiential focusing 
during th e  course of therapy. With regards to engagement, 
the studies consistently found that experiential level 
.accurately predicted eventual success and failure of therapy 
for both neurotics and schizophrenics. The astounding 
implication of the Process Scale research was that success 
was predictable from the start of therapy: cli e n t s  engaging 
in high levels of e x p e riential focusinq in therapy were 
those who showed successful outcome.
On the other hand, G endlin and his client-centered 
colleagues were quite mistaken with regards to the second 
aspect of the experiencing variable: increases in focusinq,
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They had assumed that therapy naturally helped to teach a 
client to enqaqe in experiential focusinq. Therefore it was 
expected that effective therapy would be characterized by 
proqressive increases in the c l i e n t ’s level of experiencinq 
across time. In terms of the Process Scale measure of 
experiencinq, it had been predicted that successful clients 
would move up the scale over the course of therapy. In 
actuality, however, the client-centered researchers found 
that there was o n l y  a minimum cf upward movement at best. 
Moreover, while the neurotic patients qenerally showed a 
fairly orderly linear chanqe on the P rocess Scale over time, 
schizophrenics showed much more complex curves with both 
abrupt improvements and backslidinq on the scale [Rogers, et 
a l . , 1967) .
In liqht of the results of the many experimental 
studies usinq the Process Scale,* Gendlin and his colleaques 
became convinced that level of experiencinq was the crucial 
factor in psychotherapy. Therefore they set up an 
investiqaticn to explore a series of five br o a d  questions 
implied by these findinqs [Gendlin, et al., 1968):
experiential focu s i n q d e f ine psychological
adjustment?
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At first sight, it appeared to Gendlin and his 
colleagues that focusing was necessary to move from 
maladjustment to adjustment, and so they wondered whether 
focusinq by itself constituted psychological adjustment. 
However, based on c l inical experience and the re-aralysis of 
the Process Scale data, they concluded that many maladjusted 
clients do have this focusing ability, while many 
well-adjusted people are guite lacking in this ability. 
Therefore, in answer to this question, i t  was clear that 
focusing ability, by itself, did not define psychological 
well-beinq. In fact, Gendlin ( 1 9 6 7 a )  related experiential 
focusing ability to a definition of the essential character 
of neurosis. The neurotic individual is (1) acutely 
sensitive to the way that his problems hinder his living, 
but (2) lacks the skill of experiential focusinq to carry 
his feelings forward toward resolution.
2. Is focusing a skill or trait?
Secondly, Gendlin and his colleaques were curious 
whether focusing was a learned sk i l l  or a particular 
personality trait. Tc  test this question, they administered 
two pages of instructions in how to focus (the Focusing 
Manual) to 47 high school students. S u b j e c t s ’ level of 
focusing ability was defined by scores based cn judges' 
subsequent ratings cf student answers to a short-answer 
Post-Focusing Questionnaire (PFQ). For a sequence of
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open-ended questions, the iudqes used a 4-point ratinq scale 
ranqinq from certainty that the sub j e c t ' s  response indicated 
experiential focusinq to cer t a i n t y  that it did not. The
Gendlin team then correlated the students* focusinq ability 
scores with their i n d i v i d u a l  scores on the fourteen factors 
of the Cattell Hiqh School P e r s o n a l i t y  Questionnaire, a 
trait test. They fo u n d  that focusinq ability scores were 
siqnificantly correlated with nine of the fourteen 
personality factors.
An inspection of the f actors correlatinq with 
focusinq (we had irade no specific predictions) indicates 
that for the most part focusinq a bility is associated 
with -just such traits as are akin to focusinq thus 
qivinq a meaninqful picture (Gendlin, et a l . , 1967, p.
233) .
On the contrary, a closer exa m i n a t i o n  of this research 
study suqqests that there is no consistent ” meaninqful 
picture'* here. The au t h o r s  provided no rationale to explain 
why certain personality factors should be associated with 
focusinq ability and why other factors should not, and they 
made no predictions about which p e r s onality traits would 
correlate with focusinq ability. Without includinq an 
appropriate comparison qroup or manipulation, one miqht find 
that focusinq ability correlates with any number of 
personality factors, or that some irrelevant variable like 
fcowlinq ability is similarly "correlated with 9 of the 14 
factors." In this case, Gendlin and his colleaques simply 
listed characteristics — such as "intelliqence.
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self-discipline, perseverence, staidness, and effective 
l e a d e r s h i p ”—  which had been found (post hoc) to be
correlated with f ocusing scores. For instance, the authors 
are obliqated to exp l a i n  why "effective l e a d e r s h i p ” should 
" clearly” be more a s s o c i a t e d  with exp e r i e n t i a l  focusinq than 
"poor l e a d ership.” The fact that the a uthors "made no 
specific p r e d i c t i o n s ” in this study suqqests that they had 
no such quidinq rationale, and that this is little more than 
exploratory " q rab-baq” research. Moreover, the most 
perplexinq feature of this study is the authors' conclusion 
that they prefer to think of focusinq as an a M l i t y  rather 
than a personality trait. If this is so, one wonders what
purpose this research has served.
In summary, this research study h a s  a number of 
problems. First of all, there is a question whether the 
instructions actually induced exp e r i e n t i a l  focusinq and
whether the iudqes' ratinqs provided a reliable measure of 
focusinq. The inter-iudqe c o r r e lations were qenerally low, 
ranging from .108 to .482, and only one third of the 
Post-Focusinq Questionnaire questions were "reliable and 
disc r i m i n a t e d . ” Th u s  there is some doubt ab o u t  the external 
validity of this focusinq variable. Secondly, there is no 
clear cut rationale for what personality traits should be 
strongly associated with focusinq ability. Thirdly, if 
focusinq is an ab i l i t y  that can be tauqht rather than a 
personality trait, there is confusion about how these 
trait-test results are tc be interpreted. Do certain types
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of people learn to focus more easily, or do these types of 
people already have the abi l i t y ?  In short, the research 
never clarified the oriqinal quiaing question of whether 
focusinq is a trait-
3. What is the telation ship bet ween focusing and 
cre a t i vity?
In the next phase of this research, Gendlin and his 
colleagues turned tc a third broad research question about 
experiential focusinq (Gendlin, et a l . , 1968): the
relationship between focusinq ability and creativity. In 
contrast to the exp l o r a t o r y  quality of the above study 
(which re l i e d  upon post hoc i n terpretation of r e s u l t s ) , this 
study had a clear theoretical rationale:
The ability to focus on c o n cretely felt, but 
preconceptual aspects of the situation or problem one is 
presently experiencinq is obviously necessary if one 
wishes tc move beyond the definitions, constructs, and 
interpretations one already has... Cre a t i v i t y  involves 
turninq o n e ’s a t tention from the well-articulated 
explicit form in which one interprets something, to 
o n e ’s as yet unformulated felt sense of the whole 
s i t u a t i o n —  e xactly what effective psychotherapy 
involves. The creative individual is the one who 
d o e s n ’t scorn his vague impressions, who can stand a few 
moments of a t t e n t i o n  to his — con c e p t u a l l y  vaque—  but 
concretely felt impression, and who formulates these 
(Gendlin, et al., 1968, p. 233).
To test this hypothesis, the Gendlin research team 
administered a sequence of three tests to 22 college 
sophomores. First they completed a version of the
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Gottschaldt Hidden Figures test (HFT), which involved 
findinq simple qeometrical figures embedded in mere complex 
designs. The subjects then listened to tape-recorded 
instructions from the Focusinq Manual, and completed the 
Post-Focusinq Q uestionnaire (PFQ). Finally the students 
viewed a series of TAT pictures and wrote l1as many stories 
as p o s s i b l e ” about each picture in the allotted time. (Jsinq 
the median sccres on the PFQ, TAT, and H F T , G endlin and his 
colleagues separated the subjects into comparative groups of 
"focusers" and "nonfocusers," hiqh and low scoring TAT 
qroups, and hiqh and low scoring HFT groups. A Spearman 
rank correlation of .44 was obtained between the TAT and HFT 
scores. No c o r r e lations between the two creativity tests 
and the PFQ were reported.
Using chi square analyses, Gendlin and his research 
team found that focusing a b i l i t y  was related to scores on 
the HFT, and unrelated to TAT Productivity scores. Since 
both tests were selected as measures of creativity, the 
authors had to explain why focusinq ability was related only 
to hidden figures ability. The HFT test was considered to 
be related tc focusing because it "measures the individual's 
ability to 'flexibly' adapt patterns, that is, to 'let go 
of' constructs or c onfiqerations when no lonqer appropriate 
to the situation" (Gendlin, et al., 1968, p. 235). fThey 
note that Uitken refers to this embedded figures ability as 
"field independence" rather than "creativity" [Witkin, 
1962) } .
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tfith reqards to TAT productivity, the authors arque 
that in order to "let qo" of a particular story theme to 
create a new story, the subiects also had to let qc of their 
experiential sense of the s timulus picture. However, this 
arqument assumes, first, that the focusinq subiects were 
indeed in touch with their e x p e r i e n t i a l  felt sensinq durinq 
the creation of the initial TAT story. Secondly, it assumes 
that an experiential sense is "sinqular" in the sense of 
yieldinq but a sinqle story. This conflicts with Gendlin's 
own position that any qiven felt sense "contains" a wealth 
of implicit meaninq that miqht be formulated in innumerable 
ways [i.e., multiple stories are therefore possible) . It 
appears that the a uthors selected TAT Productivity as a 
creativity measure for a special reason, but then attempted 
to "explain away" the neqative findinqs obtained. In the 
end, the authors con c l u d e  that focusinq is related to a 
specific type of creativity, defined neqatively as the 
capacity of lettinq qo of qiven frameworks.
Based on the results of these two sub-studies on 
personality and creativity, Gendlin felt that they had 
succeeded in closely approximatinq the crucial therapeutic 
process of experiential focusinq "in the laboratory." This 
raised the next maior question of whether "experiential 
focusinq" — as it was implemented by the Focusinq Manual 
instructions, and measured by the PFQ—  was the same 
capacity that was responsible for hiqh levels of 
experiencinq in therapy as measured by the Process Scale.
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As reported in the 1968 research article, Gendlin and his 
colleagues had initiated another new study tc correlate
focusinq ability and experiencinq level durinq therapy. 
This study was designed to "directly establish this presumed 
equation between focusinq ability in the laboratory and 
experiencinq level durinq therapy interviews" (Gendlin, et
a l . , 1968, p. 235). Their plan was to use Process Scale
measurements cf in-therapy experiencinq level as feedback on 
the effectiveness of various training procedures for 
focusinq. Increases in experiencinq level wculd indicate 
that the focusinq traininq procedure was provinq
"effective." However, since this proposed study has never 
been published, it is possible that this research yielded 
disappointing results.
Can f o c u s i nq be taught with procedural instructions?
j
The general line of research described above also 
emphasized what was probably the most important implication 
for psychotherapy: assuminq that experiential focusinq leads 
to positive outcome in therapy, can therapists learn ways to 
teach and directly facilitate this process? As we have 
seen, the client-centered researchers were surprised to find 
that experiencing level qenerally did not increase durinq 
the course of therapy. Therefore, assuminq that hiqh levels 
of experiencinq c h a r a cterize effective therapy, they were 
concerned with how to enhance the experiencinq process in
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therapy. Gendlin first pursued this issue by askinq whether 
focusing was a trait or a trainable skill (Gendlin, et al., 
1968). By 1969, he was c o nvinced that focusing was a skill 
that could be learned (Gendlin, 1969a). In fact, it is fair 
to state that much of Gendlin's work following this period 
of experimental research in the late 1950 's and ea.rly 1 960's 
has been devoted to developing new and improved ways of 
teachinq focusing (Gendlin, 1978, 1981).
5. Hi n t  implica t i o ns does focusing ha ve f_cr therapy 
effectiveness research?
Last of all, the c o n s i s t e n t  positive results from the 
Process Scale studies had maior implications for future 
outcome research on psychotherapy. Basically, it questioned 
the established strategy of c o mparinq a "treatment group" to 
a "no-treatment co n t r o l  group" as the way to determine 
whether a particular treatment was effective. In fact, 
according to Gendlin, the research suqgested that often as 
much as one half of the presumed "treatment grcup" are not 
doing therapy (Gendlin, 1 969a) .
This assertion was entirely consistent with the 
contemporary experimental work of Truax and Carkhuff on 
psychotherapeutic outcome (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967). Based 
on their thorough review of the evidence for and against the 
effectiveness of psychotherapy, Truax and Carkhuff (1967, p.
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18) argued that the extensive p a r a d o x i c a l  evidence against 
p sychotherapeutic e f f e c t i v e n e s s  [Eysenck, 197 1) "lies in the 
inappropriateness of c o m p arisons between ' p s y c h o t h e r a p y 1 and 
'control' conditions of 'no psychotherapy."' They argue that 
"psychotherapy" consists of a diverse collection of 
psychological conditions that produce varying degrees of 
positive and negative experiences for the client. Therefore 
it is inappropriate fc co m p a r e  a group of patients receiving 
"random unknown amounts of various psychological conditions 
collectively labeled psychotherapy" with another group 
supposedly receiving "no psychotherapy." For the same 
reason, Kiesler [1970, p. 251) has concluded that "outcome 
studies contrasting therapy pat i e n t s  as a group with control 
patients are doomed to failure."
I nstead of this approach, Truax and C a r k h u f f  [1967) 
advocated a drastic change in approach that focused on 
isolating and measuring the spe c ific ingredients and 
conditions established in the therapeutic relationship. In 
short, psychotherapy research should concentrate on relating 
the effective a n t e c e d e n t  e lements and ingredients of the 
therapeutic relationship to cons t r u c t i v e  change in the 
client. This type of research approach would explain, for 
example, why Fiedler [1950, 1951) found that the guality and 
nature o f  the therapeutic r e l a t ionship is independent of the 
individual therapist's actual training in the Adlerian, 
Freudian, or non- d i r e c t i v e  schools of therapy. The 
explanation is that any particular "school" actually
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represents a h e t e r o q e n e o u s  c o l lection of inqredients. 
Therefore research should focus on the s p e c i f ic effective 
conditions established by a therapist, reqardless of his 
particular "school,” In fact, Truax and C arkhuff (1967) 
dedicated their w e l l - k n c w n  book to identifyinq and measurinq 
the specific conditions that contribute to positive and 
deteriorative client chanqes, and supportinq these 
assertions with empirical evidence.
Based on his own extensive work in therapy research, 
Gendlin arrived at a very similar conclusion. Gendlin has 
advocated a new research strateqy based on the fact that 
level of ” experiencinq” is an accurate indice of therapy 
effectiveness (Gendlin, 1969a; Gendlin, et al., 1968). 
Basically, the researcher i n s titutes any e x p e r imental factor 
that is expected to influence therapy effectiveness, and 
then measures whether it raised or lowered the level of 
e x p e r iencinq in subsequent interview sessions. For example, 
an experimental factor miqht be focusinq instructions, 
imaqery traininq, or some other "inqredient" of the 
relationship (to use the term of Truax and Carkhuff, 1967). 
In this way, the r e s earcher can determine early in therapy 
whether the treatment is makinq a positive impact.
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6. The Divergence of Exqerlential FsychjDt herap y  from 
Client-Cen ter€d Thera ovx period V (1 96 2 -present j.
At this point we have discussed four staqes of 
evolution of client-centered therapy. Tn summary, the first 
period (rouqhly 1940-1948) was characterised by an emphasis 
on non-directive techniques. The second period (rouqhly 
1943-195 1) was c h a r a c terised by a new emphasis on the vital 
therapeutic attitudes of the counselor. The third period 
(rouqhly 1951-1957) viewed the relationship as the key 
factor, focusinq on the c l i e n t ’s experience in interaction 
with the attitudes of the therapist. The fourth period 
(rouqhly 1957-1962) was distinquished by the emerqence of 
the "new process conception" of human experiencinq. Durinq 
this fourth period, the focus was on the experiencinq 
process of the client and they endeavored to clarify it 
theoretically, measure it scientifically, and facilitate it 
in clinical practice. Based larqely on the research usinq 
the Process Scale, this "experiencinq process" was 
identified as the index of positive therapeutic personality 
change. Durinq this fourth period of evolution, 
client-centered research was clearly formulated in terms of 
R o q e r s ’ basic theory, and was aimed at relatinq this 
experiencinq process to the techniques (from Period I), 
attitudes (from Period II), and interactive relationship 
(from Period III) established in client-centered therapy.
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The fifth period of evolution arose from the vital 
discoveries that were made in clinical practice, theory and 
research durinq the fourth period. For organizational 
purposes, I have adopted the publication date of Gendlin's 
Exp?,Ei§gci ng and the Cr e a tion of Meaning J19 62) as the 
transition to the new period. As we have seen, durinq the 
late 1950's and early 1960's, Gendlin contributed to the 
client-centered approach as a theorist, clinician, and 
experimental researcher. However, his role durinq this 
period was that of an important assistant seeking to advance 
the ideas and research of Carl Poqers and the 
client-centered proqram. E x p e r iencing and the Creation of 
Meaning announced G e n d l i n ' s  philosophical break with Carl 
Poqers and the clie n t - c e n t e r e d  orientation, and narked the 
independent pursuit of his own concerns. Also, at this 
time, the massive collaborative work on the Wisconsin 
Schizophrenia Project was beinq carried to a conclusion 
(although the publication of its results was delayed until 
1 967).
Undoubtedly, Gen d l i n ' s  many fruitful years working with 
Poqers were extremely valuable because they helped him to 
clarify his basic ideas about experiencinq. Clearly, 
Gendlin had always r e mained close to his oriqinal notion of 
"experiencinq," which he had first described with Fimrinq in 
1955. By the time of Experiencing and the Creation of 
Meaning, Gendlin had clarified the central distinction 
between his own pre-theoretical descriptive Eotion of
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"experiencinq'1 and P o q e r s ' construct of "experience" (see 
Section 17). The c l a r i f ication of this crucial distinction 
marked the central point of diverqence between ' Gendlin and 
client-centered theory. This point was one cf several 
qeneral factors that contributed to G e n d l i n ’s departure from 
the client-centered orientation. For present purposes, it 
would be unnecessary to a ttempt to define the specific 
lineaqe of ideas, or critical historical events, or personal 
motives that created this diverqence. Instead, in this 
section, I will suqqest six basic points that conduced to 
this departure.
1. Philosophical interests .
Ge n d l i n  had been deeply involved in philosophy from the 
very beqinninq of his career. He had studied philosophy 
under Pichard McKeon at the University of Chicaqc, and wrote 
his masters thesis in nhilosophy in 1950 on the topic of 
Wilhelm Dilthey. In fact., Gendlin has stated that he was 
"always the philosopher," even durinq his period of 
collaboration with Carl Poqers, and he planned tc use what 
he was learninq accordinqly (Scharff, 1983). He had 
completed his doctoral dissertation on "The Function of 
Experiencinq in Symbolization" in 1958, and this was later 
refined into his maior philosophical treatise, Fxjreriencing; 
and the C r e a t ion of Heaning, published in 1962.
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As Gendlin has explained in several of his writings, 
the basic ideas of his "experiential phencmenoloqy" 
represent central p h i l o s ophical issues in the existential 
and phenoirenclcqica 1 traditions (see Gendlin, 1S62a, 1965a, 
1966b, 1973a, 1978-1979, 1979, 1982). . Tn this reqard,
Gendlin notes the influence of such .leadinq fiqures as 
Buber, Dilthey, and Kierkeqaard, but most especially 
Heideqqer (Gendlin, 1965a, 1965c, 1966b, 1967c, 1973a,
1 978-1979, 1982, 1983), Herleau-Ponty (Gendlin 1964c, 1 973a, 
1 973b) , Husserl (Gendlin, 1 965b, 1 966b, 1973a) , and Sartre 
(Gendlin, 1965a, 1965b).
Above all, G endlin credits Heideqqer as the most 
important philosophical "influence" on his thinkinq. In 
fact, he views his work as continuinq from that of 
Heideqqer. However, as Gendlin explains in the followinq 
passaqe, this influence was quite " i n d i r e c t , ” and he did not 
realize it for many years.
tfy own work for many years preceded my reading 
Heideqqer. T came to him quite late. Both the 
Personality Chanqe theory (Gendlin 1 9 6 4 a ) , and the 
philosophical work (Gendlin, 1962a), were written before 
I read Heideqqer. Bu t  I had read those philosophers 
that most influenced Heideqqer, and so I eraerqed from 
the same sources, at least to some extent. I had also 
read Sartre, Buber, and Merleau-Ponty, who were qreatly 
and crucially followinq Heideqqer. Hence ray own work 
continues from Heideqqer, and stands under his 
influence, althouqh I did not recoqnize that until later 
(Gendlin, 1978-1979, p. 70, reference dates added).
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Since the c l i e n t - centered approach has. traditionally 
stressed scientific research and practical application, and 
has paid minimal att e n t i o n  to philosophical thinVirq, it was 
predictable that G e n d l i n  would not find satisfaction for his 
philosophical interests here. In fact, his philosophical 
predilection flavored the way that Gendlin approached the 
ideas of Poqers at this time. As noted earlier (Section 
12), Gendlin became intriqued by the theoretical problem 
that Poqers faced in the 1 9 5 0 ’ s. Basically Poqers was 
trying to explain how personal meanings and feelinqs could 
emerqe and even chanqe durinq therapeutic interaction even 
thouqh these experiences were supposedly not "in a w a r e n e s s . ” 
Gendlin recoqnized this as a philosophical problem, which 
was centered around the problematic rulinq conceptions in 
psycholoqy of ”the unconscious m i n d ” and "the contents of 
e x p e r i e n c e . ” He resolved the respective difficulties of the 
"repression pa r a d i q m ” and "content paradiqm" with the new 
process conception of experiencinq (see Section 12) and the 
related notions of "implicit m e a n i n g ” (see Section 3) and 
"felt s a n s i n q ” (see Section 2).
2. Pursuing implications of the " e xpe r iencing" notion.
The second factor contributing to Gendlin's diverqence 
was that the notion of experiencinq was tremendously rich in 
its implications for psycholoqy and psychotherapy. Indeed, 
the basic idea has been a wellsprinq for Gendlin for nea'rly 
three decades. This conception has required fundamental
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re-thinkinq in many areas, In particular, it has
necessitated modifications in the conduct and aims of 
therapy, the nature of personality theory, and the 
development and use of research variables to accurately
capture the process of therapy. Furthermore, the idea of 
experiencinq has required the development of methods to
facilitate direct e x p e r iencinq (focusinq), and called for 
discussions to connect this thinkinq to contemporary
phenomenoioqy and e x i s t e n t i a l  philosophy. In fact, it would 
be accurate to describe Gen d l i n ' s  career as a life's task of
elaboratinq, clarifyinq, and unpackinq the implications of
this rich quidinq c o n c e p t i o n  called "experiencinq."
In more recent years, Gendlin has been especially 
concerned with the philosophical implications of
"experiencinq." In particular, he has endeavored to blend 
this idea into m a i n s t r e a m  philosophical thinkinq dealinq 
with Heideqqer (Gendlin, 1978-1S78, 1902, 1983).
3* A c h i evement of the clie n t - c e n t e r e d  goals.
The third factor contributinq to Gendlin's break was
the s u c cesses of the Process Scale research, As we have
seen, the extensive c l i e n t - centered research beinq conducted 
durinq this time period was yieldinq consistent support for 
the essential role of "the experiencinq process" in
successful therapy. Gendlin was one of the leaders in this
client-centered therapy research. The evidence from these
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studies repeatedly found that the successful cliert was one 
who showed hiqh .levels of direct experiencinq of feelings 
and felt meanings. In effect, this meant that Gendlin and 
his client-centered colleaques had accomplished two 
important initial qcals. First of all, it had been 
successfully demonstrated that the new process conception 
could be scientifically studied with e f f ective process 
variables. Secondly, the Process Scale research had 
demonstrated experimental support for the idea that level of 
experiencinq was the c rucial factor in psychotherapy. 
Therefore, havinq acccmplished both of these client-centered  
qoals, Gendlin was at liberty to address new problems he was- 
interested in.
Development of f o c u s inq methods.
The fourth factor contributinq to Gendlin's diverqence 
from client-centered therapy was the fact that experiential 
focusinq had now been "proven” to be the c rucial factor in 
effective psychotherapy. Convinced that effective therapy 
is characterised by experiential focusinq, Gendlin now 
became concerned with findinq ways to improve therapy by 
facilitatinq this process. In fact, Gendlin had bequn 
training graduate students in focusinq techniques as early 
as 1963 (Scharff, 1983). As described in Section 15, 
Gendlin and his colleaques began with the question of 
whether focusinq was a trait or a trainable skill [Gendlin, 
et al., 1968). In conducting this research, they found it
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was possible to provide brief procedural instructions for 
teachinq focusinq "in the lab.” They also developed a 
judqe-rated questionnaire [the PFQ) to evaluate "focusinq 
ability” followinq the instructions in focusinq. In this 
study, they explored the relationship between focusinq 
ability and personality traits and creativity, ard concluded 
that focusinq was net a trait, but a trainable skill 
[Gendlin, et al. , 1 968). This research study represented
the beqinninq of Gendlin's efforts toward iranrovinq methods 
to teach and facilitate "fo c u s i n q ” [Gendlin, 1981'; see also 
Section 7).
5. Plodifications of c l i e n t - centered therapy.
The fifth point of diverqence centered around G e n d l i n ’s 
recoqnition cf some distinct shortcominqs of client-centered 
therapy. Based on his own clinical practice, and especially 
his experiences in therapy with schizophrenics, Gendlin 
perceived certain limitations of client-centered therapy. 
Stated in brief, Gendlin realized that the key to the 
effectiveness of clie n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy was the fanner in 
which reflective respondinq was used. Specifically, the 
therapeutic effectivenss of client-centered respondinq was 
enhanced by [1) insistinq on "exact s p e c i f i c i t y ” in 
respondinq tc the cli e n t ' s  feelinqs, and by (2) irakinq sure 
that the client "checks inside" to see if the response 
accurately captures the crux of the feelinq [see Section 9).
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Not only did Gendlin become clear about the crucial 
importance of continual direct reference to experiential 
felt sensino, but he recoqnized that therapy cculd also 
proceed effectively by focusinq on the direct experiencinq 
of the therapist as well. Thus, one of his primary 
innovations cf client-centered therapy called fcr increased 
therapist self-expression. This was especially necessary 
when workinq with recalcitrant or non-verbal schizophrenic 
patients [see Section 14). In particular, Gendlin advocated 
chanqinq many of the " d o n ’t" rules of client-centered 
therapy into "do11 rules. In this way, it became acceptable 
practice to do thinqs like offer a personal opinion or 
interrupt the client tc ask for clarification. Above all, 
Gendlin was pressinq for t h e r apeutic "fo c u s i n q ” methods that 
could directly facilitate the use of the felt experiencinq 
process fsee Section 7). The implementation of these 
constructive modifications constituted yet a nother avenue of 
diverqence from the client-centered orientation.
6- I n t e r p e r s o na 1 difficulties.
Finally, it is likely that the personal difficulties 
that occurred between Foqers, Gendlin, Kiesler, Truax, and 
the other maqcr researchers of the Wisconsin Schizophrenia 
Study also contributed to G e n d l i n ’s separation from 
client-centered work, Stated in brief, there were several 
years of "aqonizinq dispute" over the e d i torship and 
authorship cf the proiect, which caused qreat delays in the
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eventual publication of the research results [nine years 
from 1958 to 1967). The nature of this dispute has been 
described at lenqth by Kirschenbaum [1979, pp. 2 8 C - 2 8 9 ) .
Tn summary, I have arqued that six related factors 
contributed to G e n d l i n ’s diverqence from Carl Foqers and the 
client-centered o r i e n t a t i o n  fcllowinq a lonq period of 
fruitful collaboration. P.ather than attemptinq to explain 
Gendlin's personal motives and the historical events in this 
matter, I have simply suqqested some qeneral factors that 
led to G e n d l i n ’s diverqence from client-centered therapy.
CHAPTER TV -
THE RELATION BETTJEEN EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
AND EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY.
17 » "Ex periencinq11 Distinguished From Rogers^
C o n s t ruct of " E x p e rie n c e 11.
The consistent central theme of this dissertation has 
been that sufc-jective experiencinq plays a vital role in the 
process of psychotherapy. However, in order tc clearly 
understand and discuss this vital function of experiencinq 
in thera peutic chanqe, there is a need for a systema tic 
theory of psychotherapy. Such a theory would provide a 
workinq terminology and framework for raakinq statements 
about observations and subjective events in therapy. 
Unfortunately, as Gendlin (1S62a) points out, standard 
psychological theories consist of a mixture of (1) 
theoretical constructs that do not have immediately 
observable experiential referents, or (2) terms defined by 
external observations, or (3) imprecise ccrrmon-sense
-160-
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lanquaqe that refers to experiencinq in a vaque manner. In 
short, terms that r e f e r  directly to experiencinq are needed 
to clearly define the vital role of experiencinq on a 
theoretical level. This does not, however, mean that 
therapists have qenerally been cut of touch with the central 
therapeutic role of experiencinq. Rather, thus far it has 
been impossible to be theoretically clear about the 
experiencinq process because psycholoqists use terms that 
refer only to c o n c e p t u a l  contents or externally observed 
behaviors, or they rely upon c o m m o n-sense descriptive
lanquaqe that provides only implicit, imprecise references 
to subiective experiencinq.
The contrast b etween Gendlin's notion of "experiencinq" 
and the construct "experience" in Foqerian theory centers 
upon this basic issue. R o qerian theory, like other 
psycholoqical theories about psychotherapy, has no terms 
that refer directly tc experiencinq. Thus, althcuqh Poqers 
does i m p li ci tly refer to the experiencinq process in his 
descriptions cf therapy, he does not have terms that refer 
to experiencinq in his explicit formal theory. As a result,
Poqers is theoretically unclear about the distinction
between direct experiencinq and formulations of experiencinq 
[see Section h) .
As noted previously in Section 6, it is possible to
refer directly tc subiective experiencinq without 
conceptualization. "Direct reference" occurs in
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psychotherapy when a client points to ’’this feelinq T h a v e ” 
even thouqh he or she is still unsure what "it" is. Later, 
the client miqht label this feelinq as "anxiety about 
divorce." This thouqht is a c o n c eptualizaticn of felt
experiencinq, rather than direct experiencinq itself, which 
had provided the qround for this particular 
conceptualization. Direct reference and conceptualization 
are two distirquishable types of symbolization. In direct 
reference, the client uses symbols to point to, or refer to 
experiencinq, but there is no representation or picture of 
what the qiven exp e r i e n c i n q  "is" (e.q., "I feel it 
s t r o n q l y " ) . Whereas c o n c eptualization uses symbols to 
represent that which is s y m b o l i z e d  [e.q., "I am feelinq 
anxious about divorce") .
In the same way, perceiving can be contrasted with "a 
perception." For example, at this moment, this paqe of 
writinq is one aspect of the phenomenal field of your
on-qoinq process of perceivinq. To understand that "this is
English printing" formulates an aspect of this complex 
on-qoinq prccess of perceivinq into content, a perception. 
This obqect of perception, or content, is not the same as 
the process of perceivinq, which may or may not be 
formulated into any p a r ticular perception [s).
Experiencinq is not known, observed, cr referred
to, except as it is "symbolized" in some way. However,
it need not be symbolized in the sense of
conceptualization. It may be symbolized by beinq
"directly referred" to [Gendlin, 1962a, p. 238).
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Gendlin's noticn of "experiencinq" can be 
differentiated from Carl Roqers' notion of "experience" in 
two ways. First of all, the Roqerian term "experience" 
usually is a c o nstruct that identifies all possible 
orqanismic events occurrinq at any qiven moment in the 
person—  events that are both "in awareness" and "denied to 
awareness." Gendlin's "experiencinq" is not a construct 
because it refers to the actual immediately qiven phenomena 
in awareness. "Experiencinq" is always "in awareness" as 
felt meaninq. Secondly, the Roqerian term "experience" 
refers to explicit conceptual content. Whereas
"experiencinq". refers to the bodily-felt, implicitly 
meaninqful datum in the individual's phenomenal field, which 
can occur with and without c o n c eptualization into content. 
In both respects then, Roqers' notion of "experience" is a 
theoretical term that does not directly refer to 
experiencinq. These points c a n  be elaborated by examininq 
Roqers' terra "experience" as it is used as a noun and a 
verb:
Experience (noun). This term is used tc include
all that is qoina on within the envelop of the orqanisra 
at any qiven moment. It includes events of which the 
individual is unaware (such as physioloqica 1 aspects of 
hunqer, cr the impact of sensory e v e n t s ) , as well as the 
phenomena which are in consciousness...
Experience (verb). To experience means simply to
receive in the orqanism the impact of the sensory or 
physioloqical events which at the moment are
transpirinq... "To experience in awareness" ...means to 
symbolize in some accurate form at the conscious level 
the above sensory or visceral events" (Gendlin, 1962a, 
p. 2h1, quotinq Roqers, 1959a, statement in parentheses 
a d d e d ) .
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This quote reveals the use of ’’e x p e r i e n c e ” as both a 
" c o n s t r u c t ” and as "concentual content." With reqards to the 
former, "experience" is a construct that refers to all the 
orqanismic events that are happeninq at any qiven moment in 
the person. These orqanismic events can be in awareness, or 
may exist at an unconscious level from which they can 
potentially enter awareness. By definition then, orqanismic 
events that are "not in a w a r e n e s s ” or "denied tc awareness" 
cannot serve as an immediately present, directly observable 
referent for the individual. There is a distinction between 
phenomenal data that is "in awareness," and data that is 
"in" the orqanism. In contrast, "experiencinq" refers to 
the i m m e d i a t e ,flow of directly felt, implicitly meaninqful 
datum in the individual phenomenal field. Thus 
"experiencinq" is al w a y s  a directly observable referent for 
the individual.
Secondly, experience is used by Roqers as conceptual 
content. In the above quote, Roqers acknowledqes that ."to 
experience in awareness" means to symbolize orqanismic 
events in seme accurate form at the conscious level. In 
other words, to "symbolize accurately" means to 
conceptualize orqanismic experience into an e x p l i c i t  content 
that is "hnown." In this fashion, "experience" which was 
once on an "unconscious" orqanismic level is now directly  
equated with the explicit conceptual content into which it 
has been conceptualized. For Roqers then, "experience" 
consists of the contents in the person at any qiver. moment,
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and these contents are essentially the same whether they 
exist "in awareness" as explicit contents, or are "denied to 
awareness" because they lack conceptualization.
On the other hand, "experiencinq"
is capable of ma n y  different conceptualizations, but is 
not itself explicit c o n t e n t s  of such conceptualizations. 
To call it implicitly meaninqful is to note that it can 
qive rise to many conceptualizations, and 
conceptual i z a t i o n s  can be checked aqainst its implicit 
meaninq (Gendlin, 1G62a, p. 243).
Tn short, "experiencinq" is immediately present and 
concretely felt, whether or not it has been conceptualized, 
and whether or not the conceptualization is "accurate" or 
"inaccurate." "Experiencinq" is felt (as implicit meaninq) 
rather than known (as explicit conceptual contents).
Havinq established the distinction between the terms 
"experience" and "experiencinq," we can now return to the 
oriqinal issue in this discussion: in order to clarify and 
theoretical statement about p s y c h o t h e rapy and 
Personality c hange, t h e re is a need for theoretical terms 
that directly ref e r to experiencing. At this point, it is 
clear that R o q e r s ’ theory is inadequate in two basic ways: 
(1) direct experiencinq is mistakenly equated with 
conceptualizations of experiencinq that are "in awareness," 
and (2) it is net clearly recoqnized that conscious 
awareness contains imDlicit felt meaninq.
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This thecretical inadequacy is especially evident with
reqards to F o q e r s ' idea of congruence. "Conqruence" is 
defined as a state in which the i n d i v i d u a l ’s experience is 
in harmony with awareness and the explicit r epresentation of.
the self-concept. Stated more exactly, congruence exists 
when there is agreement between the conceptual contents of 
awareness and the contents posited in the construct 
"experience.” However, Pogers does not clearly recoqnize 
that " e x p e r i e n c e ” and " c o n g r u e n c e ” are actually constructs 
that have no observable experiential referent (i.e., they 
are not the i it media te ly observable events in the phenomenal 
field of the i n d i v i d u a l ) . The conceptual contents in 
awareness are conqruent with a construct called " e x p e r i e n c e ” 
rather than with actual direct experiencing. However, since 
"exp e r i e n c e ” includes events that are "in awareness" as well 
as events that are "denied to a w a r e n e s s , ” there is a serious 
problem with explaining how contents that are "unformed" or 
"unconscious" can be c o n g r u e n t  with conceptualization and 
the self-concept:
Without a theoretical statement of implicitly 
meaningful experiencing..., the unanswerable question 
arises as to the meaning of "conqruent with experience," 
since it is u nclear -just what in awareness is congruent! 
Not conceptualization, since no one could exhaustively 
conceptualize all possible meanings of even one 
experience. What then? The answer must be "feeling" 
...There is no term fo r  anythinq that in awareness 
implicitly contains meanings and values (Gendlin, 1962a, 
p. 255).
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It will be recalled that this ''unanswerable q u e s t i o n ” 
first attracted the attention of Gendlin in the irid-IGSCMs 
[Gendlin and Timrinq, 1G56; see discussion Section 121. 
Gendlin recoqnized that t h e o r e t i c a l  unclarity underlay the 
absurd claim that a conc e p t u a l i z a t i o n  can be "exactly
conqruent" with "yet unformed e m o tional experience." To make 
such a claim, Roqerian t h e o r y  had to assume that all
meaninqs already exist as "contents" in "experience" and 
need only be conceptualized. Since Roqers* theoretical 
terms dealt only with p sychcloqical events that are
a ccurately conceptualized, or treated as if they were, he 
could not make a clear statement of his idea of conqruence 
and adqustment. T h e r e f o r e  F.oqers mistakenly asserted that 
therapeutic chanqe was a process of accurately 
conceptualizinq the already existinq "contents" of 
"experience," and b rinqinq them into conqruent conscious 
awareness.
what Roqers meant to say is that there is a certain 
HUBBLE o f  _ha vinq experience .that can be conqruent, even 
thouqh it is not c learly conceptualized in awareness. 
Gendlin realized that these t h e o retical problems could be 
cleared away by restorinq the intended reference to 
experiencinq: specifically, by int r o d u c i n q  terms that refer
to experiencinq as an aware feelinq containinq implicit 
meaninq. This theoretical clarity could then enable 
therapists to describe and explain what they observed in 
therapy with much more precision. Moreover, as we will see
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in the next section, theoretical clarity can advance 
experimental research on the psychotherapeutic process.
18. E x p e r i e ncing and the C o r r e l a t i o n a l  Research Paradigm.
In the previous section, we noted the tremendous 
importance of theoretical clarity regarding the experiencing 
process. This enabled us to make a clear distinction 
between Carl Regers' construct of " e x p e r i e n c e ” and Gendlin's 
notion of " e x p e r iencing.” This clarity helped us to
understand some of the problematic i n consistencies in 
Rogers' theory. In addition, establishing theoretical 
clarity can serve to enhance e x p e r i m e n t a 1 research on 
psychotherapy and per s o n a l i t y  change. At this point, we
have established (1) the need for terms that refer to direct 
experiencinq, and [2) the dis t i n c t i o n  between "experiencinq" 
and constructs that imply experiencing.
The first task for research theory is to carefully 
distinguish terms that directly refer to experiencinq from 
constructs that are defined o p e r a t ionally or by external
observations. This does not mean that terms, which are
defined by direct reference to experiencinq, should replace 
or preclude these other terms. On the contrary, clearly
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defining terns that refer directly to experiencing should 
further the formulation of better research hypotheses and 
operational procedures. Hypotheses can be "made b e t t e r ” in 
the sense that implicit r e f e r e n c e s  to experiencinq can now 
be made clear,, precise, and communicable. Tn this way, 
theoretical exactitude can advance the scientific study of 
the role of experiencinq in the therapeutic process.
Accordinq to Gendlin, the key to achievinq this 
improved research is "restorinq the intended reference to 
experiencinq" (Gendlin, 1962a). This can be dene in two 
directions: (1) by translating terms that refer to
experiencinq into externally observable terms and 
operational language, and (2) by r etranslating operational 
conclusions into terms referrinq to direct experiencinq.
As we have seen, clie n t - c e n t e r e d  researchers were 
especially concerned with findinq ways of obiectively 
measurinq the process variables of "the new process 
conception." In view of the present discussion, we can ask 
more specifically whether Gendlin and his c o l leagues were 
successful in translating terms directly referrinq to 
experiencinq into obiective measures. In other words, did 
Gendlin succeed in "restoring the intended reference to 
experiencinq" with his research variables?
The first step in assessinq this question is to lay out 
the basic ways that "experiencinq" can, in principle, be 
"directly observed" in the process of psychotherapy. First,
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and most i m p o r t a n t l y , " e x p e r i e n c i n q ” is immediately and 
directly observable in the phenomenal field of the
individual client. The essential nature of this felt
e xperiencinq has, of course, been described at lenath in the 
first chapter of this dissertation. Secondly, it is
possible to identify physioloqical correlates of different 
modes of experiencinq (e.q., Gendlin and Berlin, 196 1; Don,
1978-1 9791 . Finally, there are distinctive in-therapy
behaviors that indicate the presence or absence of intense
experiencinq. For instance, level of experiencinq is
outwardly manifest in such cues as the client's manner of
speech; facial and bodily qestures; explicit verbal reports; 
siqnificant silences; atypical chanqes in posture and 
behavior; and quality of respondinq to the therapist. In 
this reqard, the Pr o c e s s  Scale methodoloqy represents an 
elaborate and sophisticated system of defined observations, 
which e x ternal qudqes can reliably use to evaluate the level 
of client experiencinq.
With this understandinq of the basic ways that 
e xperiencinq can be "obiectively observed," it is possible 
to briefly review the Gendlin research to ascertain the ways 
in which "terms directly referrinq to experiencinq" have 
been translated into quantitative measures; First of all, 
Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien (1956, 1960) demonstrated that 
counselors could quantitatively measure the quality of 
experiencinq cccurrinq in therapy by usinq counselor-rating 
scales. In this study, they were able to measure the
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counselors' observations of experiencinq reqardless of 
whether conceptualization into content was occurrinq.
Secondly, Gendlin (1961a) used a 32-item c l i e n t O-sort 
to demonstrate that it was possible to measure instances of 
direct reference to experiencinq that involved little or no 
conceptualization into content. In this study, c lients 
sorted self-desc r i p t i v e  statements that depicted instances 
of "direct reference" without reqard to conceptual content. 
In contrast, the Q- s o r t  method used in the Gendlin and 
Shlien (1961) study measured a l titudes about immediacy of 
experiencinq, but lacked statements that directly referred 
to experiencinq itself.
Thirdly, Gendlin and Be r l i n  (1961) showed that it may 
be possible to me a s u r e  the physiological co r r e lates of 
experiencinq. In th i s  study, a p h y s i o l o q i c a 1 GSE measure 
was considered to refer directly to level of experiencinq.
Fourthly, Gendlin, et a 1. (1968) developed a
Post-Focusinq Questionnaire, in which subjects qave 
open-ended wjcitten r e sponses to various questions about 
their experiences followinq brief traininq in experiential 
focusinq. This study demonstrated that written self-reports 
of client experiences could be rated on quantifiable scales 
by outside observers. Tn addition, this research study 
showed that "experiential focusinq" could be defined as an 
operational procedure—  specifically, a set of self-quided 
instructions in focusinq.
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Fifthly, the Process Scale research demonstrated that
objective -judqes could q u antitatively measure the level of 
client experiencinq by "observing" and rating t a pe-re c orded 
excerpts of therapy (Rogers, et al., 1967). Process Scale 
ratinqs were based on a system of specified behavioral 
observations of client verbal responding.
Lastly, it may also be possible to solicit d i r e ct
client repcrts of e x p e r i e n c i n g , in which the client
describes his experiencinq as it is occurrinq. This
potential measure has not been utilized in these studies, 
althouqh it has provided a vital data base for 
non-experimental, cli n i c a l  empirical studies.
From this review, we can conclude that . there are a
number of ways to translate terms that directly refer to 
experiencinq into measureable variables. Thus, in summary,
we have established that (1) there is qreat value in
theoretical clarity about experiencinq: (2) there is a need
for theoretical terms that refer to experiencinq; and (3) 
there are potentially reliable qrounds for its observation 
and scientific measurement (i.e., the means listed above). 
However, it is still an open question whether these efforts 
have been incorporated into riqcrous scientific research 
that yields persuasive experimental support for assertions 
about "the vital role of experiencinq in the therapeutic 
process." To answer this question, we need to look more 
closely at Gendlin's basic "correlational" paradigm in these
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studies on experiencinq:
Experiencinq (certain functions of it) is a process 
that brinqs about therapeutic chanqe... Terras referrinq 
directly tc experiencinq,.. can ...be related to other 
kinds of o b s e r vations sc that operational research can 
test hypotheses thus formulated.
We shall then be able to test specific hypotheses 
of how experiencinq brinqs about therapeutic chanqe.
Of course, such h y p o theses can then be reformulated 
as correlations between externally observable behaviors 
(related to experiencinq) and psycholoqically defined 
observations. T h e o retical terms referrinq to the 
process of experiencinq can then be considered to refer 
merely to the b e h a v i o r a l  observations. Wow, however, to 
brinq that staqe of research about, we need terras that 
refer . to,' and can differentiate, experiencinq itself, 
and can formulate hypotheses about the role of 
experiencinq in therapeutic chanqe (Gendlin, 1962a, pp. 
267-268) .
This statement reflects the basic "correlational" 
paradiqm that Gendlin has used in his research on the role 
of experiencinq in therapy. It essentially involves 
translating terms teferring d ir e c tly to experiencinq i n to 
l^dsureable obse r v a t i o n s, and then correlating them with 
eipirical criteria of change. Thus, the basic paradiqm 
relates one set of "experiencinq" variables with another set 
of variables defininq psychcloqical chanqe. In this way, 
Gendlin (1962a) holds that various research hypotheses can 
be stated in which particular chanqes in experiencinq are 
predicted to brinq about the r a p e u t i c  chanqe. This basic 
"correlational" paradiqm is presented in Table A below:
Page 17^
TABLE A . Gendlin's Research Paradigm.
/\ PROCESS VARIABLES





uly def i: -F-
qbqs^s^p>n#y'(<x.*.&* y.. mqaqurfes^
1. Gendlin, Jenney & Shlien (I960): 
counselor rating scales (measuring 
"immediacy of experiencing")
counselor rating of outcome—  
(measure taken at 7th and 
final therapy session)
2. Gendlin (1961a):
client Q-sort during and after 
therapy (measuring "direct 
reference" to experiencing)
various measures—  counselor & 
client ratings of outcome & of 
change; TAT; Rorschach; Self-, 
Ideal-, Trait-Feeling Q-sorts 
(measure taken after therapy)
3. Gendlin & Berlin (1961): 
instructions in modes of 
"experiencing" (operationally 
defined procedure)
GSR physiological measure—  
(measure taken during 
procedure)
4. Gendlin & Shlien (1961):
client Q-sort (measuring attitudes 
about immediacy, not directly 
measuring "experiencing")
various measures—  counselor & 
client ratings of outcome & of 
change; TAT; Self-Ideal Q-sort 
(measures taken at 7th and 
final therapy session)
5. Gendlin, et al. (1968): 
judges' ratings of focusing 
ability based on Questionnaire 
responses (measuring "experiencing")
Cattell Personality Test—  
(measure taken before focusing 
procedure
'6. Gendlin, et al. (1968):
judges' ratings of questionnaire 
responses (measuring "experiencing")
*chi square analysis
Hidden Figures Test, TAT 
Productivity (HFT, then 
focusing, then questionnaire, 
then TAT)
+7- Rogers, Gendlin, Kiesler & Truax
(1967):
four Process Scales: 
manner of expression; personal 
constructs; experiencing; 
manner of relating (measuring 
"experiencing")
+experimental design
therapy effectiveness measures—  
MMPI; Rorschach; TAT; WAIS; 
Stroop Interference; Wittenborn 
psychiatric rating; Butler-Haigh 
Q-sort; Truax Anxiety (measures 
taken periodically)
attitudinal conditions 
measures—  rating scales of 
congruence, unconditional 
positive regard, empathy; 
Barrett-Lennard Relationship 
Inventory (measures taken 
periodically)
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As we can see from this table, there are two qeneral 
sets of variables used in G e n d l i n ’s experimental research. 
The first set cf variables ("process variables," side A) 
represent the various ways that terms referrinq directly to 
experiencinq have been translated into measureable 
observations—  such as counselor ratinqs cf client 
experiencinq level (Gendlin, Je n n e y  and Shlien, 1960). The 
second qeneral set of variables ("outcome variables," side 
E) consists cf empirical criteria of "chanqe" (it therapy). 
These "outcome variables" do net refer tc immediate 
experiencinq, but refer rather to the o r e t i c a l  constructs 
without immediate experiential referents, or refer to 
externally observable behavior. The research hypotheses in 
these studies are for m u l a t e d  as c o r r e lations between the 
externally observable behaviors (related to experiencinq) 
and the psycholoqicallly defined observations of chanqe.
The underlyinq assumption is that the empirical 
criteria of chanqe — such as the MM F I , TAT, Eorschach, 
counselor ratinqs of outcome—  are reliable obiective
measurements of therapeutic chanqe, whose external and 
internal validity has already been established thrcuqh the 
accrual of replicable and cumulative research. Assurainq the 
"strenqth" of these established empirical criteria, the 
research aim for Gendlin was to show that hiqh levels of 
client experiencinq (as measured by the "process variables," 
such as Process Scale ratinqs) correspond with 
psycholoqically defined positive chanqe (as measured by the
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empirical criteria, such as personality tests). However, 
the paramount experimental problem is to demonstrate that 
the co-relations b etween the two represent a qeEuine causal 
relationship. In short, the experimental task is to show 
that chanqes in experiencinq level led to, influenced, or 
caused important psycholoqical chanqe.
Based on my review of G e n d l i n ’s research, my conclusion 
is that Gendlin's exp e r i m e n t a l  work does not accomplish this 
qoal: there is little convincinq experimental support for 
the hypothesis that "experiencinq brinqs about therapeutic 
chanqe." However, before explaininq this conclusion, it is 
crucial to first acknowledqe the issue of whether the role 
of experiencinq in therapy "requires" experimental 
i u s t i f i c a t i o n . G e n d l i n  can arque that there is no need for 
experimental "confirmation" of an insiqht that has already 
been "confirmed" at the p h e n o m e n o l o q i c a 1 level and qrounded 
in a systematic philosophy (see Section 20). Moreover, 
experimental confirmation would not confirm anythinq to 
someone who is convinced that "X" is true based on personal 
experience. For example, psychoanalytically-oriented
therapists have conducted their form of therapy for decades 
with little concern for experimental confirmation of its 
effectiveness and quidinq ideas (Luborsky and Spence, 1971; 
luborsky, 1S84). For the present, I will lay aside the 
issue of the experimental justification of experiencinq (see 
Section 20). The fact is that Gendlin h a s  mere or less 
conducted experimental research toward the aim of
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demonstratinq that "experiencinq brinqs ab o u t  therapeutic 
chanqe." .And therefore, this research can be evaluated on 
the basis of its methodological merits.
19. The L i m i t s of the Exp e r i m e n t a 1 R e s earch 
Experiential P s y c h o t h e r a p y .
As stated above, my overall conclusion is that none of 
Gendlin's experimental research constitutes strcnq support 
for the role cf experiencinq in therapy. There are three 
bases for this conclusion. First of all, two cf the seven 
studies used c cllege st ud e n ts rather than individuals in 
actual psychctherapy (Gendlin and Berlin, 1961; Gendlin, et 
al, , 1 968) .
Second, and more importantly, careful analyses of these 
research studies has revealed serious methodological 
pcohlems in every case (with the possible exception of the 
Wisconsin Schizophrenia Study; Roqers, Gendlin, Kiesler, and 
Truaxv 1967). Some of the most glarinq methcdoloqical 
problems are briefly summarized below;
In the Gendlin, Jenney, and Shlien (1960) study, there 
is the possibility of e x p e r imenter bias because the same 
counselor who rated the experiencinq level for each client
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also rated outcome cf therapy. In addition, the "other 
evaluative measures of outcome" were left unidertified and 
unreported.
A second piece of research is strictly a pr e l iminary 
study that has never been published (Gendlin, 1961a). In 
this study, Gendlin found that counselor ratinq of outcome 
appeared to be siq n i f i c a n t l y  correlated with the client 
Q-sort measure of "direct reference." Yet this Q-sort 
measure of experiencinq was net correlated with any of the 
other tests used in the larqe battery of therapy outcome 
measures.
The study conducted by Gendlin and Shlien (1961) used a 
client Q-sort to measure c l i e n t s ’ attitudes- to w a r d  immediacy 
of experiencinq. It is s i q n ificant to note that this Q-sort 
is a measure of a t titudes (i.e., a construct!) rather than a 
measure of immediate experiencinq (i.e., a term referrinq 
directly to e x p e r i e n c i n q ) . Moreover, the only measure of 
outcome that was independent of direct client and counselor 
iudqments cf outcome (TAT score) was not siqnificantly 
correlated with the O-sort measure.
The psychcphysiolcqical study conducted by Gerdlin and 
Berlin (1961) is riddled with problems, such as predictinq 
the null hypothesis. The qeneralizability of the results of 
this lab study with students to the therapy situation is 
profoundly limited by the artificiality of the experimental 
procedure. There is serious doubt about the validity of the
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experimental procedural instructions deemed tc enqender
differing ” modes" of experiencinq in this lab study.
another Gendlin study appears quilty of a sort of 
”g r a b - b a q ” approach, in which the researchers provided no 
rationale or predictions about why certain personality 
traits would correlate with focusinq ab i l i t y  (Gendlin, et 
al., 1968). The second half of this study is suspected of 
discounting one of the two measures of creativity when it 
failed to relate positively with focusinq ability.
In addition tc these serious methodological flaws, 
there is a third fundamental problem with all of these 
studies: correlational research can rarely isolate crucial 
variables in a precise manner and determine which factor is 
responsible fcr which effects. C o r r e l a t i o n a l  research of
this kind has the maior advantaqe of allowinq many 
behavioral aspects tc be studied s i m u l t aneously with a 
minimum of interference with natural processes. It can 
yield intriquinq leads and allows ce r t a i n  limited 
predictions, but it cannot determine the causal relationship 
between variables.
In Mahoney's review cf the ” 12 most common experimental 
desiqns in therapy outcome research,” the two types of
correlational design used in the Gendlin studies are ranked 
as ”the very w e a k e s t ” (Mahoney, 1978, p. 666). In the 
Eosttest onlj design, the subject or treatment qroup 
experiences a manipulation, and the dependent variable is
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then measured. This first type of research is described as 
an "extremelv weak and uninformative desiqn; no stronq 
conclusions can be d r a w n . ’1 In the Fretest-Posttest design, 
the dependent variable is measured before and after the 
experimental manipulation or treatment. This seccnd type is 
also a weak desiqn: "it may be concluded that there was (or 
was not) a chanqe in the dependent variable, but one cannot 
determine whether this chanqe wculd have occurred anyway 
(without the experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n ) ” TMahoney, 1978, p. 
666 1.
In most studies employinq the c o r r e l a t i o n a l  method, 
independent and dependent variables are fully 
interchanqeafcle [Kiesler, 1971) . However, as outlined in 
Table A, the process variables (side A) are essentially 
treated as if they are i n d e p e n d e nt varia b les, while the 
outcome variables (side B) are reqarded as the d e pendent 
measures: chanqes in level of experiencinq (as measured with 
a counselor ratinq scale, questionnaire, Q-sort, etc.) is 
assumed to effect " o u t c o m e ” in some way (as measured with 
personality tests, ratinqs of outcome, GSR, etc.). But, in 
any research using c o r r e l a t i o n a l  data, it is not possible to 
ascertain the d irectionality of causation, Moreover, one 
cannot rule'cut the possibility that seme unknown " t h i r d ” 
factor has affected both variables.
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Obviously then, tc answer the paramount question of
what in-therapy exp e r i e n t i a l  events produce what sorts of
p s y c h o l o q i c a 1 chanqe, we need a situation in which the
researcher can e x p e r i m e n t a l l y  vary experiencinq level in 
some way and lock at subsequent client chanqes. Despite its 
many shortccminqs, Gendlin's experimental re s e a r c h  provides 
a qood startinq point and qroundworh for implementinq a much 
more riqorous e x p e r imental investiqation of the role of 
experiencinq in therapy. Gendlin's the o r e t i c a l  clarity 
about "experiencinq" has advanced the need foi terms that 
refer directly to e x p e r iencinq {see Section 17); while his 
research has suqqested a variety of ways to translate these 
experiential terms into scientifically measureable 
observations {see S ection 18) .
Moreover, a future proqram of experimental research on 
experiencinq in therapy can benefit from the qairs that have 
been made in outcome-research methcdoloqy since Gendlin's 
studies were completed in the early 1 9 6 0 's. At the 
forefront cf these advances, has been the c l a r i f ication of a 
methodoloqical approach 'that can more or less "overcome" the 
problematic issue of defininq what constitutes effective 
psychotherapy. Obviously there would not be such a plethora 
of psychotherapic schools existinq today if they aqreed on 
what constitutes "effective" therapy and how it should be 
properly conducted. Tt is -just as problematic tc try to 
establish scire particular measure of e ffectiveness that 
could be qenerally aqreed upon. The qoals of therapy differ
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qreatly frcn cne person to the next, and from one therapy
situation to the next. Some consider therapy effective if 
it brinqs about "lastinq positive personality c h a n q e . ” This, 
in turn, raises the problems of how to measure personality 
chanqe adequately? "how much" defines success in therapy; 
and "who" is the best iudqe of this chanqe. Others,
particularly the beh a v i o r a l  therapists, alternatively define 
effectiveness in terms of achievinq pre-established qoals, 
that have been stated as specific measurable chanqes in 
behavior.
Finally, there is another maicr problem with makinq 
claims about what is effective therapy. If one decides what 
constitutes "effective psychotherapy," then it tends to 
create a "self-fuIfillinq prophecy" of settinq up and then 
findinq these predetermined qualities or events. For 
example, Gendlin asserts that the central process of
positive therapeutic chanqe is "experiencinq." Thus, if 
effectiveness of therapy is defined as a hiqh score on the 
Process Scale, and a client subsequently scores hiqh on this 
scale, then this is con s i d e r e d  a "successful case." In other 
words, if therapeutic e fforts are aimed at enhancinq 
experiential focusinq because thj.s is deemed effective 
therapy, then it is a self-fulfillinq prophecy tc find that 
a focusinq score has increased as a result of treatment.
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To a larqe extent, many of these traditional issues
have been circumvented by the new emphasis on the need for
specificity in therapeutic outcome research (Berqin, 1971).
Thus, probably the sinqle qreatest advance in outcome
research has been the renunciation of the use of the
classical experimental desiqn: this traditional approach
would compare a qiven treatment qroup (s) with a control
qroup that was believed tc be equivalent in ever) way except
for not receivinq the particular psychctherapeutic
treatment. Gradually outcome researchers have ccme to the
realization that
psychotherapy is such a heteroqeneous collection of 
diverse and conflictinq events that any attempt to
definitively test its effect by virtue of classical
pre-post-ccntrol qroup desiqns is d o omed to failure...
This approach is about like askinq ’’What are the 
effects cf st o r m s ? ” Which storms? Where? What kind of
effects? What is a storm? Or it is like askinq "What 
are the effects of m e d icine?” and then proceedinq to 
collect a qroup of doctors practicinq on patients to
test for chanqes in " h e a l t h , ” whatever that is (Berqin, 
1971, p. 253, italics added).
Armed with this insiqht, the use of such qrcss tests of 
the effects of therapy have become " o b solete.” A number of 
researchers have come to this conclusion, includinq Gendlin 
(1969a), Gendlin, et al. f7968), and Truax and Carkhuff 
(1967), Tas discussed previously in Section 15 1—  as well as 
Strupp and Berqin (1969), Kiesler (1970, 1971), Paul (1967), 
and Berqin (1971). It has been realized that it is
gssentiaj. t_c isolate spe c ific variables and op e r ations from 
the broad a nd ccirpl e x e n t e r pri s e that is psychot h e r a p y.
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Outcome research should be directed toward 
answerinq ’’what treatment, by whom, is most effective 
for this individual with that specific problem, and 
under which set of c i r c u m s t a n c e s ” (Paul, 1967, p. 111).
Based on this understandinq of the need for specificity 
in outcome research, I can offer the follcwinq brief 
recommendations toward improvinq G e n d l i n ’s experimental 
research. fit best, Gendlin's present research merely shows 
a certain deqree of positive correlation between measures of 
experiencinq and therapeutic outcome. However, the 
experimental qcal is tc demonstrate that c hanqes in the 
empirical criteria of t h e r apeutic outcome are due to chanqes 
in level of experiencinq and n e t due to the effects of other 
factors. This qoal miqht be accomplished by applyinq the 
principle of specificity to future outcome research on 
experiencinq. Belcw are some qeneral steps that could be 
taken toward this aim:
The first step is to define a tarqet qroup cf clients 
with a specific psy c h o l o q i c a l  problem. For example, the 
experiment cculd. be limited to the treatment of colleqe 
students sufferinq from depressive symptoms that meet the 
DSM III diaqnostic cr i t e r i a  of Dysthymic Discrder. The 
criteria for subiect selection could be further specified by 
establishinq cut-off scores on certain appropriate obqective 
measures like the Beck Depression Inventory. Thus subiect 
selection cculd be restricted to those Dysthymic clients 
with scores ranqinq from 25-45 on the Beck Inventory. 
Subqects for the experiment could be recruited via the usual
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intake procedures of a t ypical out-patient clinic setting, 
and randomly assigned to therapists by the social worker or 
other staff person at initial contact.
As a second step toward specificity, the the r a p i s t s  in 
the experiment could be c a refully matched f o r  such factors 
as age, sex, and years of experience. Moreover, the 
prospective t h e rapists could be matched on attitudinal 
features such as warmth, empathy, and unconditioral positive 
regard fcr the client. Reliable measures of these 
attitudinal cr personality qualities have already been 
developed in outcome research in the c l i ent-centered 
tradition (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967). Using matched scores 
on these attitudinal measures, the study could claim 
equivalence of t h e r a p i s t ’s qualities previous tc treatment 
as an additional aspect of expe r i m e n t a l  control.
The third step would be to precisely define what 
constitutes '’positive outcome" in therapy. By restricting 
experimental participation tc clients suffering from 
Dysthymic Disorder, for example, successful outcome could be 
appropriately defined as an all e v i a t i o n  cf depressive 
symptoms. Thus one could use standard measures of 
depressive symptoms, such as the Beck Inventory. By 
administering the outcome m easures at the beginninq, middle, 
and completion of therapy, one has an objective empirical 
criteria of therapeutic change.
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The fourth step might be to specify the c ircumstances 
under which therapy is occurrinq. For example, the
selection and treatment of s u b i e c t s  ' could be defined as
depressed (dysthymic) colleqe students, who have been
referred to a university out-patient clinic for tine-limited 
treatment of 25 s essions once weekly.
The fifth and mcst important step is to define and
specify what the ’’treatment'* is. Luborsky (1984) has 
stressed the methodclcqical n e cessity of insurinq that the
therapist is actually i m p l ementing the treatment which is 
hypothesized to cause positive outcome. As a
psychoanalytically-oriented researcher, Luborsky has refined 
a ’’therapy manual" approach to therapy outcome research. In 
this methodclcqical strateqy, the therapists master an 
explicit quidebook, which e m p h a s i z e s  the practical in vivo 
application cf concepts and techniques of the specified mode 
of therapy. In turn, there is an a c c o m panying measure, 
which can quantitatively assess the degree to which the 
individual therapist has e f f e ctively applied the concepts  
and techniques from the manual. This measure provides a 
clear operational d e f i n i t i o n  of the "purity" of treatment 
usinq the particular mode of therapy, and thereby 
constitutes a tiqhter experimental control ever the 
treatment manipulation.
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This "therapy manual" research strateqy could be 
readily adapted to Gendlin's research. Tn fact, in the 
research study conducted by Gendlin, et al. [1868), Gendlin 
had already taken steps toward implementing this "manual" 
approach to therapy outcome research. Gendlin and his 
colleagues developed a Focusinq Manual, which provided an 
operationally defined procedure for teaching experiential 
focusing. They also created a Post-Focusing Questionnaire 
fPFQ) as a measure of the degree to which the clients had 
learned to focus. Tn contrast to Luborsky's approach, which 
measures the degree to which the therapist is actually 
implementinc the specified therapeutic treatment, G e n d l i n ’s 
research measures the degree to which the c l ient has been 
effected by the "treatment" t r aining procedure.
In fact, Gendlin reported a proposed experimental study 
that could have provided much stronger direct experimental 
support for the hypothesis that experiencing is crucial to 
effective therapy [Gendlin, et al, 1968, pp. 235-236). 
Apparently, the results were disappointing because this 
research has not been published or mentioned in any of 
G e n d l i n ’s subsequent writings. Nevertheless, this aborted 
experiment probably represents the most methcdclogically 
sound effort tc di r e c tly test this hypothesis. In this 
proposed study, two therapy sessions were tape-recorded at 
the beginninq of therapy for 10 clients. The clients then 
received instructions in focusinq [the Focusinq Manual) and 
responded to the Post - F o c u s i n g  Questionnaire [PFQ) at the
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end of the session. This was done twice in succession, and 
then two additional therapy sessions were tape-recorded 
following the focusinq administration. Apparently, the 
sessions were tape-recorded in order to take advantaqe of 
the existinq Fcqerian Process S c a l e ’ measures of experiencing 
level. As stated by Gendlin, this research desiqn would 
allow them tc e x p e r i m e n t a l l y  test two hyp o t h e s e s  about 
experiencing in therapy: (1) whether focusinq ability tends
to enhance experiencing level in therapy, and (2) whether 
two administrations of the focusinq instructions were 
sufficient to "teach" focusinq. Ultimately, outcome 
measures could "confirm" whether the focusinq procedure had 
raised experiencing level or not fassuminq, of course, that 
experiencing is the ba s i s  for positive therapeutic chanqe)
In conclusion, Gendlin had the riqht idea in proposinq 
this research, and future research can take advantaqe of the 
initial steps he had made in this direction. First of all, 
research can utilise the Process Scale methodclcqy, which 
probably presents the racst rigorous and reliable "direct" 
measure of immediate experiencing in therapy. Secondly, the 
"manual" approach see ms very prcmisinq because it qives the 
researcher concrete evidence that the supposed mode of 
therapy is actually beinq conducted. In this reqard, the 
Post-Focusinq Questionnaire could be raodifed and refined to 
provide a direct measure of the deqree to which the 
therapist is usinq discernible "techniques" tc facilitate 
e xperiential focusinq. Some of these experiential
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techniques could include reflection of feelinqs; directinq 
the client to "check inside": askina the client to remain 
silent in . crder to let a felt sense form; fcllcwinq the 
experiential effects of a concept rather than its loqical 
implications: and so on. In principle, there are many
observable events that could be systematized into a measure 
of the deqree to ■which the therapist is "treatinq" the 
client in ways that c o n s titute "experiential psychotherapy."
Thus, in this way, one could have an experimentally 
controlled check of the "purity" of the experiential therapy 
treatment as implemented by the therapist. Moreover, this 
measure of the t h e r a p i s t 1s experiential treatment could be 
bolstered by a modified version of the already existinq 
Qlient Post-Focusinq Questionnaire. This would enable the 
experimenter tc assess the deqree to which experiential 
therapy was beinq conducted by the therapist, and to what 
extent the client was beinq effected by this "treatment" in 
the enhancement of his or her focusinq ability. Then the 
measures of focusinq ability could be correlated with 
Process Scale measures of experiencinq level. And, 
ultimately, if the Process Scale literature has been valid, 
one would expect a c o n tinued stronq correlation between hiqh 
levels of experiencinq and positive outcome (as treasured by 
such objective tests as the MMPT and Beck Depression 
I n v e n t o r y ) .
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The feature that has been missing from Gendlin's 
correlational research is an experimental control or 
comparison condition, which would allow causal inferences 
about experiencinq and therapeutic outcome. We have already 
pointed out the problems with qross comparisons of 
" t r eatment” with ” n o n - t r e a t m e n t ” controls, and the need for 
specificity. In this instance, a more riqorous 
wjt h in-subiect design is recommended, in which there are 
systematic internal experimental controls of when the 
defined therapy treatment i s  occurring and when it is not, 
and simultaneous measures of changes in experiencinq level. 
Thus,, in principle, it is possible to systematically measure 
the e ffects of " t r e a t m e n t ” and "ineffectiveness of 
t r e a t m e n t . ” Finally, one could compare the efficacy of 
e xperien tial trea tinent — for these clients with this 
specific disorder under these specified cceditions by 
therapists with these measured personality c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s —  
with other treatment modes, such as coqnitive therapy, or 
supportive-expressive therapy, which have already been 
systematized in the "manual" approach described by Luborsky 
(1 984) ,
20. Is E x perimenta 1 Justification " N e cessary” ?
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In retrospect, we can see that Gendlin emerqed from an 
exciting and crucial period in the c l i e n t - centered movement, 
durinq which Carl E c q e r s  and his colleaques were tryinq to 
experimentally test the e f f e c t iveness of this "new" type of 
therapy. Their intensive efforts to study therapy in a
precise scientific manner raised the issue of what is r e a l ly 
happening in therapy and how can cne measure it? This vital 
concern with the ade q u a t e  measurement of the authentic 
events in therapy qave birth to "the new process
c o n c e p t i o n . " Rogers and his c l i ent-centered colleaques 
wanted scientific methods that could study the essential
fluid nature of the t h e r a p e u t i c  pr o c e s s in all its richness. 
The crowninq achievement of this research directive was the 
development and r e f i n e m e n t  of the Rogers* Process Scale
(talker, Rablen and Roqers, 1960).
Meanwhile, cominq from a tackqround in philosophy, and 
interested ir. learninq about psychotherapy, Euqene Gendlin 
collaborated in this c l i ent-centered work by contributing 
the idea of "experiencinq" to  the new Roqerian concern with 
Process. Within the troader context of the client-c e n t e r e d  
experimental program, Gendlin initiated some cf his own 
experimental studies of the e x p e r i e n c i n q  process in therapy. 
On the whole, G e n d l i n ’s research was methodologically flawed 
and inadequate, and it failed to produce any ccnvincinq 
experimental evidence of the presumed cr u c i a l  role of 
"experiencinq" in therapy. Yet, despite the shortcomings of 
his research, Gendlin was able to contribute theoretical
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clarity to the process question, and also demonstrated
several ways of translatinq terms that refer directly to 
experiencinq into scie n t i f i c a l l y  measureable observations.
Historically, it is evident that G eDdlin ce a s ed
experimental research by the nid-1960*s. In this final
section, I would like to account for Gendlin* s altered
position reqardinq the role of experimentation in
experiential psychotherapy. Stated in brief, it appears
that Gendlin more or less realized the problems with tryinq
to lust ify the importance of experiencinq throuqh
experimentation. Hence, rather than try to criticize and
improve the experimental research beinq dene, or try to
analyze the faulty philosophical basis for conductinq more 
such experimentation, Gendlin felt that he could best 
■justify his experiential method by doing it. In other
words, he felt his e n e r q i e s  were better spent developinq
improved ways of facilitatinq "experiential focusi,nq."
Gendlin recoqnized that expe r i m e n t a t i o n  is only one way of 
confirminq the vital imp o r t a n c e  of experiencinq in therapy. 
Thus, to some deqree, it was irrelevant whether the
supportinq experimental res e a r c h  was strcnq or weak. For 
Gendlin, it was not important to qather experimental
evidence for an i n s i q h t  that was already confirmed on other 
qrounds.
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While it is true that strcnq e x p e r imental evidence can 
function as a powerfully convincinq arqument, it is really 
only convincinq tc those who already believe in the 
confirmatory power of experimentation. Followers of the 
client-centered a pproach traditionally have received 
extensive traininq iD experimental research method, and 
place g r e a t value on scientific evidence of this kind. In 
contrast, psychoanalytically-oriented therapists, for 
example, typically dc j o t  receive such scientific traininq, 
and are much less impressed by experimental ccrfirmation 
(Luborsky and Spence, 1971; Xuborsky, 1984). As a whole, 
psychoanalytically-criented therapists have net sought 
experimental verification of their ideas, nor been swayed by 
experimental evidence reqardinq the effectiveness of varying 
types of therapy.
In short, clie n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy is founded cn Roqers' 
firm commitment to the scientific study and validation of 
client-centered work. But G e n d l i n ’s e x p e r iential approach 
has a different foundation, and for this reason, he has not 
surcorabed to an over-valued reqard for the experimental 
iustification of experiencinq. Certainly he is net opposed 
to experimental research on experiential psychotherapy. For 
example, Gendlin presently makes use of his past 
experimental studies, but onlj as a d d itional persuasion for 
those who already value such experimental evidence and are 
sympathetic tc his experiential approach. Moreover, Gendlin 
would certainly agree that experiential events can be
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scientifically studied. But Gendlin would vehemently oppose 
the claim that e x p e r imental confirmation of the importance 
of experiencinq is n e c e s s a r y.
Instead, Gendlin has different qrounds for the 
11 iustif icaticn" of the vital role of experiencinq in 
therapy: what I have called (11 practical phencmencloqical 
qrounds, (2) "case study” evidence, and (3) philosophical 
iustif i c a t i o n .
First of all, exp e r i e n c i n q  is -justified by Gendlin's 
own personal clinical experiences in psychotherapy. This is 
what miqht he called the ” practi c a 1 phe n eme noloq i c a l ” 
grounds for e x p e r iencinq—  raeaninq that it refers to 
Gendlin's own direct observations of what " r e a l l y ” happens 
in therapy. Drawinq upon such ccnfirminq personal evidence 
is not unique to Gendlin. All of the qreat theorists of 
psychotherapy and personality invested years in studyinq 
clinical events, mcdifyinq their techniques, . and 
experimentinq with the effects of this or that approach. 
Freud is a prctotypic example of someone who relied on 
personal experience and case studv material to find his core 
factors of "effective t h e r a p y . ” Similarly, Gendlin spent 
many years practicinq therapy in the client-centered 
orientation, where he observed the in vivo operation of 
" e x p e r i e n c i n q ” as the fundamental process. He witnessed 
first-hand the phenomena he called "direct reference," "felt 
m e a n i n q , ” "experiential shift," etc. He learned how to use
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conceptual kncwledqe "experientially," and he tested out
various procedures of experiential focusinq. Everyone knows 
how persuasive it is to experience somethinq first-hand. 
Unfortunately, the drawback is that others are frequently
skeptical cr critical of the validity and reliability of 
personal clinical evidence. Hence, althouqh evidence from 
clinical Iphencmenclcqical) experience is certainly 
empirical, and sometimes is very convincinq, it tends to 
lack the "sales power" of experimental research in reaching 
the broader audience cf experimentally-minded practitioners.
G e n d l i n ’s second qround for the confirmation of the 
vital role cf experiencinq is what miqht be called e m p i r i c al 
"case s t u d y " data. As it is typically utilized, the case
study method emphasizes the individual history and 
siqnificant life ev e n t s  and relationships of the particular 
client. It explains how various experiences shaped the 
course of the individual p a t i e n t ’s life and/cr contributed 
to the development of his o r  her psychopathology. Gendlin 
uses the case study in an entirely different way. For 
example, in his bock Focusing, he presents a series of 
clinical vignettes, such as "the man who felt 
inappropriate," and "the qirl who was scared cf colleqe," 
and "the man who c o u l d n ’t work," and so on. He describes 
nothinq about the personal history of these individual
clients. Instead he concentrates on describing the process 
of experiencinq and its explication in each clinical case 
example. Thus he utilizes the common m a n ner in which each
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of these individuals enqaaes in experiential focusinq (each 
in his or her cwn unique style) to illustrate the crucial 
role of experiencinq in therapeutic chanqe.
Above all, Gendlin's main iustification for 
"experiencinq" is philosophical. Gendlin states that 
experiential focusinq "is part of a wider philosophy" that 
"leads to a new method of human thinkinq" (Gendlin, 1981, 
pp. 165-166). Philosophical iustification is probably the 
least convincinq, and most difficult perspective to 
communicate tc empirically-minded psycholoqists because they 
expect that any statement about a p s y c h o l o q i c a 1 phenomenon 
can be tested experimentally. They feel that claims about 
what constitutes eff e c t i v e  therapy should be subjected to 
experimental verification.
As a philosopher, Gendlin's p h e n o m e n o l o q i c a 1 approach 
is devoted tc the clarification and affirmation of what 
human experience is ess e n t i a l l y  like = As we have seen, 
Gendlin has presented the notion of "felt meaninq" or 
"felt-meaninqfulness" to describe the fact that there is a 
concretely-sensed quality tc any qiven mcraent of 
consciousness: and that this bodily-sensed quality
implicitly "encompasses everythinq you feel and know about 
the qiven subject at a qiven time" all at once (Gendlin, 
1981, p. 32). This is a Heideqqerian notion of 
" b e i n q - i n - t h e - w o r l d ," which means that the experiencinq of 
the individual never exists separate from the meaninqfully
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related world of ev e n t s  and people in which it occurs (i.e., 
"3ef indlichkeit" — see Gendlin, 1 978-1979). Heideqqar
clarified the tasic rel a t e d n e s s  between human existence and 
the world. Felt e x p e r iencinq in any qiven moment implicitly 
contains the whole mearinq of a qiven situation c.f l i v i n g .  
Felt experiencinq is a sinqle bcdily-felt beholdinq of the 
world by the individual, which encompasses present and past 
history, the environment, cultural siqnificatee, social 
relations, values, attitudes, perceptions, and sc cn.
Thus, for Gendlin, " e x p e r i e n c i n q ” is net a mere
"armchair theory" or conception about behavior in
psychotherapy. For him, it is a description of the 
essential nature of human experience itself, which is 
consistent with a br o a d e r  c omprehensive philosophy of life. 
For Gendlin, to describe what it is like tc directly 
experience life in the immediate moment does j e t  require 
e xperimental iustification. It is a qiven. The 
phenomenoloqist*s aim is to present "what human experiencinq 
is like" in a descriptive fashion that is affirraable by 
others. This means that others will aqree with the 
phenomenoloqical des c r i p t i o n  not because of the precision of 
the arqument, but because they find it acc u r a t e l y  captures 
the essential quality of human livinq for them.
Hopefully, in presentinq G e n d l i n ’s rich philosophy of 
experiencinq, I have been able to use his descriptive 
approach to ccirrounicate what human awareness is like, both
Paqe 198
in terms of everyday experiencinq, and its rcle in the 




Adler, A. The irdi v i d ual psy c h c l cqy of Alfred Adler. n. 
Ansbacher and F. Ansbacher (Eds.), Mew York: Harper 
and Row, 19 56.
Alexander, F. and French, T. Psychoanalytic th e r a py:
P r i n c i ples and a p p l i c a t i o n s . New York: Rena Id Press, 
1946.
Alperson, E. Carrying experiencinq forward throuqh
authentic body movement. P s y c h otherapy: T h e o r y ,
Res earch and Practice, 1974, VI, 211-214,
Berqin, A. The evaluation of therapeutic outcomes. In A. 
Berqin and S. Garfield (Eds.), Handbook of 
p s y c h o therapv and behavior chajge. New York: Hiley,
1971, pp. 217-27C.
Berlin, J. Seme autonomic correlates cf therapeutic
con d i t i o n s  in interpersonal relationships. Unpubl.
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicaqo, 196G.
Bonime, F. Creative writinq course. New School fcr Social 
Research, New Ycrk, N.Y., 1977.
Butler, J. and Haiqh, G. C hanqes in the relation between 
self-ccncepts and ideal concepts consequent upon 
c l i e n t - centered counselinq. In C. Roqers and R. 
Dymond (Eds.) , Psychot h e r apy and p e r s o n a l ity change. 
Chicaqo: Univ. of Chicaqo Press, 1954, pp. 55-75.
Campbell, F. and McMahon, E. Cosmic cgjngruer.ee. New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1979.
Cartwright, D. A n notated biblioqraphy cf research and
theory construction in client-centered therapy.
J o u r n a l  cf Cou nseling P s y c h o logy. 1957, 4, 15-22,
Don, N. The transformation of conscious experience and its 
EEG correlates. J ou rnal of Altered States of 
C o n sc i ousness. 1977-1978, 3, 147-168.
Eysenck, H. The effects cf psychotherapy. In H. Eysenck, 
Uses and a b u ses of p s y c h c l ogy. Baltimore: Penquin, 
1971, pp. 193-2 C 8.
Fen ic h e l , C. The p syc h o a n a l y t ic theory of n e uro sis. New
York: Norton, 1945.
Fiedler, F. A comparison of therapeutic relaticr.ships in
psychoanalytic, non-directive, and Adlerian therapy.
J ournal cf C o n s ulting Psjchologjy, 19 50 , J4, 436-445.
Paqe 201
Fiedler, F. Factor analyses of psychoanalytic, 
non-directive, and Adlerian therapeutic relationships. 
J our n a 1 cf Consu ltinq P s y c hology, 1951, J5, 2 2-3 8.
Frank, J. and Ascher, E. The corrective emotional 
experience in qrcup therapy. American Journal of 
P s y c h i a t r y . 1951, JOB, 126-131.
Freud, S. Cora: An a nalvsi s of a case of h ysteria . New 
York: Ccllier, 1963. (Oriqinally publ. 1905).
Gray, J. The influence of e x p e r iential focusinq on state 
a nx i e t y  and problem-solvinq ability in "borderline" 
patients. Unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Calif. School 
of Professional Psycholoqy, 1976.
Hart, J. Twc problems in the use of ratinq scales to 
measure psychotherapy variables. Unpubl. manuscript, 
Univ. of Wisconsin, 1960.
Hart, J. Seme inter-rater and intra-rater reliability 
properties of the Process Scale, Onpufcl. M.A. 
thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1961.
Hart, J. The development of client-centered therapy. In J. 
Hart and T. Tomlinson fids.). New directions in 
c l i e n t -centered t h e r a p y . Boston: Houqhtcn Mifflin,
1970,” pp. 3-22.
Hendricks, M. and Cartwriqht, R, Experiencinq ir. dreams: 
An individual difference variable. Ps ychoth e ra p y: 
Research and P r a c t i c e . 1978, J5, 29 2-298.
Hinterkopf, E. Beneficial therapeutic skills tauqht to
mental patients. P s y chotherapy: T h e o r y , R es e arch and 
P r a c t i c e , 1977, 4, 63.
Hinterkopf, I. and Brunswick, L. Teachinq therapeutic
skills to mental patients. Psychothera p y : T h e o r y .
R e s e a r ch and Practice, 1975, J2, 8-12,
Holloway, A. The identification of intermediate processes 
within psychotherapy as indicators of the development 
of psychotherapy as a whole. Report cn work in 
progress, C c u nselinq Center, Univ of Chicaqo, 1960.
Hohmann, G. Some effects of spinal cord lesions on 
experienced eroctional feelinq.s. P s y ch c p h ysioloqy, 
1966, 3, 143-156.
Iberq, J. The e f f e c t s  of focusinq on iob interview 
behavior. Unpufcl. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of
Chicaqc, 1979.
James, U. 'The nrincij:les of psyc h o l o g y . New York: Holt,
Paqe 202
1890.
James, 17. The physical basis of emotion. P sychological 
Bf-Yigw • 1894, .1, 518-529.
Jasnos, T. and Hakmiller, K. Some effects of lesion level 
and emotional cues on affective expression in spinal 
cord patients. Psychological R e p o r t s. 1975, 37,
859-870.
Kantor, S. and Zimrirq, F. The effects of focusing on a 
problem. Psych o therapy;. Theory. R e s e a r ch a n d Practice. 
1976 , J3, 2 55-25 6.
Kiesler, D. Basic methodoloqic issues implicit in 
psychotherapy. In J. Hart and T. Tomlicscn (Eds.), 
New di r e c t ions in c l ient-centered th e rapy. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 237-256.
Kiesler, D. Experimental desiqns in psychotherapy research. 
Tn A. Berqin and S. Garfield (Eds.) , Handbook of 
p s y c h o therapy and behavior change. New York: Wiley,
1971, pp. 36- 7 9 .
K i r s c h e n b a u m , H. On becoming Carl R o g e rs . New York; Dell,
1 979 .
Kirtner, W. and Cartwriqht, D. Success and failure in
client-centered therapy as a function cf client 
personality variables. J o ur n a 1 of Consulting 
Ps y c h o logy . 19 58a, 22, 2 59-264.
Kirtner, N. and Cartwright, D. Success and failure in
client-centered therapy as a function cf initial 
in-therapy behavior. Journal of Consulting P sychology, 
1958b, 22, 329-333.
Luborsky, L. Principles of p s y c h o a n a l ytic p s y c h o t herapy; A 
ffiaflual for s u pporti ve-expressive t r e a t m e n t . New York: 
Basic Books, 1984.
Luborsky, I. and Spence, D. Quantitative research on 
psychoanalytic therapy. In A. Bergin and S. Garfield 
(Eds.) , Handbook of p s y c h o t her a py and behavj.gr change. 
New York: Wiley, 1971, pp. 408-438.
Mahoney, M. Experimental methods and outcome evaluation. 
J o u r n a 1 of Co n s ulting and Clinjcal Psychology, 1978, 
46, 660-672.
Matarazzo, J. Psychotherapeutic processes. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 1565, J6, 181-224.
Matarazzo, P., Matarazzo, J., Saslow, G., and Phillips, J. 
Psychological test and organismic correlates of
Paqe 203
interview behavior. Journal of abnormal and Social 
P s y c h o l o g y, 1958, 56, 329-338.
Mandler, G. Emotion. In E . Hearst (Ed.), The first 
c e ntury of e x p e r i m e n t a 1 psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Erlbau®, 1979.
McMuliin, E. Effects of counselor focusinq on client 
s e l f -experiencing under low attitudinal conditions. 
J o u r n al cf C ounseling Psychology. 197 2, _19.
Mullahy, P. The co n t r ibuti o n s of H a rry Sta c k S ullivan. New 
York: Hericitaqe House, 1952,
Hurray, V. Experiential focusinq and classroom verbal 
behavior. Unpubl. Ed.D. dissertation, Rutgers State 
Univ., New Brunswick, N.J., 1978.
Nichols, M. C atha r s is in p s y c l o t h e r a g y , New York: Gardiner 
Press, 1977.
Nichols, m . and Zax, M. Outcome of brief cathartic 
psychotherapy. J o u r n al of Cons u lting and Clinical  
P s y c h o l o g y . 1974, 42, 403-410.
Olsen, L. Focusi n g and self-healing. Los Angeles: 
C o ntinuum Tape Montage, 1978. (Tape)
Paul, G» Strategy of outcome research in psychotherapy.
Jo u r n a l  cf C o n s u lting P s y c h o logy. 1967, 3.1, 109 — 118.
Platt, A. The utilisation of hypnosis to teaching focusing 
ability. Unpufcl. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of 
Chicago, 1971.
Prouty, G. Pre-therapy: A method of treating pre-expressive 
psychotic and retarded patients. Psychotherapy: 
Theg ry.jL Be sea rch and P r a c t i c e , 1976, 13, 290-294.
Rachlin, H. B e h a v i o r ism in everyday life. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
Rainsford, B, knowing me^ knowing you. Chicaco: Coronet
Instructional Media, 1977. (Film)
Rogers, C. Tjhe cli n i c a l treatmen_t of the problem child. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939.
Rogers, C. P. theory of personality and behavicr. In C.
Roqers, C l i e nt-centered therapy. Boston: Houqhton
Mifflin, 1951.
Pogers, C. The necessary and sufficient conditions of 
therapeutic personality change. Journal of Consul ting 
P s y c h o l o g y , 19 57, 2J, 95-103.
Paqe 204
Eoqers, C. a process conception of psychotherapy. American 
P s y c h o logist, 1958, .13, 142-149.
Eoqers, C. A theory of therapy, perscrality and 
interpersonal relationships. In S. Koch (Ed.), 
P s y c h o l o q y : A s t u d y of a science, Vol^ 3. New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1959a, pp. 184— 256.
Eoqers, C. a tentative scale for the measurement cf process 
in psychotherapy. In M . Parloff and E. Rubinstein 
(Eds.) , R e search in psychotherapy. Vol. J.
Washinqton, D.C.: Amer. Psychol. Assoc., 1959b, pp.
96-107.
Eoqers, C. Ojn Becoming a person. Boston: Hough ten Mifflin, 
1961.
Eoqers, C. Freedom _to learn. Columbus: Merrill, 196 9.
Eoqers, C. Carl E o qers on e n c o u n ter g r o n ^ s . New York: 
Harper.and How, 1970.
Eoqers, C. Oj p e r s o n a l power. New York: Delacorte, 1977.
Eoqers, C. A wav of fceinjg. Boston: Houqhton Mifflin, 1980.
Eoqers, C. and Dymond, R. P s y c h o t h e r apy and personalitv 
chan^ej. Coordinated studies in the cl i e n t - c entered 
a p p r o a c h . Chicaqo: Univ. of Chicaqo, 1954.
Eoqers, C., Gendlin, E., Kiesler, D., and Truax, C. (Eds.). 
The the r a p e utic relationship and its iraoact: A study of 
p s y c h o therapy w i t h sc h izophrenics. Madison: Univ. of 
Wi s consin Press, 1967.
Eoqers, C. and Eablen, E. A scale of process in 
psychotherapy. Unpubl. manual, Univ. of Wisconsin, 
1 95 8.
Eoqers, C. and Stevens, B. Person to pers o n : The problem 
of beinjg human. Lafayette, Calif.: Real People's 
Press, 1967.
Scharff, E. Personal communication. Univ. of New 
Hampshire, 1983.
Scheff, I. Catha r sis in h e a l i n g ,, ritual and drama.
Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1979.
Seeman, J. Counselor -judgments of therapeutic process and 
outcome. In C, Roqers and R. Dymcnd (Eds.) , 
P s y c h o t h e rapy and personality c h a n g e . Chicaqo: Univ.
of Chicaqo Press, 1954.
Shlien, J. Time-limited psychotherapy: An experimental
Paqe 205
in v e s t iqation cf practical values and theoretical 
implications. J o u r n a l of Counseling P s y c h o l o g y , 1957,a.
Shlien, J. and Zimrinq, F. Research directives and methods 
in client-centered therapy. In J. Hart and T. 
T om l i n s o n  (Eds.), New d i rections in c lient-centered 
therapy* Boston: Houqhton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 33-57.
Shontz, F. Re search methods it) p e r s o n a l ity. New York: 
Appletcr-Century-Crofts, 1965.
Siirala, H . Schizophrenia: A human situation. American
J ournal cf P s y c h o a nalysis. 1964, 23.
Skinner, B. T. Ah cut behaviorism. New York: Random House, 
1 976 .
Strupp, H. and Berqin, A. Some emp i r i c a l  and conceptual 
bases for coo r d i n a t e d  research in psychotherapy: A 
c ri t i c a l  review of issues, trends, and evidence. 
T n t e r n a t i o n a l Journal of Ps y c h iatr y , 1969, 1 ,  18-90.
Taft, J. D ynamics of the r a py in a conjtrolled r e l a t i o n ship. 
New York: Macmillan, 1953.
Tomlinson, T. A validation study of a scale for the 
measurement of the process .of personality chanqe in 
psychotherapy. Unpubl, M.A. thesis, Univ. of 
Wisconsin, 1959.
Tomlinson, T. Th r e e  approaches to the study of 
psychotherapy: Process, cutccme, and chanqe. Unpubl.
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1962.
Tomlinson, T. and Hart, J. A validation of the process 
scale. J our n a 1 of C o n sulting P sycholog v . 1962 , 2 6 , 
74— Y 8 .
Truax, C. Effective inqrediants in psychotherapy. Journal 
of C o u nseling Psychology, 1963, 1.0, 256-263.
Truax, C. and Carkhuff, R. T o w a r d e f f e c t ive counselinq and 
p s y c h o therapy: Traininq and p r a c t i ce. Chicaqc: Aldine, 
1967..'“
Van den Bos, G. An investigation of several methods of 
teachinq e x p e r iential focusinq. Unpubl. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Univ. of Detroit, 1973.
van der Veen, E. A strand a n alysis of the Psychotherapy 
Process Scale. Unpubl. research report, Univ. of 
Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, 1960.
van der Veen, F. Recent trends in the client-centered
Paqe 206
framework. In J. Hart and T. T o m linson (Eds.), New 
d i r e c t i o n s in c l i e n t - c e n t e red therapy. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 23-32.
van der Veen, F. and Stoler, N, T h e r a p i s t ’s -judgment, 
interview .behavior and case outcome. P s y c hotherapy. 
1965, 2, 153.
Walker, A., Rablen, P., and Roqers, C. Development of a 
scale tc measure process chanqe in psychotherapy. 
Journal cf Clinical Psycholocjy, 1960, J.6, 7 9-85.
Witkin, H. P s y c h o l o g i c a l differentjLation. New York: Wiley, 
1 962.
Weiss, J. The effects of meditation on experiential 
focusinq. Unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
Univ . , 1978.
Zimrinq, P. Counselinq C e n t e r  Research. Onpubl. report, 
Univ. of Chicaqo, July 1958- July 1959.
Zimrinq, F. and Balombe, J. Coqnitive operations in two 
measures of hardlinq e m o t i o n a l l y  relevant material. 
P s y c h o therapy: T h e o r y . R e s e a rch and P r a c t i c e , 19 74, JM, 
3.
Paqe 207
IIST OF GENDLIN'S WORK.
Gendlin, E. Wilhelm Dilthey and the problem of
comprehending hunan siqnificance in the science of man, 
Onpubl. M.A. thesis, Univ. of Chicaqo, 1950.
Gendlin, E. , and Zimrinq, F. The qualities or dimensions of 
experiencinq and their chanqe. Coun s e l ing Center
D i scussion Papers, 1955, Vol. 1: 3, Univ. of Chicaqo 
Library.
Gendlin, E., Jenney, R ., and Shlien, J. Cou n s e l o r  .ratings 
of process and outcome in c l ient-centered therapy. 
Paper presented at Araer. Psychol. A s s o c . , 1956. (See 
also Gendlin, Jenney and Shlien, 1960).
Gendlin, E. A process concept cf relationship. Counse l i ng 
C enter Disc u s sion papers, 1957, Vol. 3, Oniv. of
C hicaqo library.
Gendlin, E. The function of experiencinq in symbolization. 
Unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicaqo, 1958.
Gendlin, E,, Jenney, R., and Shlien, J. C o u nselor ratinqs 
of process and outcome in clie n t - c e n t e r e d  therapy. 
J o u rnal of C l i n ical P s y c ho l o gy, 1960, ± 6 , 210-213.
(Originally A.P.A. paper presentation, 1956).
Gendlin, E. Experiencinq: A variable in the process of 
therapeutic chanqe. A merican J o u r n a 1 of P s y c h otherapy. 
1961a, J 5, 233-245. (Reprinted in C o u n s e l i n g : S e l e c ted 
Readings. Columbus: Merrill, 1962).
Gendlin, E. Initiating psychotherapy with uEmotivated 
patients. Psych iatric 0 uarterly, 1961b, 35, 134-139.
Gendlin, E. and Berlin, J. Galvanic skin response 
correlates of different modes of experiencinq. Journal 
of Clinical P s y c h o lo g y . 1961, J 1 ,  1 3 - 1 1 .
Gendlin, E. and Shlien, J. Immediacy in time attitudes 
before and a f t e r  time-limited psychotherapy. Journal 
of C l inical Ps y c h o l ogy. 1961, 1 1 ,  6 9-72.
Gendlin, E. Exper i e n c inq and the cr e a tion of jeaninqq A 
philosophical a nd psycho l o g ical a p proach to the 
s u b j e c t i ve. New York: Macmillan, 1962a.
Gendlin, E. Need for a new type of concept: Current trends 
and needs in psychology research on schizophrenia. 
R e v iew of Existential Psychology and. P s y c h i a t r y. 19 62b, 
2, 37-46. (Oriqinally paper presented at A.P.A.,
Chicaqo, 1960).
Paqe 208
Gendlin, E. Client-centered developments and work with 
schizophrenics. Journal of Counseling P sychology, 
1962c, 9, 205-212.
Gendlin, E. and Geist, N. The relationship of therapist 
c ongruence tc psycholcqica.1 test eval u a t i o n s  of 
personality chanqe. Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, 
Univ. of Wisecrsin, Brisf Research Report s , 19 62, 24.
Gendlin, E. , Klein, PI. and Tomlinson, T. Process scale 
movement in neurotic cases. Onpubl. research report, 
Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, Univ. of Wisconsin, 
1962a.
Gendlin, E. , Hart, J. , Tomlinson, T., Truax, C. and van der 
Veen, E. Scale of experiencinq; scale of
p r o b l e m - e x p r e s s i o n ; scale of relationship; scale of 
personal constructs; scale of accurate empathy; scales 
of empathy, qenuineness, and unconditional positive 
regard. Unpubl. manuals. Psychotherapy Research 
Section, Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, Univ. of 
Wisconsin, 1962b.
Gendlin, E. Subverbal
e xpressivity trends in 
schizophrenics. J ournal 
P s y c h o l o g y , 1963a, 4,
and Stevens, 1967).
communication and therapist 
client-centered therapy with 
of Existential Psychiatry a nd 
105-120. (Reprinted in Rogers
Gendlin, E. Experiencinq and the nature of concepts. T he 
C h r istian Scholar, 1963b, 46, 245-255.
Gendlin, E. and Geist, N. Silence and therapist behavior 
in client-centered psychctherapy with schizophrenics. 
Unpubl. research report, Wisconsin Psychiatric
Institute, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1963.
Bookbinder, I., Gendlin, E . , and Pearson, L. Psychologists 
Interested in Advancement of Psychotherapy (PIAP) 
questionnaire. American Ps y c h o l o g i s t . 19 63, .18,
571-5*75.
Geist, a., Gendlin, E. and Stoler, N. Initial in-therapy
behavior and test measures in an unmotivated 
population. Unpubl. paper, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1963.
Gendlin, E. A theory cf personality chanqe. In P. Worchel 
and D. Byrne (Eds.), Personality change. New York: 
Wiley, 1964a, pp. 102-148, (Reprinted in Hart and 
Tomlinson, 1970; and in Hahrer, 1971).
Gendlin, E. Schizophrenia: Problems and methods of
psychotherapy. Review of E x i s t e n t ial P s y chology and 
Psychiatry, 1964b, 4, 16 8-179.
Paqe 209
Gendlin, E. Fook review of M erleau— Pon ty * s "The structure
of behavior." The Modern Schoo l m a n , 1964c, 4 2, 87-96.
Gendlin, E. Experiential exp l i c a t i o n  and truth. J o urnal of
E x i s t e n t ialism. 1965a, 6, 131-146. (Reprinted in
Molina, 1969; see Gend.lin, 1 969a) .
Gendlin, E. vihat are the qrounds of explication! A basic 
problem in linquistic analysis and in p h e n c m e n o l o q y . 
The Monist, 1965b, 49, 137-164.
Gendlin, E. Expressive meaninqs. Tn J. Edie IEd.),
I nvita t io n to p h enomenology. Chicaqo: Quadranqle,
1965c.
Gendlin, E. Research in p sychotherapy with schizophrenic
patients and the nature of that "illness." A m e r i c a n 
Journal gf  P s ychothe r apy. 1966a, 20, 4-16. (Reprinted 
in Hart and Tomlinson, 1 970) .
Gendlin, E. Existentialism and experiential psychotherapy. 
In C. Mcustakas (Ed.) , E x i s t e n t i a 1 c hild the rap y . New 
York: Basic Books, 1966b, pp. 206-246. (Reprinted in 
Hart and Tomlinson, 1970) .
Gendlin, E . , Kelly, J., Raulinaitus, V. and Spaner, F. 
Volunteers as a major asset in the treatment proqram. 
M e ntal Hygie n e . 1966, 50, 421-427.
Gendlin, E. Neurosis and human nature in the experiential 
method cf thouqht and therapy. H u man i t a s . 1967a, 3, 
139-152.
Gendlin, E. Values and the process of experiencinq. In A. 
Mahrer (Ed.), The goals of ps y c hotherapy. New York: 
Appletcr.-Century-Crofts, 1967b, pp. 180-205.
Gendlin, E. Analysis. Tn M. Heideqqer, What ij a thing? 
Chicaqo: Reqnery, 1967c, pp. 245-296.
Gendlin, E . , Diesenhaus, H . , Oberlander, H. and Pearson, L. 
Psycholcqists and government programs. In B. Lubin 
and E. Levitt (Eds.), T h e clip ical psycho l q i s t: 
Readings on background, roles and functions. Chicaqo: 
Aldine, 1967.
Gendlin, E. and Tomlinson, T. The process conception and 
its measurement. In Roqers, et al. , 1967, pp.
109- 131.
Roqers, C. , Gendlin, E., Kiesler, D. and T u a x ,  C. (Eds.). 
The thera peutic relatj o n s h i p and its impact: A study of 
p s y c h o t h e rapy with schizophrenics. Madison: Univ. of 
Wisconsin Press, 1967.
Paqe 210
Gendlin, P. Psychotherapy and community psycholoqy.
Ps y c h oth e r a p y: The o r y , Research.*, and P r a c t ice, 196 8a,
5, 67-72.
Gendlin, E. The experiential response. In E. Rammer
[Ed.), Use of inter p r e tation in treatme n t : Tec h nique 
and art. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1968b, pp.
203-227.
Gendlin, E. and Beebe, J. An e x p e r imental approach to
qroup therapy. Journal of Research and Development in
Education, 196 8a, _1, 19-2 9.
Gendlin, E. and Beebe, J. Experiential qroups:
I n s t r uctions for qroups. In G. Gazda [Ed.),
I nnovations to qroup psychothera ny. Sprinqf ield: C.
C. Thomas, 1968b, [Essentially the same as Gendlin 
and Beebe, 1968a).
Gendlin, E , , Beebe, J. , Cassens, J., Klein, M. and
Oberlander, M. Focusinq ability in psychotherapy,
per s o n a l i t y  and creativity. In J, Shlien [Ed.),
Research in p s y c h o t hera py, Vcl. 3. Washinqton, D.C.: 
Araer. Psychol. Assoc., 1968. [Oriqinally paper 
presented to 3rd A.P.A. Conference on research in 
psychotherapy, Chicaqo, 1966).
Gendlin, E. Focusinq. P s y chotherapy: T h e o r y . Res e a r ch and 
P r a c t i c e , 1969a, 6, 4-?5.
Gendlin, E. Experiential explication and truth. In F. 
Holina [Ed.), ^he s o u r c es of e x i s t e n t i alism as
philosophy. Enqlewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969b.
[See also Gendlin 1965a) .
Gendlin, E. A short summary and some lonq predictions. In 
J. Hart and T. Tomlinson (Eds.), New directions in 
c l i e n t - centered thera py. Boston: Houqhtcn Mifflin,
1970, pp. 544-562.
Gendlin, E. and Olsen, L. The use of imaqery in
experiential focusinq. P s ycho t herap y : ^Theory . Research 
Pract i ce, 197C, 7, 221-223.
Gendlin, E. and Rychlax, J. Psychotherapeutic processes. 
A n n u al Fe view of Psycholoqy. 1970, 2J, 15 5— ISC.
Klein, M., H a t h i e u - C c u q h l a n , P., Kiesler, D. ard Gendlin, 
E- The experiencing scale manual. Madison: Univ. of 
Wisconsin Press, 197C.
Gendlin, E. A theory of personality chanqe. In A. Mahrer 
and I. Pearscn [Eds.), Cr e a t i v e  d e v e lopments in 
psychotherapy. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve, 1971. 
[Also reprinted in Horchel and Eyrne, 1964, and Hart
Paqe 211
and Tomlinson, 1970; see Gendlin, 1964a).
Gendlin, E. T h e r apeutic p r o cedures with schizophrenic 
patients. In M. Hammer [Ed.), T h e theory and eractice 
of p s y c h othera py with specific disorders, Sprinqfield: 
C. C. Thomas, 1972.
Gendlin, E. and Hendricks, M . Pag m a n u a l. Unpubl. manual
by Ch a n g e s , Chicaqo, 1972.
Gendlin, E. Experiential p h e n o m e n o l o q y . In M . Natanson
[Ed,) , .Phenomenoloqv and the s o c ial sciences, 
Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1S73a.
Gendlin, E. A phencmenolcqy of emotions: Anqer. In D.
Carr and E. Casey [Eds.) , E x p l o i a t i o n s in 
p h e n o m e n c l o g y . The Haque: Niqhoff, 1 973b.
Gendlin, E. and Glaser, K. Main themes in C h a nges. A
therapeutic community. C o m m u n i t i e s , 1973, No. 2,
30-36. [Also reprinted in R o u g h Times, 1973, 3, 2-4).
Gendlin, E. The role of knowledqe in practice. In G.
Harwell, N. Gamsky, and P. Mathieu-Couqfclan [Eds.), 
Tb§ c.ounse lor 1 s h a n d b o o k . New York: Intext Educational 
Publications, 1974a, pp. 269-294.
Gendlin, E. Clie n t - c e n t e r e d  and e x p e r iential psychotherapy. 
In D. Nexler and L. Rice [Eds.), Innovations in 
c l ie n t - c entered therapy. New York: Uiley, 1974b, pp. 
211-246.
Gendlin, E. The newer therapies. In S. Arieti [Ed.),
American ha n d b o ok of psychiatry. Vol. 5. New York: 
Basic Eccks, 1975, pp. 269-239.
Gendin, E. Pbenomenc l c q i c a l  concept vs. phencmenoloqical 
method: A critique of Medard Boss on dreams.
Sou ndi nqs , 1977, 40, 285-3C0.
Gendlin, E. Focusinq teaching tapes. Lone Rock, Uis.: Lone
Rock Media, 1978 (tape).
Gendlin, E. Eefindlichkeit: Heideqqer and the philosophy of
psycholoqy. Re v iew of Existential P s y c h ology and 
Psychiatry, 1978-1979, 16, 43-77.
Gendlin, E. Fxperiential psychotherapy. In B. Corsini
[Ed.), Current p s y c h o t h e r a p i e s . Itasia, 111.: Peacock, 
1979 [2nd e d . ).
Gendlin, E. Hocusing. New York: Bantaam, 1981.
[Oriainally published by New York: Everest House,
1978).
Paqe 212
Gendlin, E. Iwo phencmeno l o q i s t s  do not disaqree. In P.. 
Bruzina and E. Wilshire (Eds,), Ph e n o m e n o l ogy: 
Diag l o gu e s and bridges, Albany: S.D.N.T. Press, 1982.
Gendlin, E. Ewellinq. Paper presented at 17th Eeideqqer 
Conference, Univ. of New Hampshire, May, 1983.
